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## P R O C E E D I N G S

[9:00 a.m.]

1  
2  
3 DR. GOLDBERG: Why don't you go ahead with  
4 the security policy recap, and I will follow with  
5 comments and the introduction of the briefings.

6 MS. KLOSS: As I said, Ms. Davis Harding was  
7 unable to participate this morning, but she did ask me  
8 to present her thoughts, her sentiments, and to give  
9 you an update on the status of security policy as it  
10 relates to declassification.

11 Now, Ms. Davis-Harding is going on to the  
12 Defense Investigative Service, but assures that she  
13 will monitor the progress of the HRDAP very closely and  
14 she encourages us all to keep in touch with her.

15 The policy overview from the DoD perspective,  
16 specifically from my office, is that declassification  
17 is the final step of a continuum of managing  
18 information. While the HDRAP focuses on  
19 declassification, it's important to recognize that many  
20 of our DoD assets, those individuals in the security  
21 field, are working on the 360 degree viewpoint of  
22 protection. And often, the needs of declassification  
23 have to be weighed with those of the originators of  
24 information, the origination of classification  
25 management.



1           Now, when the Executive Order was issued, the  
2   Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security  
3   Information, we had a series of implementation  
4   missions, and I'd like to update you on the status of  
5   those.

6           The first mission was to implement our  
7   existing guidance, which is found in the 5200-1-R. My  
8   office is currently finalizing comments submitted from  
9   different components on the draft, and we anticipate  
10   publication sometime this Summer. That document, the  
11   5200-1-R Information Security Program, serves as the  
12   guidelines for execution of the Executive Order.

13          We're also heavily involved with reeducating  
14   the consumers on classification management. We used  
15   the original classification guidelines, modified those  
16   slightly to include declassification as a key decision  
17   point for all original decisions. What that will  
18   inevitably do is assist in future declassification  
19   efforts if we charge an OCA, an original classification  
20   authority, with the responsibility to monitor  
21   information through declassification and ultimate  
22   release.

23          Now, in the rush of activity surrounding  
24   automatic declassification, those of us in the DoD have  
25   not forgotten that we have other declassification

1 issues that we must deal with and monitor, not the  
2 least of which is a systematic declassification.  
3 Here's a real pull. We have limited resources. Those  
4 resources are at this time oriented toward the most  
5 pressing need, and that is the automatic  
6 declassification program and review of all historical  
7 documents by the year 2000.

8           The Executive Order also established review  
9 forums that DoD participates in. Now, remember at the  
10 last HDRAP, Dr. Goldberg briefed you on two panels.  
11 The first was the ICAP, Interagency Appeals Panel, that  
12 is managed by the Information Security Oversight  
13 Office. In fact that panel will meet at the end of the  
14 month for the first time.

15           The second advisory council that Dr. Goldberg  
16 briefed you on last month is not formed at this time,  
17 so that's an update.

18           The final Executive Order implementation  
19 issue that the Security Programs Office is working on  
20 is assessing and managing costs applied towards  
21 security. I'll talk to that a little bit later in the  
22 briefing.

23           Now, with that as our implementation plan  
24 within DoD, where does the HRDAP fit in?

25           The HRDAP, when you were established, you

1 were charged with developing a recommended list of  
2 topical areas of interest. Now, that action is going  
3 to serve the DoD declassification community insofar as  
4 it will focus some of the priorities. There's no  
5 guarantees on the actions that will be taken with your  
6 recommendations. We say that very candidly up front.  
7 However, if we marry up your recommendations, what is  
8 of interest from the public's perspective and  
9 historians with the realities of the declassification  
10 initiatives briefed to you this morning, I think we'll  
11 have synergism in our declassification program.

12           One of our concerns and a point of confusion  
13 over the past couple of months has been the overzealous  
14 recommendations and expectations that will result in  
15 this panel's proceedings.

16           DoD considers the HRDAP a valuable member of  
17 the declassification management team; a member. Now,  
18 the value of the forum will be in the independent  
19 nature of your recommendations. In the past and at the  
20 last meeting, there was quite a bit of discussion on  
21 the aspects of declassification plans that were sent to  
22 the panel members for review. We would just like to,  
23 as a policy office, reemphasize that those  
24 declassification plans were provided to you to give you  
25 an outline, a feel for the type of management processes

1 that are in effect within the components of the DoD.

2 DoD reserves unto itself the validation of  
3 these plans and the oversight of the declassification  
4 plans. That's a negative viewpoint, and I just want to  
5 focus on what's gone right, because we think a lot has  
6 gone right in the DoD declassification business.

7 Now, it was 10 months ago to the day that Dr.  
8 Trachtenberg first approached DoD to establish this  
9 forum in conjunction with DoD assets, marry up the  
10 distinguished historians with the security  
11 practitioners and those other individuals involved with  
12 declassification plans. And since that time, we've had  
13 a lot of progress.

14 First off, all of the components have worked  
15 very hard on refining their declassification plans,  
16 their management plans. Those will be briefed to you  
17 in detail today and we urge you to listen to some of  
18 the challenges that they're facing in implementing and  
19 executing the plans.

20 The second action that has been completed  
21 since the last -- since you were formed 10 months ago,  
22 is the identification of file series of records. Now,  
23 this was just a monumental task and a lot of effort  
24 went into not only identifying all of the various files  
25 but categorizing the files into what would be likely

1 exemptible categories, versus those that are primed for  
2 declassification.

3           At your first meeting of the HRDAP, your  
4 report to the Secretary of Defense asked for briefings  
5 from the military departments and agencies. In  
6 discussing the schedule, we feel that we can give you  
7 the three briefings today in an level of detail that  
8 will be valuable for you, and we will schedule the  
9 remaining briefings that you requested later in the  
10 year at other forums.

11           In the HRDAP report, you also emphasized to  
12 the Secretary of Defense your very real concerns over  
13 DoD resources that are currently applied to  
14 declassification. We appreciate your strong support in  
15 emphasizing the needs for additional resources. That  
16 married up with the recommendations from our internal  
17 panel, the Department of Defense Management Panel, also  
18 coming up with the recommendation of reevaluating  
19 resources for declassification, I think will make for a  
20 very strong argument during this next budget cycle.

21           Our declassification concerns, I think we can  
22 narrow down in two specific areas. One is, of course,  
23 the resources applied for declassification and  
24 priority. The second is inadvertent disclosures that  
25 may occur.

1           Now, on the resource side, last year Ms.  
2 Davis-Harding took the lead to establish a funding law  
3 that would allow for a logical, progressive  
4 declassification program, eliminating redundancies by  
5 centralizing the process. We were not able to get that  
6 funding last year. And as most of you know, in the  
7 Department of Defense, whenever we go forward with  
8 large funding issues, we have to find offsets.  
9 Department of Defense has traditionally not factored  
10 security costs separately.

11           Security costs have been included in  
12 overhead, as part of program costs. We really have not  
13 had one separate funding line that we could tape into  
14 and divert for security. We will continue to work on  
15 that issue.

16           The INTEL community, if you have been  
17 monitoring their actions, is a little bit more  
18 fortunate insofar as the House Permanent Select  
19 Committee on Intelligence earmarked or found \$2.5  
20 million per agency to be applied for the automatic  
21 declassification program.

22           So if you are monitoring the declassification  
23 initiatives of the INTEL community, you may find that  
24 they are a little bit further along in automation and  
25 in some of the front-load analysis.

1           Manning considers a variety of factors within  
2 the components. Now, two of the components, as  
3 agencies, specifically WHS, representing Washington  
4 Headquarters Service and OSD staff and the United  
5 States Air Force already had existing workforces in  
6 place. The other components -- and those existing  
7 workforces could immediately start on the process of  
8 automatic declassification. The other components are  
9 looking at various combinations of manning to  
10 accomplish their declassification program. And I've  
11 asked them to brief you on that today.

12           The last issue that we are concerned with is  
13 inadvertent disclosures. When you're looking at a  
14 billion plus pages of information and a rather  
15 ambitious schedule of declassification within five  
16 years, we are concerned that our haste will lead to  
17 disclosures of information that we view still requires  
18 protection.

19           Now, in analyzing the various pockets of  
20 information, we categorized them in four general areas  
21 that warrant continued protection, the first of which  
22 is human sources; confidential human intelligence  
23 sources. If we lose those sources, if we prematurely  
24 disclose information on those sources, we will  
25 jeopardize our ability in the future to recruit sources

1 and that is unacceptable to the DoD.

2           The second category of information that we're  
3 concerned with are releases of information on  
4 technology that contributes to the development of  
5 weapons of mass destruction or the application of  
6 state-of-the-art technologies to our future weapons  
7 systems.

8           Premature disclosure of those pieces of  
9 information will lead to the development of similar  
10 weapons, countermeasures to our fielded weapons or the  
11 proliferations of weapons in areas that we in the U.S.  
12 deem as unstable regions.

13           Third area of concern are documents and  
14 holdings that deal with international and diplomatic  
15 activities and agreements. The disclosure of this  
16 information will seriously damage our existing  
17 relationships and agreements and may undermine our  
18 ability to negotiate future agreements.

19           And the last category of information that we  
20 are concerned with has to do with U.S. military war and  
21 contingency plans, many of which are currently in  
22 effect. Even if they are old, there are aspects that  
23 are still germane, are still valid. And the release of  
24 that information would allow hostile nations to counter  
25 or neutralize any of our future U.S. operations.



1           So, in closing, the DoD will continue to  
2 stand ready to implement all aspects of the Executive  
3 Order, declassification being just one. We'll succeed  
4 if our resources eventually marry up with the initial  
5 requirements that have been identified to this panel  
6 and will be identified today.

7           Ms. Davis-Harding wants to extend to you her  
8 personal appreciation for all of our involvement and  
9 your work on the panel. She encourages you to stay in  
10 touch with her and she stands by ready to assist you in  
11 any future endeavors in her capacity at DIS.

12           Thank you.

13           DR. GOLDBERG: Thank you.

14           Are there any questions you would like to put  
15 to Ms. Kloss?

16           (No response.)

17           MS. KLOSS: We're going to have some easy  
18 briefings, folks.

19           DR. GOLDBERG: It was a resounding success.

20           MS. KLOSS: I need just one minute. We're  
21 going to set up the viewgraphs. I'm sorry for the  
22 distraction.

23           DR. GOLDBERG: All right.

24           MR. TRACHTENBERG: At some point we're going  
25 to have to discuss the issues that are raised in the

1 exchange of correspondence between Ms. Davis-Harding  
2 and Bob Wampler. I don't know when we will schedule  
3 that.

4 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes. We will get to that.

5 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Okay.

6 DR. GOLDBERG: There will be opportunity  
7 during the discussion period. I'm going to mention  
8 that in just a few minutes, as a matter of fact. But I  
9 think we'll hold the discussion until after the  
10 briefing.

11 I do want to report on what happened to the  
12 report that we submitted on our first meeting. You may  
13 remember, I did submit a report to the Secretary of  
14 Defense. As it happened, it passed through the  
15 Assistance Secretary of Defense, C-III and went to the  
16 Deputy Secretary of Defense, who presumably read it.  
17 At least he initialed it, indicating that he had seen  
18 it.

19 Assistant Secretary Page, in his comments on  
20 the report, expressed agreement with our first  
21 recommendation to take a different approach from a  
22 purely topical one. That is, to attempt to review and  
23 declassify the materials of most interest to historians  
24 and the public. That is, top level policy materials at  
25 the upper levels of the hierarchy, Secretary of

1 Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Secretaries of  
2 the services, et cetera.

3           There was agreement on that by Secretary Page  
4 and it was also agreed to informally by the Director of  
5 Administration and Management for the Department. So I  
6 don't think from that level we will face any problems  
7 in recommending our approach, rather than the topical  
8 one.

9           This means, of course, that to some extent we  
10 will be revising our approach to the Executive Order,  
11 but that's nothing new. It's often happened before  
12 with Executive Orders and all kinds of other orders and  
13 regulations. Practice often requires some kind of  
14 change in the prescribed programs and in theory.

15           There has been mention already of the Defense  
16 Declassification Management Panel, which held a meeting  
17 on April 16th, which heard the briefings that you're  
18 going to hear this morning and plus, additional ones.  
19 I attended and found it very useful, very helpful. It  
20 certainly broadened and deepened my knowledge and  
21 understanding of the declassification process and of  
22 the many problems involved in facilitating that process  
23 and you will be hearing some of the fruits of those  
24 earlier briefings here this morning.

25           You've already had mentioned, the -- you have

1 I think in your folders, notice of the meeting of the  
2 CIA Energy Declassification Management Conference on  
3 the 21st to the 23rd. And also, I might mention that  
4 the Moynihan Commission, that is, the commission on  
5 protecting and reducing government secrecy, will hold a  
6 roundtable discussion in this building on May 16th.  
7 That may be of interest to some of you, also.

8           We have received over the past several months  
9 correspondence and suggestions for approaches to this  
10 problem. We've had detailed listings of documents and  
11 files for declassification submitted by James David of  
12 the Air Museum -- Air and Space Museum, and from Bob  
13 Wampler, a member of this panel. We will discuss these  
14 I think in some detail perhaps later on, because I'm  
15 sure these do go in good measure to the heart of the  
16 problem of our approach and what it is that we might be  
17 able to accomplish.

18           We also have received some time ago a letter  
19 from Gerhard Weinberg concerning NSA and its  
20 declassification program and its lagging in  
21 declassifying World War II records.

22           I think some progress may have been made  
23 since you wrote your letter. You're aware of it. I've  
24 seen several notices of it.

25           And finally, indirectly, I have a letter from

1 a German scholar who is interested in German-American  
2 relations, particularly security arrangements between  
3 the United States and Germany since World War II and  
4 the role of American forces in Germany since then. And  
5 he asked that we give consideration to giving priority  
6 to declassification of documents pertaining to that  
7 subject.

8 I suspect we'll be receiving more such  
9 letters. Many of them, I think, will be asking for a  
10 topical approach rather than the broader approach I  
11 think that we have under consideration.

12 There are a number of suggestions that have  
13 been made, a number of ideas that have been brought  
14 forward about declassification, and I'd like to mention  
15 some because I think that these do go to the heart of  
16 the problem. There's things that we will have to think  
17 about in concocting recommendations to make, specific  
18 recommendations. And I'd like to mention some of them  
19 before we go on to the briefings.

20 First of all, we've had raised the question  
21 of the status of inventories. Do the services and the  
22 other entities know what they actually have? Do they  
23 have listings of these things that could be made  
24 available? And if they don't -- I'm sure that they  
25 don't have complete ones -- what is involved in doing

1 this? Is this something that should be done first?  
2 How much time and effort will it take? How will it  
3 perhaps slow down the actual declassification of  
4 records?

5 Second is the creation of finding aids and  
6 indexes, which are also desirable and perhaps even  
7 necessary in order to do an effective job of  
8 recommending declassification and making it something  
9 useful and effective.

10 Third is the transfer of records to the  
11 National Archives, which has been recommended. We do  
12 know that the services still hold the greater part of  
13 their records for the last 30 or 40 years not in the  
14 Pentagon, not in their facilities. Most of it at the  
15 records centers around the country. And for  
16 Washington, particularly, here at Suitland in the  
17 Federal Records Center.

18 The question is can they be turned over  
19 expeditiously to the Archives. And the basic question  
20 there is can the Archives receive them and handle them.  
21 And you must keep this in mind. The Archives is also  
22 having its problems of all kinds; space, money, staff  
23 and all the rest of it. And the fact that they are  
24 well behind in accessioning records from government  
25 agencies, that fact has been well known for many years

1 and its gotten worse over the years because they just  
2 don't have the staff to accession readily and we can't  
3 expect them to take in at one fell swoop an enormous  
4 body of records.

5           Then there is the automatic declassification  
6 of confidential information 25 years and also, which  
7 has also been recommended. That raises problems and  
8 questions of the integrity of the folders and the case  
9 files. Much of that material is in files with  
10 materials of higher classification. How do we manage  
11 that problem? How big a problem is it, really? And I  
12 think probably it may be much larger than is realized.

13           Most of these things are going to take a lot  
14 of time and a lot of effort because they're not simple.  
15 There are no simple solutions to that sort of problem.

16           Then there's a matter of review schedules,  
17 which has been recommended; annual or quarterly review  
18 schedules. At this point it's questionable whether any  
19 of these agencies are in a position to provide some  
20 scheduling. Perhaps one of the reasons is they may not  
21 have the inventories which would make it possible for  
22 them to do that. At best, they could probably provide  
23 partial schedules, I would think.

24           Then there's the problem of equities and what  
25 constitutes an equity. That is, there are documents

1 which are obviously made up of materials from a number  
2 of different sources, from different agencies,  
3 different service. How do you decide what really  
4 constitutes an equity? What will entitled these  
5 offices and agencies to review of the document when  
6 they may not -- actually, there may not be very much  
7 that they've provided for it. So it's a matter of  
8 determining there where do we draw the line.

9           And it would be desirable to draw a line, of  
10 course, which would eliminate as much of this as  
11 possible. This is a very time-consuming process and it  
12 may also be an argument for some kind of centralization  
13 for review and declassification of documents that are  
14 related to several agencies, not just one.

15           And this is another major problem and can  
16 also be a very time-consuming matter. Giving equities  
17 an opportunity to review is going to take -- has taken  
18 time and is going to continue to take time.

19           Finally, a subject that I think we ought to  
20 discuss -- will discuss here before we're through, is  
21 approaching this perhaps by -- approaching what we  
22 would like to see done; namely, review of the high  
23 level documents, by establishing pilot projects in the  
24 services and the agencies, eventually. Limited  
25 projects at the top most levels, at the Secretary of



1 Defense level, the Chairman of the Joint Chief's level,  
2 the Secretaries of the services, et cetera, to review a  
3 limited number of records to see just how that works  
4 out.

5           The goals of such a project, obviously, would  
6 be to determine the nature of the contents of these  
7 files. What are you going to find in the files of the  
8 Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Air Force?  
9 What mix of classification exists there and how is that  
10 going to affect the process? How much is really high  
11 policy?

12           You'll find a lot of things in these files.  
13 In some of the Secretaries' files, I've found personal  
14 correspondence dealing with a bank checking account,  
15 that sort of thing. All the creeps in. Can creep in.  
16 How much is there from other stakeholders? That is, how  
17 many equities are there? And you must expect that  
18 files at that level will include documents from a lot  
19 of different organizations. And if it's a whole  
20 document, presumably it would have to be reviewed by  
21 the originating agency.

22           And then how much time will be spent in  
23 actually carrying out the review? Supposed you say,  
24 okay, do five or 10 feet of these records and give us  
25 an idea of what's there and how long it took to review

1 it, et cetera. Is it possible to project from that  
2 what a larger project would take with trying to do a  
3 much larger job? How long would that take and how much  
4 of the records could we hope to cover with that  
5 approach?

6           So these are all questions I think that have  
7 to be considered and that have to be recognized and  
8 that I trust that we will discuss later on. I  
9 personally feel that the pilot project approach is a  
10 feasible one and a desirable one and that we can learn  
11 a great deal from it. It will give us a better notion  
12 of what we face in making recommendations for  
13 declassification of high level policy records.

14           Now, I'd like to turn to the briefings that  
15 we have scheduled. We will have only four instead of  
16 five. One of them had to be canceled. Colonel Bailey,  
17 who headed up the DoD part of the human radiation  
18 experimentation declassification project has a family  
19 emergency, had to leave town yesterday and cannot be  
20 here, which is too bad because it's one of the most  
21 interesting projects of its kind, declassification  
22 projects, that have been carried out in government in  
23 recent years.

24           It did cut across the whole government. It  
25 was not simply DoD, although DoD played a very large

1 part. It was an enormous undertaking on the part of  
2 DoD and, I must say, a very expensive one. But he has  
3 all the figures and I hope that he will be here next  
4 time and be able to give you a full briefing on that.

5 We have briefings scheduled this morning by  
6 the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and a special  
7 project, the Gulf War.

8 We will start in the order of precedence of  
9 the services; namely, with the Army, and Helen Bragg  
10 will give us this briefing.

11 MS. BRAGG: Thank you, Dr. Goldberg.

12 I apologize to the people that I'll have to  
13 turn my back to, the nature of how we've got things set  
14 up here.

15 And Dr. Goldberg did ask me to mention that  
16 because we are pretty tight for time, we have a lot of  
17 things to cover, if we could save our questions until  
18 the end of all the presentations. I think we could get  
19 through this a little bit more efficiently.

20 I'm here to tell you about the Army  
21 declassification program. I just want to give you our  
22 understanding of what's required, just so you'll know  
23 where we're coming from. It's a new and automatic  
24 program. We've never had this before. It covers all  
25 information that will be 25 years old by 17 April in

1 the year 2000 that is of permanent historical value.

2 It covers all Army information unless the  
3 information falls into one or more of nine categories  
4 of exemptions. And our goal is that between now and  
5 April of 2000, we will by declassifying 15 percent per  
6 year. After 2000, the program continues on, so that in  
7 the year 2001 we would look at the information that  
8 would hit the 25th year, which would be the 1976  
9 records.

10 And the key here that I cannot overemphasize  
11 is that this is an automatic declassification program.  
12 The information will be declassified whether or not it  
13 has been reviewed. Even if it falls into one of the  
14 nine exemption categories, if we have not reviewed the  
15 material to determine that it is legally exempt and  
16 marked it as such, it will be automatically  
17 declassified.

18 And that, of course, is the point that  
19 concerns us the most because we feel that we do have a  
20 lot of information that would be at risk to our forces  
21 that are deployed. We have information in our files of  
22 the capabilities and limitations of our weapons  
23 systems.

24 Now, people say to me -- well, this is  
25 information 25 years old. What kind of systems do you

1 have?

2           If you look at the acquisition process that  
3 we have in the Department of Defense, especially with  
4 our high technology systems, it sometimes can take 10,  
5 15, even 20 years to field a weapons system. Once we  
6 have it in our inventory, we like to keep it in the  
7 inventory for decades, and especially now because the  
8 DoD budget is too tight, we want to try to keep these  
9 systems as long as we can.

10           Furthermore, you have a rather -- what's the  
11 word I want to say? You have a very mature foreign  
12 military sales system where some of our systems are  
13 sold to our allies. Our allies might be a little bit  
14 concerned if you declassified the system that they have  
15 bought. So that's one of our concerns.

16           Also, as we saw in Desert Shield and Desert  
17 Storm, the technological advantage that we have with  
18 these high systems is certainly an advantage to our  
19 forces and we must maintain our technological edge if  
20 we wish to retain our position in world leadership.

21           There are some very sensitive foreign  
22 relations information in our files. We're not the  
23 State Department. We're not trying to take over their  
24 role. But when you create war plans that involve our  
25 allies, of course, their commitment of forces is a very

1 close hold, as well, and it's very sensitive to their  
2 governments, the relationships between the two military  
3 departments.

4           We have some confidential and new  
5 intelligence sources of information. Now, this  
6 directly involves the lives of these people. They have  
7 provided information to the United States Army under  
8 the condition that it would be held in confidence.  
9 Their very lives would be in jeopardy, or the lives of  
10 their family, if that information became known.

11           We have in our files, as I think Dr. Goldberg  
12 mentioned, the question of equities. Army files do not  
13 contain solely Army information. They contain  
14 information that other agencies of the U.S. government  
15 have provided us, as well as other foreign government.

16           We have information in our files that if it  
17 was prematurely declassified, it would violate other  
18 statutes and agreements. For instance, the Atomic  
19 Energy Act, the Privacy Act, the Trade Secrets Act, our  
20 international agreements, our agreements with the  
21 treaties of NATO.

22           And, of course, the bottom line here that  
23 we're concerned about, what does that raise? We do not  
24 want to jeopardize American lives. We do not want to  
25 jeopardize the lives of our soldiers or the American

1 people that they have pledged to defend.

2           The factors that we have to look at here is  
3 the scope of the efforts. It's all Army information.  
4 All Army information except for that which is what we  
5 call RD and FRD, restricted data and formerly  
6 restricted data, that which involves nuclear weapons.

7           The problem though, although that's exempted  
8 from the terms of the Executive Order because it's  
9 covered under the Atomic Energy Act, the problem is  
10 that that information is not segregated in separate  
11 files. It is mixed in with our regular files. So that  
12 information could be in jeopardy even though it's not  
13 covered by the Executive Order.

14           The best estimation that we can come up  
15 with -- and this figure go up, but it is at least 270  
16 million pages of affected files. That's over 20 miles  
17 worth of files that we need to go through.

18           The location of the files -- and this was  
19 kind of surprising to me. The location of the files is  
20 mostly right here in the Washington, D. C. area. When  
21 you add in the Archives and the Washington Federal  
22 Records Center, that's the bulk of our information.

23           The condition of the files. You were talking  
24 about finding aids and the index of the information  
25 that we file. That does not lend itself to

1 identification in terms of these categories of  
2 exemptions, and that has been one of our big problems  
3 is that we've been trying to find an easy way. Isn't  
4 there some way that we could look at an identification  
5 of files and figure out is it or is it not exempt under  
6 the terms of automatic declassification.

7           We have looked at this from every angle. And  
8 as much as we would like to find an easy way out, we  
9 have not found one. There is no current program in  
10 existence. That's certainly a situation to keep in  
11 mind.

12           The factors that we have here is we do have a  
13 relationship between risk versus cost. The risk here  
14 is failure to comply with the terms of the Executive  
15 Order and to exercise our commitments to the American  
16 public to defend this country, the inadvertent  
17 declassification of critical information, the violation  
18 of other statutes and agreements that we're bound by.

19           But we have to balance that against the cost.  
20 And to get the cost down to the lowest possible level  
21 and not review the material as carefully as we  
22 ordinarily would have reviewed it under other programs.  
23 The lowest cost we came up with is \$250 million. And  
24 that's less than \$1 a page and that's the best we can  
25 do.



1           The key question we have here is how much  
2 risk is acceptable to the cost, especially in this era  
3 of very tight budgets.

4           We have a strategic plan that was signed by  
5 the Secretary of the Army in October of '95. The Army  
6 is committed to comply with the Executive Order. We  
7 stated that we 270 million pages and that our goal is  
8 to declassify 15 percent per year.

9           The approach that we're using is to review  
10 for declassification or the continued classification of  
11 the information. Because we have so much material here  
12 in the Washington, D. C. area, we are advocating a  
13 centralized approach to this.

14           Now, you may hear from other agencies that  
15 their material is out in the field. For them it might  
16 be more efficient to have a decentralized program. But  
17 just by the nature of where the Army files are, we feel  
18 it makes more sense to have a more centralized effort.

19           There's approximately 10 percent of the files  
20 that are located throughout the Army. And for that,  
21 they will be done in a decentralized manner. The  
22 people who hold those files will review them.

23           That was our strategic plan. That was a good  
24 plan, but we really need to have an implementation plan  
25 of how we get to that particular point that we've

1 actually reviewed these files.

2 In the implementation plan, we have to  
3 designate what we're calling a special program manager  
4 to actually run this program. We have a range of  
5 operations that we're looking at as to how we would  
6 approach it. We're recommending a particular option.

7 Now, all that is under view right now by the  
8 Army leadership because it is such a big pot of money  
9 that we're asking for. There is a lot of review going  
10 on and we have not come to a final decision on that.

11 The progress so far. As you see, we have a  
12 big elephant on our plate here and no money really to  
13 put against it. So the 15 percent goal for 1996 may  
14 very well not be reached but we intend to make that up  
15 in the out years.

16 The program is unfunded. It is totally  
17 unfunded. Our intention is to address all files, but  
18 the resources remain a concern.

19 Our areas of concerns is launching the  
20 program, getting something started here so that we can  
21 make some progress. Jeopardizing critical information.  
22 And I can't emphasize that enough. I know a lot of  
23 people think that -- well, it's over 25 years old. How  
24 critical can this be? A lot of it is not. A lot of it  
25 certainly could be declassified but it is a question of

1 finding the needles in a haystack because those needles  
2 do have to be protected.

3 The resources. You know, they say in real  
4 estate what's the three most important thing:  
5 location, location, location. Well, what's the three  
6 most important things on the success of our program:  
7 resources, resources, resources.

8 Topical reviews. It's going to be a problem  
9 for us because as you see, we have a tremendous program  
10 ahead of us with little or not funding for it to date.  
11 If we had a small amount of material and the adequate  
12 resources, we could probably approach this system under  
13 a topical review. But I think as was discussed at the  
14 first meeting of the HRDAP, that's really not feasible  
15 for a large organization with a lot of files. It would  
16 bog us down tremendously.

17 We have a concern of any real push towards an  
18 aggressive systematic declassification program at the  
19 same time that we're trying to address this automatic  
20 declassification program. We can only spread ourselves  
21 so thin, so we've got to address what's the most  
22 important first.

23 Any additional requirements that are levied  
24 on us beyond what is required in the Executive Order is  
25 a concern to us because we're really struggling with

1 meeting the terms of the order.

2           What's next? We need to get an  
3 implementation decision from the Army leadership on how  
4 we're going to go with the appointment of a special  
5 program manager. The resources, of course, is critical  
6 to the success of this program. And then we'll be  
7 hiring people, contracting certain aspects of it,  
8 entering in a lease agreement or whatever to locate a  
9 facility, buying equipment that's needed, deciding upon  
10 the methodology that would be best to handle the  
11 information based on the resources that we are given,  
12 and we'll be publishing the policy.

13           As Ms. Kloss said, there's a DoD directive on  
14 all this. And of course, there'll be an Army  
15 directive, as well.

16           Training the people. This is not easy for an  
17 individual to go in cold and look at these files  
18 without adequate training on what it is you need to  
19 look for. And when you're talking about the United  
20 States Army, it's soup to nuts. We just are involved  
21 in an awful lot of critical, very sensitive programs  
22 that they would have to know about in order to make the  
23 appropriate decision on whether or not it is  
24 appropriately exempt.

25           And then, of course, the execution is to get

1 out there and tackle these files.

2 That concludes my briefing.

3 DR. GOLDBERG: Don't sit down, please.

4 I'd like to invite any questions or comments  
5 that you have at this point. I think we'll do it  
6 individually for each one of these presentations while  
7 your minds are still fresh on the subject.

8 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Just a quick one. On  
9 that \$250 million, over what period of time would that  
10 be needed?

11 MS. BRAGG: Oh, that would just be for the  
12 initial effort to take care of the backlog. That would  
13 just be money that would be needed to address the 270  
14 million pages.

15 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: And spread over what  
16 period of time?

17 MS. BRAGG: Between now and April 2000.

18 GEN. ARMSTRONG: How close are you to getting  
19 an implementation decision, a special program manager  
20 and money?

21 MS. BRAGG: It's a long haul. The  
22 implementation decision, I think we're closer on. The  
23 money I really can't address because the implementation  
24 plan as to who will be the special program manager,  
25 that is making its way through the Pentagon halls as we

1 speak.

2 So, I would say that would be fairly soon. I  
3 really can't say if it's a question of weeks, but  
4 certainly it is a question of months. I would  
5 definitely say within that period of time.

6 The question of resources is harder because I  
7 don't know if you're familiar with how we have to  
8 budget out, but the money for this year has got to be  
9 programmed several years back.

10 GEN. ARMSTRONG: So you've got to reprogram  
11 money?

12 MS. BRAGG: You have to reprogram money. And  
13 unfortunately, because of the constraints of the DoD  
14 and thus the Army budget, all of our programs are  
15 really being looked at with a lot of scrutiny because  
16 there's a lot of what we euphemistically call  
17 downsizing where we're trying to save money. We're  
18 trying to reduce the number of personnel that we have.

19 For instance, just to give you an idea, the  
20 job that I do now a short time ago was done by three  
21 people. And that was before this Executive Order was  
22 signed and the additional burden of this automatic  
23 declassification program and trying to work on that.

24 So when you're looking at an organization  
25 like the Army where they're really crunching down,

1 where we had three people and now it's down to one,  
2 it's tough.

3 GEN. ARMSTRONG: So it's fair to say your  
4 program at this point in time has not started and it's  
5 start is dependent on a reprogramming action to get the  
6 money to make it go?

7 MS. BRAGG: It's fair to say that the  
8 implementation part of it, which I'm sure that's the  
9 part that you're talking about, has not started. There  
10 has been a lot of effort done on the planning and the  
11 gathering of data so that we know what we have to  
12 address.

13 MR. LEFFLER: Your priorities in terms of  
14 what you think should be declassified or at least  
15 evaluated first, where do you stand on that?

16 MS. BRAGG: That is totally dependent on the  
17 resources that will be provided. For instance, if --  
18 let's just say -- and this is just a scenario -- that  
19 we had quite a bit less than the \$240 million provided  
20 to us. Then we would have to take a very hard look and  
21 say, okay, what is the stuff that we really need to get  
22 at first so at least we protect that critical data, and  
23 then the rest goes.

24 Without any valuation of other factors, that  
25 would probably be the more recent material. We'd start

1 with '75 and work our way back.

2 If we have more adequate funding, then we  
3 might take a different approach. So it will be quite  
4 resource dependent.

5 MR. LEFFLER: Ah, -- go ahead. You started  
6 to say something else.

7 MS. BRAGG: Well, I was going to say -- I  
8 mean, you know, and maybe that's a scenario that the  
9 HRDAP could consider. If there is limited resources,  
10 what would you advise us as to what files we should  
11 look at first.

12 The problem is that -- and this is not a  
13 criticism of the Army filing system. The Army filing  
14 system was never set up to envision that there would be  
15 an Executive Order that would provide for automatic  
16 declassification unless it fell into these high  
17 exemption categories. So the people in the past that  
18 created this system, they can't really be criticized  
19 because they filed their material in such a way that  
20 doesn't lend itself to the ready execution of this  
21 program.

22 MR. LEFFLER: Did I hear you say that you  
23 would start with the 1975 materials and work backwards?

24 MS. BRAGG: All other things being equal. If  
25 we could identify more critical areas, --



1           MR. LEFFLER: Why would you do that if your  
2 major concern is about risk? Why would you start with  
3 the most recent stuff? It would seem to me that much  
4 less risk would adhere if you went back further. And  
5 since the Army has virtually declassified nothing since  
6 1945, I mean, you sort of tell us that, you know,  
7 you've worried about for the last 25 years. But the  
8 truth is, going back to 1945, researchers can get  
9 virtually nothing from the Chief of Staff, from the  
10 plans of operations, et cetera, et cetera.

11           And it would seem to me that there would be  
12 much less risk involved if you started further back and  
13 then moved forward. That you could open up lots of  
14 things without worrying that much about releasing  
15 information about critical weapons systems and things  
16 of that sort.

17           MS. BRAGG: Okay. Well, I think it's good  
18 we're having this dialogue because you have a different  
19 impression of the terms of the Executive Order I think  
20 than I do. The Executive Order, as the Army  
21 understands it, is that if we do nothing, if we just  
22 sit here and do absolutely nothing, on the 17th of  
23 April, the year 2000, all of the information will be  
24 declassified automatically by fiat. I mean, whether  
25 it's looked at or not.

1           So therefore, what is more important to the  
2 Army to try to -- I mean, let's say we had a limited  
3 amount of money. Would it be better to look at the  
4 files that were created in 1955 and see if there's any  
5 critical information that could legally be exempted, or  
6 would it be better to look at the files created in  
7 1975?

8           Well, there's probably some information in  
9 the 1955 files that we're concerned about but we're  
10 making the assumption there would be more information  
11 in the 1975 files that we would be concerned about.

12           Unless this group comes up with -- and maybe  
13 based on an historical perspective, maybe you can  
14 identify for us certain times in history where we might  
15 have files that would deal with more critical issues,  
16 just not factoring in anything else other than time  
17 sensitive.

18           MR. LEFFLER: Let me just -- one last follow-  
19 up. That was quite informative for me, what you just  
20 said. So is it's everyone's understanding that even  
21 within the exempted categories, once you identify  
22 exempted categories, that unless you go through it page  
23 by page and select out that which should not be opened,  
24 that even within those exempted categories, everything  
25 will be opened in the year 2000?

1           MS. BRAGG: No, no. In the year 2000, if do  
2 nothing, the material is declassified. But if we go in  
3 and we exempt something -- for instance one of the  
4 exemption categories deals with weapons of mass  
5 destruction, let's say. I don't think anyone would  
6 argue that that's probably a good idea to exempt that.  
7 So we go in and we look in the file and we say, okay,  
8 this would provide critical information on the  
9 development of weapons of mass destruction. Then we  
10 identify that file. We say this is exempt. So that  
11 file will not be automatically declassified in the year  
12 2000.

13           DR. WAMPLER: But is this an ongoing process  
14 then? I mean, we had the sense that as of about a  
15 month ago all the agencies and components had to file  
16 their file exemption requests for everything.

17           MS. BRAGG: Okay. That's different, but it's  
18 sort of the same. What happened that I think you're  
19 talking about is something called the exempt file  
20 series. There is a provision in the Executive Order  
21 that says that we really should have done it by  
22 October 14th. I believe it was six months after the  
23 date of the order but within DoD, we asked for a six  
24 month extension. So for us, it was like the middle of  
25 April.

1           Okay. That we could have a one-time, and one  
2 time only designation of certain file series that would  
3 be so replete with this exemptible material that to  
4 look at those file series really wouldn't make much  
5 sense because just about everything in them would be  
6 exemptible anyway.

7           So we could go in, and we gave our  
8 justification of why that particular series should be  
9 exempted from this whole process. And if the President  
10 approves that series, then we would not have to  
11 individually look at all the material in that file  
12 series.

13           MR. LEFFLER: It just stays exempt and you  
14 don't follow it?

15           MS. BRAGG: No. It does not just stay  
16 exempt. Part of the justification, we had to pick a  
17 date or event for future declassification. So although  
18 it would not be declassified automatically in 2000, you  
19 had to say when in future it would be declassified.  
20 Okay?

21           That's an example of that. Maybe let's say  
22 that it had technology that's in a current weapons  
23 system? Well, once that technology is now no longer  
24 state-of-the-art and it's not in systems that we use  
25 and that we've sold to our allies, that's an event that

1 it could be declassified.

2 DR. CLARKE: Did the Army identify any such  
3 series?

4 MS. BRAGG: Yes, we did. And we've proposed  
5 this. It has gone to Ms. Kloss' office. She has told  
6 me that it has not been approved by the Secretary of  
7 Defense yet or been approved by the President yet, but  
8 we have proposed that.

9 But that's going to represent a small amount  
10 of material. The rest of it -- and even that -- let's  
11 say that the list gets approved. We still have to go  
12 in, open those boxes, find those file series, identify  
13 them and then look at all the other material in that  
14 box that's not in that file series.

15 I know it's kind of a confusing process. I  
16 mean, you'd think -- well, how many file series could  
17 the Army possibly have? What would be your guess?

18 MR. LEFFLER: Oh, thousands. Tens of  
19 thousands.

20 MS. BRAGG: Well, we actually have a little  
21 less than 6,000.

22 MR. LEFFLER: Okay.

23 MS. BRAGG: when you say a file series, you  
24 have sort of an enumerated list of file series that you  
25 wish to be exempt. Is that correct?

1 MS. BRAGG: That's correct.

2 MR. LEFFLER: You've made up this list.  
3 You've submitted it.

4 MS. BRAGG: Yes.

5 MR. LEFFLER: Okay. Can we be informed about  
6 that list?

7 MS. BRAGG: No. At least from the Army's  
8 perspective. Now, maybe other agencies feel  
9 differently. Our list contains very detailed  
10 information of why we feel that that information -- we  
11 identify our critical file series and why they're  
12 critical; what types of information they contain and  
13 why. We feel that that is not information that we  
14 would want to have released for review by any potential  
15 adversaries.

16 If we release it to the public, that's  
17 tantamount to release to foreign governments. That's  
18 number one.

19 Number two is we wanted the HRDAP to -- I  
20 mean, the whole value of the HRDAP is to provide an  
21 outside look. You have no particular -- well, I'm  
22 assuming you have no particular axe to grind here. You  
23 want to provide an independent look at what would be  
24 the best way to approach this. What would be the files  
25 or the subject or whatever that your group, whatever it

1 is, that should be tackled first, second, third,  
2 whatever.

3 And that if you had this list, we might  
4 lose -- our feeling is you could lose the objectivity  
5 that is the value of the group to begin with.

6 MR. WEINBERG: Well, let me just pick up on  
7 that because I don't think you quite caught the thrust  
8 of what Professor Leffler was saying and with which I  
9 completely agree for several reasons. And that is, that  
10 if you start with the earlier period rather than the  
11 later period, you get the benefit of something that  
12 neither Ms. Kloss nor you have touched on on the issue  
13 of risk.

14 The best place to hide a tree is in a forest.  
15 I was involved in a huge program of microfilming. And  
16 when the question was raised -- well, aren't there  
17 maybe going to be privacy violations and security  
18 violations, my answer was we'll do our best but after  
19 the first 10 million frames are made available, the  
20 likelihood that somebody will find the six that  
21 shouldn't been in there in the next 20 years is very  
22 slight.

23 And the fact of the matter is that in the 40  
24 years since we started depositing that stuff in the  
25 National Archives -- now they're in College Park -- no

1 one, no one in 40 years has found one of the things we  
2 slipped up on. The way to make sure that things which  
3 are incidentally overlooked in a relatively rapid  
4 review is to make certain that they are among millions  
5 of documents which no one in the period of time that  
6 they are still sensitive is likely to find.

7           Therefore, if one starts in the '45 to '60  
8 period, the amount, even at the higher levels that can  
9 be opened up is going to be at a relatively low cost  
10 bracket basis; very, very low. And if as a result of a  
11 rather hurried process there is a page here and a part  
12 of a file there that may be, if it had been looked at  
13 more carefully, shouldn't have.

14           The likelihood anybody's going to find these  
15 in the six -- six, eight, 10, 20 years, if very slight.  
16 And by the time somebody in 25 years does locate them,  
17 the sensitivity is likely to have disappeared. And I  
18 think one has to see this in the sense that I think  
19 Professor Leffler was driving at. That if you move  
20 forward rather than backwards chronologically, you  
21 automatically, by the very possibility of both in the  
22 early part -- do you see what I'm driving at -- reduce  
23 the risk that Kloss was referring to earlier and that  
24 you have touched on.

25           The other thing that it seems to me is



1 essential in that process is that where in your  
2 viewgraph and your material where you talk about the  
3 review for declassification or continued  
4 classification, you've got to -- I assume you were  
5 hinting in that direction just now -- put time on it so  
6 that those which are continued classified have a time  
7 when they become unclassified, which means that you'll  
8 have to look at them again only if you want to open  
9 them earlier or you decide that they need to be kept  
10 longer.

11 MR. LEFFLER: May I comment?

12 MR. WEINBERG: Just one second.

13 The issue of bulk is a two-edged sword. It  
14 involves on the one hand the fact that you've got these  
15 endless quantities, not only in the Army but in all the  
16 others. And you've got the pressure to start, if you  
17 will, at the top, at the Secretary, Chiefs, et cetera,  
18 et cetera, et cetera. The earlier you start  
19 chronologically with the stuff, the easier it will be  
20 to do substantial bulk.

21 If you find in the process that in certain  
22 areas the bulk is not forthcoming, you've got enough  
23 shall we say inventiveness that one can find -- I'm  
24 being serious. Please, don't misunderstand me. I'm not  
25 trying to make fun of this.

1           You've got enough inventiveness and enough  
2 flexibility in the front of these 250 million pages  
3 that you can in fact identify segments elsewhere in  
4 which in a relatively rapid period you can produce both  
5 deliberately. So that the total, number one, meets  
6 your targets that you're setting for yourself; and  
7 number two, adds the safety factor that I just talked  
8 about. That is to say that when you declassify the  
9 first 20 million of the 250 million, that the tiny  
10 number of secrets scattered in through there won't be  
11 found until, it's safe to say, they no longer need to  
12 be secret.

13           Do you understand where I'm going there?

14           MS. BRAGG: I understand exactly what you're  
15 saying.

16           MR. WEINBERG: I think one has to see this  
17 issue of bulk in other words from both sides. And if  
18 you run into the kind of mixed files that you were  
19 alluding to, then you can introduce into your program a  
20 different form of mixture. The top ones to work on  
21 which will not produce vast quantities, and some other  
22 runs of files where you have good reason to believe  
23 that you will produce great quantities. That's the  
24 other mixture.

25           MS. BRAGG: Yes.

1 MS. BRAGG: And it seems to me that that  
2 would accomplish the purpose.

3 MS. BRAGG: Can I just make a comment on that  
4 and then I think we'll open it up to the audience. But  
5 while I think about it, I'd like to make this comment.

6 First of all, number one, I don't mean to  
7 imply that the Army plan is to address the '75 files  
8 first and look at them. I was asked by I think this  
9 gentleman or this one, I forget which, how would you  
10 approach it -- I forget exactly what the question was,  
11 but -- was it what year group or which files would you  
12 look at first?

13 DR. GOLDBERG: With limited resources.

14 MS. BRAGG: Yes. And what I said was that if  
15 we had a scenario where we had substantially limited  
16 resources, then our feeling is we'd have to tackle the  
17 most critical files first. Notwithstanding what you  
18 just said, but let me just finish. Our feeling is we'd  
19 have to protect the most critical files first and then,  
20 come what may, after April of 2000.

21 So, therefore, all other things being equal -  
22 - and maybe all other things are not equal. But just  
23 all other things being equal, we would assume, well,  
24 the more critical files are the more current ones.

25 MR. LEFFLER: I understand that but I'm still

1 trying to understand the process itself. I really  
2 don't understand -- maybe I'm dense about this, but I  
3 don't understand what the procedure really is here.  
4 You have identified sets of files already that you  
5 believe are exempt or should be exempt.

6 MS. BRAGG: Yes.

7 MR. LEFFLER: Okay. Now, once you put those  
8 files aside, is it your understanding that you do or do  
9 not have to go through those files page by page by the  
10 year 2000?

11 MS. BRAGG: The file series that we propose  
12 for exemption, assuming it's approved --

13 MR. LEFFLER: Yes.

14 MS. BRAGG: Make that assumption. We would  
15 not go through that page by page by the year 2000. But  
16 for each file series, we have had to identify a date or  
17 event for declassification so that at some point we  
18 have a choice now. We either review them again for  
19 they're declassified when that date or event is  
20 reached.

21 MR. LEFFLER: So let me just make sure I  
22 understand. You've identified how many files now? Of  
23 these 6,000, how many --

24 MS. BRAGG: Fifty-four. So you can see we  
25 have less one tenth of one percent identified.

1 MR. LEFFLER: Okay. You have identified 54  
2 file series in which all the materials in those series,  
3 if approved, will not need to be reviewed by the year  
4 2000?

5 MS. BRAGG: That's correct. Yes.

6 MR. LEFFLER: And you are unwilling or unable  
7 to even tell us what those files are so that we then  
8 will not be able even to have a sense of what it is in  
9 these 56 categories that no one will have a right to  
10 know even beyond 2000?

11 DR. GOLDBERG: Just a minute here.

12 MR. LEFFLER: I'm just trying to understand  
13 specifically what's going on.

14 DR. GOLDBERG: I'm trying to get some  
15 information here. Would it be possible to simply give  
16 them the bare bones information without the reasons why  
17 they're being exempted, would it not? Simply to give  
18 them the list of files?

19 MS. BRAGG: No, sir. We have made the  
20 decision in the Army that that is for official use  
21 only. We have had it reviewed by what we call the FOIA  
22 people, Freedom of Information Act people. It does  
23 fall under the exemption categories and it will not be  
24 released.

25 But I think we're kind of losing sight of the

1 big picture here. This is 54 categories out of 6,000.  
2 It's a very limited amount of material. It will  
3 eventually be declassified. It's just that it won't  
4 automatically be declassified in 2000.

5 MR. LEFFLER: So, is the file -- you don't  
6 have to say, but when you say a file, 56 files, like  
7 might a file be records of the Chief of Staff?

8 MS. BRAGG: No, on.

9 MR. LEFFLER: What's a file?

10 MS. BRAGG: A file on nuclear weapons. A  
11 file on biological weapons. A file on human  
12 intelligence collection programs. Those are examples  
13 of files, series. Personnel files are a file series.

14 DR. WAMPLER: But these are nominal  
15 categories. They describe a type of information that's  
16 in the file.

17 MS. BRAGG: That's right.

18 DR. WAMPLER: They are not, you know, record  
19 group --

20 MS. BRAGG: Oh, no. They're not record  
21 groups at all. They're not Sec. Army files or Chief of  
22 Staff of the Army files or anything like that. They're  
23 not even the name of a command file. It's a particular  
24 subject matter.

25 DR. WAMPLER: Well, what I want to get at

1 then is --

2 MR. WEINBERG: Excuse me. Aren't these the  
3 lists that we were sent with a cover letter on  
4 December 11th? "Attached for inclusion in the  
5 materials relating to the panel are copies of the  
6 unclassified requests for files series exemption that  
7 have been received from DoD components to date."

8 In other words, if I understand this, we have  
9 been provided --

10 MR. LEFFLER: No. But if you look under the  
11 Army one, it doesn't say anything.

12 MR. WEINBERG: And the one thing -- and  
13 obviously your office provided a portion of this, as I  
14 understand what we got.

15 MS. BRAGG: No. Not of the 11 December or  
16 whatever you're saying.

17 MR. WEINBERG: I see. Well, the thing about  
18 this, and if we ever get the supplement from this very  
19 summary form of yours which I found was alarming, was  
20 not a lot of detail as to content but the complete  
21 absence of dates. I guess this is the historian in me.

22 MS. BRAGG: File series don't go by dates.

23 MR. WEINBERG: I'm sorry?

24 MS. BRAGG: File series do not go by dates.

25 MR. WEINBERG: But somebody must have some

1 clue as to what dates these files cover?

2 MS. BRAGG: Well, okay. Let me give you an  
3 example. My job is information security. There is a  
4 file series called 380-G. That's the number. And it's  
5 called information security. So in the entire United  
6 States Army, every Army Command that deals with  
7 information security, if they get a piece of paper, if  
8 I send out a letter to all these people about the new  
9 Executive Order or whatever, they file that under that  
10 file series, under 380-G, information security. And  
11 then they put the date. But the file series has  
12 nothing to do with the date of the record at all. It's  
13 only the subject matter. In this case, information  
14 security.

15 MR. WEINBERG: But I'm not disputing what  
16 you're saying. I understand that. My point here is  
17 that when you apply for an exemption on a set of files  
18 on the basis that it's just not worth reviewing now.  
19 That's really what you're saying. Because there are so  
20 many things in there.

21 MS. BRAGG: It is so replete with exemptible  
22 material that --

23 MR. WEINBERG: That presupposes that someone  
24 has actually taken a look at this file, doesn't it? Or  
25 the set of files?



1 MS. BRAGG: No. It presupposes that someone  
2 has taken a look at the subject matter itself.

3 MR. WEINBERG: Okay.

4 MS. BRAGG: And that that subject matter is  
5 so replete with information that would fall into one of  
6 those nine categories.

7 MS. BRAGG: I understand. But when you are  
8 describing it to get the approval for your list, is it  
9 not possible to indicate that these are from 1960 to  
10 1990 or something like that?

11 MS. BRAGG: Yes. And the way that I did it,  
12 because I'm the one who works on the final version of  
13 that, is that the Army has had a series of different  
14 records management systems. The current one we have,  
15 not to bore you totally, is called MARKS, the Army  
16 Recordkeeping System. That started in something like  
17 1987, I believe.

18 The system before that was called TAFS, the  
19 Army Functional File System. That was from the --  
20 don't quote me on the dates. It was like the mid '60s  
21 up to '87, something like that.

22 Before that date, we were under the War  
23 Department Decimal System. So what we had to do was  
24 look at the files in the MARKS, the corresponding files  
25 in the TAFS, then the corresponding files under the War

1 Department Decimal System.

2 Now, the numbers themselves may be different.

3 Under the War Department Decimal System, maybe  
4 information security, if I could only think they had  
5 something called information security, you wouldn't  
6 have probably had that number, 380-G. We would have  
7 had different numbers. It might have been called  
8 something a little bit different in those days. But in  
9 general, the types of information that the Army files  
10 is pretty steady throughout that time.

11 Obviously, we didn't have nuclear files  
12 before a certain period of reporting. We didn't have  
13 stealth technology before a certain other period. But  
14 the basic, these recordkeeping systems, they go back in  
15 history to I believe 1912 was when the War Department  
16 Decimal File System started and it was kind of a  
17 military version of the Dewey Decimal System.

18 DR. WAMPLER: Well, then -- okay. For the  
19 '50s, would a good guess be that under filing, for  
20 example, 471.6092 dealing with international alliances  
21 and relations and dealing with nuclear weapons, for the  
22 period within which that system applied. And what  
23 would happen is you'd pull up an Army file from that  
24 period, go through it, first of all, and try to find  
25 out if there's a file in there which has a number which

1 corresponds to your file exemption and then you'd just  
2 pull it out.

3           You'd say, okay. If you have an approval for  
4 that, you don't have to look at it until that date  
5 which has been set.

6           MS. BRAGG: That would be a likely scenario.

7           DR. WAMPLER: Okay. Now, I think what Mel was  
8 trying to get at, you've got 54 file exemptions  
9 requested out of 6,000. That's 10 percent of the list  
10 of files.

11           MS. BRAGG: No, no. It wouldn't be 10  
12 percent. Fifty-four out of 6,000 is not 10 percent.  
13 It's not even one percent.

14           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: There's a problem in  
15 the appreciation of the term file series. As records  
16 managers use file series -- and this confused the hell  
17 out of us, too, so don't feel alone. As records  
18 managers define file series, they're talking about an  
19 area, subject area. But there is also -- many people  
20 think, well, file series, they're talking about a  
21 discrete physical collection with a beginning and  
22 ending date that usually comes from an office and that  
23 is not it. That is what we call a collection. And  
24 that collection may have dozens of files series in it.  
25 Except it's only a definition of a subject area.

1 That's the term file series.

2           There's another area also that you've having  
3 problems with, and that is the fact that we are under  
4 the gun for automatic declassification. So all files  
5 that have not been reviewed by the year 2000,  
6 April 15th, everything that hasn't been reviewed that's  
7 older than 20 years old at that time that was  
8 declassified. That's why they're starting with the  
9 younger files because that's the files that has the  
10 most damaging data in it as far as younger weapons  
11 systems, more capable weapons systems, plans that are  
12 closer to the plans that we have today.

13           MR. LEFFLER: I'm still trying to figure out  
14 what we're talking about. What you said helps. But  
15 when we say a file series, then, just to be specific,  
16 are we talking about a decimal file like 471.6?

17           MS. BRAGG: That would be the number that  
18 would correspond with the files. For instance, I gave  
19 you the example information security.

20           MR. LEFFLER: Okay. That's great. Okay.  
21 Now I'm starting to understand. So there are 56 of  
22 those --

23           MS. BRAGG: Fifty-four. Yes.

24           MR. LEFFLER: -- 54 of those categories.

25           MS. BRAGG: Yes.

1           MR. LEFFLER: And on most of those  
2 categories, once you enumerate them, if approved, then  
3 nobody necessarily by the year 2000 will go through  
4 those categories?

5           MS. BRAGG: That's correct.

6           MR. LEFFLER: Okay. And this, in other  
7 words, means then that -- to go back to what Ms. Kloss  
8 said -- that if you had identified a general category  
9 like international activities and agreements, right?  
10 That was one category. So file series that relate to  
11 international activities and agreements have been put  
12 in these -- amongst these 54.

13          MS. BRAGG: It could potentially be put  
14 amongst them or potentially not. But if you're using  
15 that as an example, that could be an example.

16          MR. LEFFLER: Okay. But is that the  
17 criteria? I mean, I'm just trying to understand how  
18 you've come to these 54 categories. Because those of  
19 us who are very concerned about opening up materials of  
20 high value are fearful. I am fearful that you are  
21 taking sort of 40 or 50 categories of documents and  
22 saying, we're never going to see these, or at least not  
23 for the --

24          MS. BRAGG: I left out one part here. I left  
25 out a very important part. And then I know, Professor

1 Trachtenberg had a question and I know he's the  
2 godfather of the group so we've got to get him some  
3 time.

4           The important thing to mention, and I  
5 probably should have mentioned it in the briefing, is  
6 that although you have a discrete file series -- I'll  
7 go back to my innocuous area, information security,  
8 which certainly would not make the 54. Although you  
9 have a file series, anyone in the Army has the  
10 opportunity to file that particular piece of paper in  
11 any one of 6,000 files. So the same document that  
12 would have been put logically in that file series is  
13 going to be filed in all the non-exempt file series,  
14 and we will be reviewing that page by page, or as best  
15 we can. We will be reviewing it hopefully file by  
16 file, box by box.

17           So the information, it is highly unlikely, in  
18 my view, that there would only be one copy of that  
19 document in the entire United States Army files that  
20 would have been put in that file series. Because I  
21 know that for any particular subject -- although we  
22 have these 6,000 files, the reality is that whatever  
23 your office deals with, you've got your own little set  
24 of numbers.

25           So I'll get something in. Maybe a war plan.

1 Maybe somebody wants me to review it for  
2 classification. Well, there's an Army file for war  
3 plans but I don't put it in there. I put it under my  
4 information security file. The logistics people put it  
5 under their log files, et cetera, et cetera.

6 DR. GOLDBERG: Could you perhaps do a paper  
7 on this subject for the benefit of this panel so there  
8 will be a better understanding of how these file series  
9 work, how the exemptions of them work, et cetera? I  
10 think they don't include the high level material that  
11 you're interested in except insofar as those files may  
12 contain documents related to these file series.

13 And as we've heard, these documents may  
14 appear in hundreds of files throughout not only Army  
15 but through the Department of Defense and elsewhere,  
16 too.

17 MS. BRAGG: Yes. Elsewhere.

18 DR. WAMPLER: Do you have a general sense  
19 of -- okay. Fifty-four is a very small percentage of  
20 6,000, but in terms of the 250 million pages.

21 MS. BRAGG: No. That's the unfortunate part.  
22 And it's really the unfortunate part because it would  
23 help us a lot with trying to plan for the resources.

24 Originally, we took the list from the  
25 archives of the records centers and we said, okay,

1 based on the list, we'll see what's exemptible that we  
2 can come up with. Now, that was a total disaster. I  
3 mean, that did not work at all.

4 The lists that we were provided did not have  
5 the specificity needed in order to see is it in one of  
6 these exemption categories or not. So we had to say,  
7 okay, go back to the drawing board. How can we best do  
8 it.

9 And because we couldn't rely on those lists  
10 to use and we had to look at it at face value what  
11 would logically be the exemptible material, we have no  
12 idea of the percentage. If we had relied on the list,  
13 we could have determined the percentage. But because  
14 of that, we didn't.

15 DR. GOLDBERG: Just a moment, please.  
16 Members of the panel do have priority.

17 MR. TRACHTENBERG: What I wanted to talk  
18 about is this whole issue of the great specter of  
19 automatic declassification because it's come up a  
20 number of times. Actually, the first time David  
21 Rickman was talking about this whole thing. The danger  
22 of just releasing all kinds of important things  
23 wholesale which nobody wants. We just want a rational  
24 system.

25 What I am going to argue is I think that this



1 whole specter is a red herring. It is not going to  
2 happen. This is not something that we should concern  
3 ourselves with. And I've read Section 3.4 quite  
4 carefully many, many times.

5           This argument about automatic  
6 declassification is subject, as you well know, to  
7 paragraph B, which has all of these categories for  
8 exemption. Now, it's true paragraph B refers to  
9 exemption of specific information which might imply  
10 document by document. But specific is one of those  
11 words that is extremely elastic and will in fact be  
12 pulled to cover whole categories of things, I believe.

13           And the reason I believe that has to do with  
14 my observation of what's been going on with regard to  
15 paragraph C and what we've been doing in terms of the  
16 specific categories that we've been exempting now. And  
17 basically what I'm doing is I'm testing how seriously  
18 people are taking the precise language of the Executive  
19 Order.

20           Now, if you notice in paragraph C, it says  
21 that you can exempt right now files whose contents  
22 almost invariably fall within the exempted categories.  
23 That implies practically everything.

24           MS. BRAGG: Oh, no.

25           MR. TRACHTENBERG: Almost invariably it does.

1 Almost invariably.

2 MS. BRAGG: No, no.

3 MR. TRACHTENBERG: I'll just finish because -  
4 - almost invariably. I should say almost always.  
5 Right?

6 In reality, if you look at the kind of lists,  
7 and I happened to look at the list -- the thing for the  
8 U.S. Strategic Command, what do they include?  
9 Historical program records, historical research.

10 I'm sure a lot of this stuff is legitimately  
11 exempt but certainly, almost invariably, because I've  
12 seen -- we've seen a lot of that stuff. And believe  
13 me, I don't think the test of almost invariably would  
14 apply. But what they're doing is to say there's a lot  
15 of this stuff that shouldn't be released automatically.  
16 We're going to exempt it.

17 And so --

18 MS. KLOSS: But I think in there, didn't they  
19 say they're only exempting it until 2005? I mean, it  
20 wasn't like they were way out in --

21 MR. TRACHTENBERG: They don't have --  
22 actually, that's another thing because in subparagraph  
23 2 there they speak about specific dates or events for  
24 the declassification of the information. That's often  
25 ignored. They're taking this with a grain of salt.

1 Nobody seems to mind.

2 Let me just go on. In paragraph D, they say  
3 in addition to this almost invariably test, we can have  
4 lists for specific information. I haven't seen any of  
5 that stuff being done.

6 So, what I'm getting at is that the reality  
7 is that the phrasing is taken not terribly literally, I  
8 think it fair to say.

9 Now, let me just go on a little bit because  
10 this has to do with my own experience with the --

11 MS. BRAGG: Can I just interrupt just for a  
12 second?

13 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Well, it's --

14 MS. BRAGG: I'll forget if I don't. I'll  
15 forget if I don't.

16 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Okay.

17 MS. BRAGG: I believe these lists have been  
18 refined and they have passed the screening of Ms.  
19 Kloss' office.

20 MS. KLOSS: They made it to the General  
21 Counsel.

22 MS. BRAGG: And what you have there I think  
23 is the --

24 MR. TRACHTENBERG: They've prepared a D list?

25 MS. BRAGG: The preliminary.

1 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Yes. I'm just saying -- I  
2 agree. I may be true. That's the measure of how  
3 seriously we should take this language. What the  
4 strategic community has done is fine in practice.

5 MS. BRAGG: No, no. What I'm saying is the  
6 list you get -- is this the 11 December --

7 MS. KLOSS: It's their preliminary  
8 declassification.

9 MR. TRACHTENBERG: October '95 list.

10 MS. BRAGG: The list that has gone to Ms.  
11 Kloss' office, and I can verify this because I was  
12 burning the midnight oil refining our list. It passed  
13 a close scrutiny before she would allow us to go to Mr.  
14 Gray for something.

15 MR. TRACHTENBERG: That's my point. The  
16 close scrutiny is a realistic test. They're taking  
17 these things realistically. They're saying the text  
18 of the Executive Order, the test of almost invariably -  
19 - yeah, that's on paper. But we all know that in  
20 reality things work in a somehow looser way.

21 Let me just -- I have two more points to kind  
22 of demonstrate that this whole argument is, as I say, a  
23 red herring.

24 The next argument has to do with my own  
25 experience with the Freedom of Information Act. I

1 actually read the text of the Freedom of Information  
2 Act. You look at the text of that Act. Very precise  
3 deadlines for getting material out. It doesn't say if  
4 budgetary resources aren't allocated that agencies  
5 should be free to stretch out compliance with the Act.  
6 But that's the way it works in practice.

7 In reality, if the axe is about to fall and  
8 you say, well, we haven't been able to do this because  
9 you haven't given us the money, nobody is going to  
10 object to that. That is absolutely the way this is  
11 going to happen, just as it -- and it happens with  
12 FOIA, especially since -- and this is one of the  
13 comments you made. You pointed out how the RD and the  
14 FRD stuff is mixed up totally with all these things.  
15 The President can give Executive Orders until he's blue  
16 in the face. He doesn't have the right -- he doesn't  
17 have the legal authority to force any agency of the  
18 government to violate a law passed by Congress.

19 MS. BRAGG: We agree.

20 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Right?

21 MS. BRAGG: We agree.

22 MR. TRACHTENBERG: And so this is yet another  
23 argument that will be used when the time comes to avoid  
24 this kind of massive automatic meat axe approach to the  
25 declassification problem. So this is not a real issue.

1 This is not a real issue. It is not going to happen.  
2 And I think we can just sweep it off of the agenda, at  
3 which point Mel's point applies, about let's begin with  
4 the early stuff and proceed in a rational way.

5 Which brings me to the question that I have  
6 is basically, you want advice from us? Are you coming  
7 to us asking for input or would you just as soon be  
8 allowed to kind of get on with your own work instead of  
9 having to come up with more documents and more reports.  
10 Wouldn't it be better from your standpoint for us to  
11 just get off your back, so to speak, and allow you to  
12 do the work or is there something specific you would  
13 want from us?

14 MS. BRAGG: You've raised a lot of questions  
15 here.

16 DR. GOLDBERG: Just a moment, please. We  
17 have three more briefings after this. There will be an  
18 opportunity to discuss the same matters in future  
19 briefings. I call on you to take a look at the back of  
20 the room. You brought part of the audience to its  
21 feet.

22 So I think at this point we will take a five  
23 minute break and resume.

24 MS. BRAGG: Sir, before we do, I would be  
25 remiss if I didn't address Professor Weinberg's comment

1 and also Professor Trachtenberg's.

2 Our key concern here is the protection of our  
3 soldiers and of this nation. That's our key concern.  
4 We're not trying to duck out of this Executive Order.  
5 We're not trying to come up with red herrings out of  
6 the air. We're not trying to come up with excuses.

7 As Dr. Clark will tell you, the Army has a  
8 proud history. We want to tell our history. But the  
9 main reason that we have an Army is to protect this  
10 nation. That's our first priority. We've got to keep  
11 our eye on the ball here.

12 I didn't want to leave with --

13 MR. WEINBERG: That's exactly related to the  
14 point that Professor Leffler has made and Professor  
15 Trachtenberg has made, that I have made. If you start  
16 with the period '45 to '60, you will be most likely to  
17 protect our soldiers because you're then dealing with a  
18 period where the current relevance and future relevance  
19 is likely to be least and the dangers of release that  
20 Ms. Kloss and you referred to are likely to be  
21 minimized.

22 MS. BRAGG: But what do we do in April 2000?

23 DR. GOLDBERG: I'm going to have the last  
24 word at this point. The odds are very great that the  
25 declassifiers will start with '45 and the '45 to '60

1 period will be given priority and that it's a red  
2 herring at this point to think they're going to start  
3 with '75 and work backward. I don't know any who are  
4 really planning to do that.

5 MS. BRAGG: That was just a scenario if we  
6 didn't get the adequate resources. That was a  
7 scenario.

8 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Well, you're not going to  
9 get the adequate resources. That we know.

10 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

11 DR. GOLDBERG: The next briefing will be the  
12 Navy briefing which will be presented by Mike Brown.

13 MR. BROWN: Thank you. Thank you very much.

14 You probably don't need that because you know  
15 what I'm going to talk about. I think you will find  
16 that we've got some pretty common elements here that we  
17 might want to address universally rather than in the  
18 specifics. I'll have to get help from Dr. Kloss for  
19 myself because she did an admirable job and she's  
20 always a hard act to follow. In this case, a very hard  
21 act to follow.

22 The Navy plan was submitted, as required, to  
23 the Director of the Information Security Oversight  
24 Office in November last year and approved in January.  
25 And I'll quote from the approval, which is that it's



1 comprehensive and clear; meets the requirements of  
2 Section 3.4(e) of the Executive Order.

3 That's kind of like a B plus, I guess.

4 That initial plan surveyed, as best we were  
5 able, those commands and activities, and brought in  
6 from the National Archives Record Center, just local  
7 command records, to try to estimate the volume of  
8 records that are affected by the order and identified  
9 where the records were located.

10 That plan was updated in April of this year  
11 to provide a little more comprehensive identification  
12 of the records, where they were located, and perhaps  
13 the volume of those, which increased somewhat.

14 The approach that we're taking -- and I find  
15 that maybe the term centralized and decentralized and  
16 how we're using that term may differ with the different  
17 organizations, military departments and other defense  
18 agencies. Basically, what we mean when we're talking  
19 about centralized management of the plan is that the  
20 senior security official in the Navy, who is my boss,  
21 has the responsibility for implementation of the  
22 Executive Order. And further, then delegates the  
23 functional responsibility to me as the CNO assistant  
24 for Information and Personnel Security.

25 And what we've done is decided that we will

1 act in an capacity to provide guidance, coordination  
2 and liaison. Guidance to the Navy commands who have to  
3 execute the plan. And this plan is their plan. It  
4 wasn't our plan. We didn't say, here's what you're  
5 going to do. We bought people together and said how  
6 can we best achieve the goal here. And that is, that  
7 we're going to develop guidelines, declassification  
8 guidance. We're going to coordinate among ourselves.  
9 We're going to effect liaison with other agencies so  
10 that we can figure out how best to approach the task.

11           The decentralized management or  
12 decentralization execution -- that's what we'll call it  
13 -- gives to those commands, the major claimants, those  
14 that have the equities and the records, wherever they  
15 are, the opportunity to assess their own capability to  
16 attack the record declassification, to identify those  
17 records, to review those records and to dispose of  
18 those records.

19           It is for declassification or in some  
20 instances to determine that perhaps in our history of  
21 records management we were somewhat remiss in not  
22 properly identifying permanently valuable records.

23           Astounding numbers. We estimate our Navy  
24 records -- were placed on the kinds of input that we  
25 can get. This must be some of what you were asking

1 about earlier -- that we get from NARA, we get from the  
2 Federal Records Centers, the Presidential libraries, of  
3 what categorization and identification of records that  
4 they have that we can look at to begin the process of  
5 breaking out what will be affected by this  
6 declassification process. Such things that identify --  
7 one on the short listing here -- records of the Office  
8 of the Chief of Naval Operations, that organization.

9           And these have some very succinct and often  
10 not very descriptive identification of what those  
11 records contain which may be Office of the Chief of  
12 Naval Operations 1947 INTEL reports. We have a much  
13 larger stack of those. This is illustrative of what we  
14 are getting to identify.

15           So at that point, we're at 500 million pages  
16 of records, estimated. That does not include those  
17 records that other agencies are going to identify that  
18 contain some Navy equities, and which will be referred  
19 to us.

20           I think this figure is going to become  
21 somewhat standard at a nominal cost of \$1.00 a page to  
22 conduct a review that's not necessarily a line by line  
23 FOIA type review with an intent to redact and bracket  
24 out the minutia or minute bits of information but  
25 rather a cursory review to determine whether within

1 those records there's a distinct possibility or perhaps  
2 an even identifiable means to determine that they do  
3 contain exempt material.

4 Now, the point that was made earlier is that  
5 if we go for the low hanging fruit, the older stuff, we  
6 can turn out a lot of material initially. And that's  
7 true. The approach at this point is necessarily to  
8 look at the records at the National Archives, the  
9 Federal Records Centers, the Presidential libraries,  
10 which included the special project to go to the Johnson  
11 Library with the External Referral Working Group to  
12 begin the process of looking at those and capturing  
13 that information on electronic media and bringing it  
14 back to look at.

15 We have established a group in the Navy  
16 of records managers and security specialists from the  
17 different Navy activities, primarily in the Washington  
18 area because, as Helen said, that's where most of our  
19 records are maintained and where most of the folk who  
20 are going to have to look at these records from a  
21 technical standpoint are located. We meet periodically  
22 but frequently to discuss lessons learned, what  
23 approach is being taken, what assets are available to  
24 apply to the task, is there some commonality that we  
25 can achieve to eliminate one activity having to do all

1 the work.

2 And we currently have 34 people ranging from  
3 An O/6 through some military reservists to GS-14's down  
4 through GS-5's who are employed at reviewing records,  
5 either on a full-time basis or on a 5 percent basis.  
6 And that, depending on the individual Navy Command's  
7 assessment of their need to do the job and how we're  
8 best going to be able to do it with the resources that  
9 they have.

10 I'm not going to be overly redundant here  
11 because the point has already been made by Ms. Kloss,  
12 by Helen, by Dr. Goldberg and Professor Trachtenberg  
13 that resources are our biggest problem. But we have to  
14 do what we're doing within the constraints of the  
15 resources that we have. And the ability to obtain  
16 additional resources is dependent, as you know, on how  
17 well you plead your case and competing resources.

18 The approach that's being taken by these  
19 activities is a simple pass/fail philosophy. It's  
20 either in or out. It's either still classified or it's  
21 not. It's not partially classified. And we're going  
22 to look at it to examine whether it can be downgraded.  
23 We're not going to redact because that slows the  
24 process down. And we're in a learning curve now.

25 We do not have -- did not have a team, an

1 already established function of doing this that was  
2 ready to go and -- "go team" to go anywhere in the  
3 world and declassify our records wherever that might be  
4 found. We'll have to start this process and we're  
5 learning and we're teaching.

6           As I mentioned earlier, we have been ready to  
7 go with this ERWIG activity and I do not have time, did  
8 not envision that we would have the time to go into  
9 some very detailed presentations of how our individual  
10 activities are taking -- how they are accomplishing  
11 their efforts. But what have we accomplished at this  
12 point?

13           We have reviewed almost 2600 cubic feet of  
14 records. These were primarily records from the Office  
15 of Naval Intelligence, Marine Corps, Naval Sea Systems  
16 Command. Of those -- and here's an astonishing thing  
17 which will indicate part of the problem. As I referred  
18 to earlier, not all of these records are permanently  
19 valuable records. Of that 2600 or so cubic feet, only  
20 570 cubic feet were determined to be permanently  
21 valuable.

22           Of that 570 cubic feet, we declassified a  
23 little over 300 cubic feet. Using our standard of 2500  
24 pages per cubic feet, that's probably three-quarters of  
25 a million pages. I mean -- yes. Three-quarters of a

1 million pages of declassified material that has now  
2 been put on the conveyor belt. It's been declassified.  
3 It hasn't been released. It's been put in that process  
4 to be released.

5           The cost of doing that comes close to the  
6 \$1.00 per page, the nominal cost that we've identified.  
7 And these are records that are the older records. I  
8 have Commander Terry Pike, a Naval Reservist here, who  
9 has been leading the charge on getting Naval  
10 intelligence records declassified and she has a team of  
11 Naval Reservists and they're doing an excellent job in  
12 trying to accomplish the task.

13           We have updated all Navy classification  
14 guides. For us, that's something. And the reason it's  
15 something is because a long time ago we made a  
16 brilliant decision -- we can say that now because it's  
17 kind of playing out that way -- to bring the  
18 responsibility for management, recording and  
19 promulgation of all Navy classification guides into one  
20 office, my office, so that we have a standard format  
21 and ostensibly achieve some consistency in how those  
22 guides are presented, the language that's used, the  
23 areas that they identify and that we achieve  
24 consistency across programs because we have many of the  
25 same elements of information that apply to different

1 systems and programs, so we wanted to make sure we have  
2 an equivalent classification goal established.

3 We've updated all those classification guides  
4 to bring in the language of the new Executive Order  
5 regarding exemptions, eliminated the OADR markings.  
6 And additionally, we have produced a Navy -- we've  
7 updated the Navy Declassification Guide for 25-year old  
8 information, which has been an ongoing project for many  
9 years in response to a DoD requirement.

10 And we used to call it something else. We  
11 called it a continued protection guideline. Well, now,  
12 we're taking a different approach. Anything that was  
13 not in that guide for requiring continued protection  
14 was declassified. So now we're taking a little  
15 different approach that identifies what can be  
16 declassified.

17 In addition to that guide, we have kind of  
18 ongoing elements that are being presented. Just  
19 yesterday, I just got a topical declassification  
20 identification which is some older series of surface  
21 search regulars. Navy Sea Systems Command said we've  
22 looked at these and now all of these surface search  
23 regulars, these detonations, everything about the  
24 performance, technical specs, are now declassified  
25 because they're older systems.



1           So those individual inputs will be  
2 incorporated into this declassification guide, which we  
3 provide to the National Archives. We feel that we are  
4 making pretty good progress at this point. I do not  
5 feel that we will achieve the 15 percent this year and  
6 I think that's to be expected because we're continuing  
7 the process. But we started the wheels turning and  
8 we're moving along.

9           That's my 15 minutes.

10          Thank you.

11          MR. WEINBERG: I have a question on your --  
12 you indicated, and I think that makes very good sense,  
13 that you're not getting into mucking up parts and  
14 pieces of documents. They're either one way or the  
15 other. When they are the other, i.e., they remain  
16 closed, are you doing as I understood the Army is  
17 doing, then indicating on the file or document a  
18 declassification date or are you planning to go over  
19 those all over again regardless?

20          MR. BROWN: There will be several iterations  
21 of that scenario. One is that we may look at the  
22 record and say this is restricted data or formerly  
23 restricted data. This is the common red flag that goes  
24 up because we all know we've got a law there that we  
25 have to adhere to. So, this restricted data or

1 formerly restricted data we're not going to do anything  
2 with it. We're going to send it to DOE.

3 Now, similarly, if we get something -- if we  
4 look at something that we identify as another agency's  
5 equity, we're going to refer it to them and let them  
6 take the action. If it's a Navy record, we're going to  
7 mark it with a date or event for declassification.

8 MR. WEINBERG: Okay. You are going to mark  
9 the Navy things. I just want to make sure I understood  
10 what you said. The Navy things that on the review  
11 remain closed, are going to have a date of opening on  
12 them. Is that right?

13 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: A date or event, sir.

14 MR. BROWN: A date or event.

15 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Or the guide that says  
16 when it's going to be declassified.

17 MR. WEINBERG: So it will say 2005 or  
18 whatever?

19 MR. BROWN: Yes. Now, that's part of what we  
20 give with the declassification guides and the  
21 classification guides because we have over 1,000  
22 classification guides that address every system, most  
23 every system, plan, program that is classified. And  
24 that guide, since they are updated under the old  
25 Executive Order, required to be reviewed on a biennial

1 basis and not a five year basis under the new Executive  
2 Order. We will cite that guide as being the  
3 controlling document for future review -- as the  
4 controlling guide for the future review of that  
5 document.

6 MR. WEINBERG: Now, let me make sure I  
7 understand what you're saying. If it's a Navy document  
8 or file and you've decided it's got to remain closed,  
9 it gets a date in which unless you look at it again,  
10 it's automatically declassified. Is that correct? Or  
11 is it simply a date at which it will get another look?

12 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: It will get another  
13 look. What has been done for the most part with those  
14 that have been exempted, and there are several  
15 different approaches. Some have dates. Some have  
16 events. But if we have to exempt it, we don't know  
17 today when that information is going to be declassified  
18 because it's exempt and there's a reason for the  
19 exemption. So we cite the guide that will tell us.

20 When that guide is updated and the guidance  
21 is you can declassify it, then that's when that will be  
22 declassified. We put on the box or put on the record  
23 of review the guide that protects it, the reason for  
24 classifying it. So when that classification guide says  
25 you can declassify that information, that's the event

1 that will allow you to declassify it.

2 MR. WEINBERG: But there's no date which says  
3 that as of such-and-such a date, this record must be  
4 reviewed again?

5 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: No, no. That's not a  
6 requirement that you have to re-review the document,  
7 that you have to set a date for re-review.

8 MR. WEINBERG: But aren't you making your own  
9 life more difficult? That is to say, if you've got  
10 different categories with different dates, it means  
11 that every one of those you're going to go through  
12 again instead of having categories which are going to  
13 be going after five, after 10, after 15, whatever the  
14 number is.

15 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Sir, this is a very  
16 complicated business.

17 MS. BRAGG: Believe me, if we could look in a  
18 crystal ball and determine when a piece of information  
19 loses its sensitivity out in the future, Mr. Brown and  
20 I and our colleagues in the Air Force would be very  
21 happy. But by the nature of the Department of Defense,  
22 the type of stuff that we classify, it is very hard to  
23 look in a crystal ball.

24 There are some cases where you can but for  
25 the most part --

1           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: May I have an example,  
2 an operational example?

3           I finished 100 boxes of acoustic mag tapes  
4 that look at the acoustic vulnerability of the USSBN's.  
5 I exempted those 100 boxes. And the event I put under  
6 the exemption was when we decommission that SSBN, I no  
7 longer am concerned about its specific acoustic  
8 characteristics and their vulnerabilities.

9           The advantage of having a systematic  
10 downgrading and declassification system allows me  
11 systematically, as a particular file, to go back and  
12 look for that box. Instead of having the event prompt  
13 me, I have that box scheduled at every five years or  
14 every 10 years, when I've now scheduled it. I can go  
15 back and say -- I'm not shaving with big razors out of  
16 that. Now I don't need to protect that particular  
17 SSBN's acoustic vulnerability.

18           That's the advantage to me from a management  
19 perspective rather than having it every time I  
20 decommission something or every change in the  
21 technology. I would rather have put that into a system  
22 and from a management perspective annually have to  
23 review every record on an annual basis that I've now  
24 scheduled for systematic review by its having then  
25 driven -- but that's a particular -- from the Office of

1 Naval Intelligence perspective.

2           The other aspect I would like -- and I don't  
3 want to digress too much further, but in the permanent  
4 historical value, valuable material, there are -- 2000  
5 records that were not determined to be, and I'd like to  
6 give you an operational example of how those got into  
7 the records system, so you don't think who's making the  
8 call on that that material is not permanently  
9 valuable -- we're working very closely with Jean  
10 Schauble's people in the Department of the Navy trying  
11 to determine how did we get in the predicament we're in  
12 today.

13           How do I have 10,000 cubic feet? And then,  
14 -- being in the field commands or on ships and giving  
15 the order that the war is done and you can go home and  
16 we basically shovel things into boxes, tape them, send  
17 our sailors home and thus that material is gone.

18           So, I anticipate that as I go through those  
19 cubic feet and identify historical material, I can then  
20 check on a closer basis to exempt only those particular  
21 information very objectively and release the policy and  
22 guidance materials.

23           DR. GOLDBERG: Do you understand that?

24           (Laughter.)

25           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I wanted to give an

1 example.

2 DR. GOLDBERG: Any other questions?

3 (No response.)

4 You're almost getting off easy here.

5 MR. DAVID: Jim David from the Air and Space  
6 Museum. I'm going to take or suggest kind of a  
7 different tack here, and that is possible exemption of  
8 entire collections. For example, the secretaries of  
9 the services, Secretary of Defense, a lot of the  
10 assistant secretaries, Chiefs of Staff or assistant  
11 Chiefs of Staff, et cetera, which would leave records,  
12 for example, Army Office of the Surgeon General records  
13 -- both at the National Archives and at the Records  
14 Center in Suitland as possible candidates for automatic  
15 declassification.

16 And then permit the bulk of the resources to  
17 be committed to systematic review of the records of  
18 greatest interest; the secretaries and chiefs of staff,  
19 et cetera.

20 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Good suggestion.

21 MR. DAVID: For example, the Army currently  
22 is planning on applying for exemption of 54 or 56  
23 specific file series. Regardless of what collection  
24 those files are in, the EO specifically provides that  
25 exempt files are subject to systematic review.

1           I would suggest that when it comes to the  
2 exemption dealing with weapons of mass destruction,  
3 simply apply for an exemption of all records on the  
4 chemical warfare and its successors, whether in RT-175  
5 or one of the holding areas up at Aberdeen and do  
6 similar such exemptions and then start systematically  
7 reviewing Secretary of the Army records, Chief of Staff  
8 and down from there. That's my recommendation.

9           MR. BROWN: We also have a requirement that  
10 we're trying to meet, which is, at least in this first  
11 year, are the greatest obstacles because of the time  
12 it's taking to get where we are now and to get this  
13 machinery put together to try to achieve the 15 percent  
14 goal.

15           MR. DAVID: But what I'm saying is 15 percent  
16 is the goal of non-exempt records. What I'm really  
17 focusing on is the exempt records. And so the 15  
18 percent is a much smaller number if you have, for  
19 example, all the records of chemical warfare service  
20 and its successors, wherever located, are exempt.

21           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: What you're saying, I  
22 guess, is that you would exempt this part of the entire  
23 collection, entire group --

24           MR. DAVID: Correct.

25           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: -- and tackle only



1 that which has not been exempt. And that's the plan.  
2 That's what the Army is doing.

3 MS. BRAGG: He's saying one thing further.  
4 What he's saying, I believe, is that of the exempt  
5 material, that we would have an aggressive systematic  
6 declassification review of the exempt material.

7 MR. DAVID: Correct. Starting from the top  
8 down.

9 MS. BRAGG: Or starting from the middle out.  
10 It doesn't matter. What the problem is is one of  
11 resources. And I hate to just keep saying this over  
12 and over and over again like a broken record, but think  
13 of the Army as a swimmer who is out there and about to  
14 go down for the third time trying to come up with  
15 resources to deal with the automatic program. And if  
16 we have an aggressive systematic program at the same  
17 time as the automatic program, it's like throwing an  
18 anchor around our neck and we'll sink to the bottom.  
19 We won't be able to do anything. There will be so much  
20 on our plate.

21 I think we'll admit -- I mean, if anyone asks  
22 me how should this Executive Order have been written, I  
23 would have said, well, maybe it would have made more  
24 sense to really put more emphasis on a systematic quota  
25 and really get to the heart of what the historical

1 community and other groups that represent the public  
2 interest are really interested in, rather than this  
3 vast mountain of dusty files. That's not how the  
4 Executive Order was written.

5 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: To answer your  
6 question, Section 3.5 of the order conceives of a speed  
7 whereby we give you all of the non-exempted records in  
8 the next -- less than four years. Then on the 18th of  
9 April 2000, we start reviewing systematically all of  
10 the exempted records. That's what the order says.  
11 That's what the President wants.

12 In order to change that, you have to see the  
13 President. And I said that the last time at this  
14 meeting and I think that's still valid.

15 MR. WEINBERG: Let me just come back to -- if  
16 I understood correctly your figures, the -- and this is  
17 the issue of the pilot project which currently worries  
18 me. If I understand correctly, the sample figures that  
19 you were using that added up to half a million dollars  
20 or so on and so forth, you had -- do I remember this  
21 correctly? CNO records from the late '40s, early '50s,  
22 primarily reports from ONI. Did I hear you correctly?

23 MR. BROWN: In what we have accomplished  
24 already?

25 MR. WEINBERG: Yes, yes.

1 MR. BROWN: Primarily.

2 MR. WEINBERG: Okay. Well, --

3 MR. BROWN: And the Marine Corps.

4 MR. WEINBERG: And certain Marine Corps.

5 Well, may I suggest that that's not necessarily the  
6 most accurate basis on which to do your predicting  
7 thereafter. ONI records, at least ONI records that I  
8 have seen, suggest that the proportion of problems is  
9 likely to be relatively higher than average than if you  
10 take, in other words, the exempt categories and areas  
11 out. Then you do those which are in the over 25 year  
12 period which are left in that batch. ONI reports are  
13 likely to be, it seems to me, proportionately slower to  
14 work on, higher proportions of problems than most -- at  
15 least a substantial proportion.

16 And so in terms of producing substantial  
17 numbers of higher level materials, let us say  
18 operational material in the CNO records from the Korean  
19 War, let us say, are likely to be, shall we say, more  
20 rapidly processed or less likely to raise problems and  
21 also, more likely to help you meet your percentage  
22 targets.

23 We're not as unrealistic as we may sound on  
24 this project.

25 MR. BROWN: I agree with you 100 percent.

1 The problem here, and that's one of the benefits that  
2 we get here, is to be able to identify, examine just  
3 that kind of an approach or perception. I'm not saying  
4 it's an incorrect assessment. However, the Office of  
5 Naval Intelligence has been able to identify and bring  
6 resources to bear.

7 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: The Director of Naval  
8 Intelligence stands committed to have --

9 MR. WEINBERG: I'm sorry. Could you start  
10 over again? I just couldn't hear you. Sorry.

11 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: The Director of Naval  
12 Intelligence stands committed to take the funding for  
13 this project out of HIDE. And so he has identified  
14 money to put towards this project. Since the  
15 Department of Navy has adopted a decentralized  
16 approach, we prefer think that we're at the forefront  
17 and have people who have worked more than five years  
18 stand committed.

19 It may not be the order in which we would  
20 have preferred to review records. It may not be the  
21 correct years. But we're going to review our records.

22 MR. BROWN: To take your other suggestion,  
23 the CNO records -- and I'm not trying to focus anything  
24 on Dr. Dudley here. He has a project already  
25 identified that he has to accomplish that he has

1 already identified resources to take care of. And  
2 that's to review business form records. And until he  
3 finishes that project, he cannot apply his resources to  
4 this effort.

5           So, you know, the approach that you have,  
6 that's what we'd love to do. We don't have the people  
7 who are trained, one. Two, we have not yet been able  
8 to break down -- when we've looked at it from the 360  
9 degrees, to try to figure out what's the best way to  
10 make the first cut on this thing. And we think we did  
11 it with identifying -- we don't have any money pond,  
12 out-year programs, to take care of this Navy wide.  
13 That is a simple pot of money. But that's a big put of  
14 money. We've used just one dollar as nominal cost.  
15 Big pot of money to try to go in and identify.

16           And that's a continuum, too. That's not just  
17 a one-time shot. Because as we deal with this 25  
18 through 20 year old directive, there's a whole bunch  
19 more that are now coming on line. Just haven't reached  
20 that point, too, that we'll have to continue to look  
21 at.

22           MR. WEINBERG: But that only argues along the  
23 same lines as Professor Trachtenberg and I have been  
24 saying. And is, if you do your training of the  
25 personnel on the earliest part of the records, then if

1 and when, as is going to happen, mistakes are made,  
2 they are least likely to have any significant impact.  
3 And by the time they get to the chronologically and  
4 substantively more sensitive files, the newly trained  
5 people presumably would be better at it.

6 MS. BRAGG: What if we run out of time?

7 MR. WEINBERG: I'm sorry. I didn't hear what  
8 you said.

9 MS. BRAGG: What if we run out of time?

10 MR. WEINBERG: Well, you're not going to run  
11 out of time because precisely starting at the  
12 chronologically earlier period is the way to be most  
13 likely to get you the percentages figure that are your  
14 targets.

15 MS. BRAGG: That's not the clock I'm worried  
16 about. The clock I hear ticking is 17 April 2000.  
17 That's my problem.

18 MR. TRACHTENBERG: What's your answer to the  
19 argument I made?

20 MR. WEINBERG: Nothing is going to happen on  
21 that 17th of April. Not to you, not to the documents,  
22 not to anybody.

23 DR. WAMPLER: I was also wondering, on the  
24 same line, that you're talking about these 15 percents.  
25 Okay. It's 15 percent of the non-exempt material. Is

1 that the way you figure it? You put in you initial  
2 request and as you identify targets of opportunity, you  
3 carry out your review for other documents, files or  
4 whole collections you think are replete.

5 What happens if you don't make the 15  
6 percent?

7 MR. BROWN: Well, that's yet to be answered,  
8 because I don't know where the declassification police  
9 is.

10 DR. WAMPLER: It means we need flexibility  
11 here and both the time line and the 15 percent are in  
12 the middle of this somehow, to see where we can find  
13 somebody to interpose our qualitative concerns with  
14 your supposedly quantitative axe over your head.

15 MR. BROWN: And I think that we can deal with  
16 that situation if we do exactly what you're saying.  
17 That we can meet perhaps two goals, not necessarily  
18 completely but if we add this goal and this goal, which  
19 we met or came close to meeting and this one which we  
20 came close to meeting, maybe that all adds up to --  
21 okay, we'll consider that to meet the letter and intent  
22 of the Executive Order -- and the spirit.

23 DR. WAMPLER: Because I got the assumption  
24 from the Army briefing that you might be able to use it  
25 like income averaging. You'd look at this and you'd

1 say, okay, we didn't get the first year, but if you  
2 looked at it over the full four years, it all works  
3 out.

4 MR. BROWN: Sure. Yes.

5 DR. WAMPLER: And you need some kind of  
6 flexibility here to give you political cover,  
7 bureaucratic cover, if you're trying to make a good  
8 faith effort to respond to our recommendations.

9 MR. BROWN: And part of the way that the  
10 individual commands identify how they're going to  
11 achieve this is, okay, first year, we figure we can do  
12 2 percent. Next year, we'll jump to may be 17 percent  
13 and then the next year we will have our learning curves  
14 taken care of. We will have then been able to take  
15 care of the older material and gotten that shoved out.  
16 That kind of stacks the boxes up over in our office for  
17 them to start processing, but it at least meets our  
18 goal.

19 DR. WAMPLER: Is your requested file  
20 exemptions in the same category as the Army's that  
21 cannot be seen?

22 MR. BROWN: I can't answer that question  
23 straight away because we have gone in with an exemption  
24 for all of our standard subject identification codes,  
25 which aren't identified except in an administrative



1 document that covers all those, similar to what Helen  
2 had identified. We've gone through several series of  
3 administrative requirements for identifying records.  
4 One does not necessarily compliment the other. They're  
5 separate and distinct.

6           And currently, we use a standard subject  
7 identification code so that everything that gets  
8 written gets some kind of identifying number for  
9 information retrieval purposes in very broad  
10 categories.

11           I'll use Helen's example and show it over the  
12 Navy, just so you'll have another number to worry  
13 about.

14           In information and personnel security and  
15 other security arrangements, we have a 55-10 series.  
16 So everything that pertains to information, personnel  
17 security, physical security, will get categorized under  
18 that heading. That may include information that  
19 pertains to nuclear weapons. But I'm writing on it in  
20 my capacity as a security manager and I'm saying, okay,  
21 the attached document, or the problem dealing with  
22 physical security in nuclear weapons at a certain  
23 location is addressed in this manner. And by the way,  
24 we have 57 of this type at that location.

25           Well, when it comes time to look at that

1 record, the only thing in there that's classified is  
2 what is pertaining to the nuclear weapon, but it will  
3 have been categorized under my file series because I  
4 wrote on it. I've made a security policy decision on  
5 it. But the real classified information in there  
6 belongs to the Department of Energy.

7           So when I come across that record and look at  
8 it and say, oh, it's 55-10. But it's classified and it  
9 contains restricted data, so it goes across the street.

10           MR. ULMAS: That's where the problems come  
11 in. I'm Roger Ulmas, a Goodman Researcher. The way I  
12 see it, you and the Army are both avoiding the spirit  
13 and the intent of the Executive Order, in that this is  
14 left for a computer system. As one member of your  
15 staff mentioned, a tickler system that would let you  
16 know when some thing might be declassified if it fell  
17 into like a series classification or a special  
18 exemption.

19           This is not the intent. I would trust a less  
20 than perfect human system put on a computer system and  
21 we'd both be reassured. If there's no administrative  
22 appeal on a hidden list, I immediately get concerned.  
23 But I realized that you have had the past  
24 responsibility on much information that should be  
25 declassified, but in the past, you institutionalized --

1 not you personally -- the government has  
2 institutionalized some bad policy, and that is what has  
3 brought about the current Executive Order.

4 We have such a vast amount of documents to be  
5 declassified. Much will be hidden. And if by chance,  
6 through what errors that were being held by an agency  
7 in a classified manner because they didn't feel it was  
8 time they could let it out because it could embarrass a  
9 certain branch of the government and that was put on a  
10 list, it ought to be able to be eligible for review  
11 either within the branch of the Navy or the DoD or  
12 within the Information and Security Oversight Office.

13 But the way I see both the Army and the Navy  
14 speaking now, it's not only less than perfect, it's a  
15 cause for concern.

16 MR. BROWN: Well, we're trying our best,  
17 that's all I can say, with what we have now.

18 MR. ULMAS: But from what I've heard today,  
19 that's not good enough. There has to be a safeguard  
20 built into it because though you may be a 100 percent  
21 honest individual, the person that follows you may  
22 misinterpret what you intended. And I would like to  
23 have a chance of appeal or somebody else to have a  
24 chance to appeal if they disagree.

25 MS. KLOSS: Sir, you absolutely have an

1 appeal process. That was the panel that Dr. Goldberg  
2 briefed you on last meeting.

3 MR. ULMAS: Yes. But if I don't know what  
4 the categories are and I may be looking for it but I  
5 don't know they're on the list, there's no way them.

6 MR. WEINBERG: Excuse me. There used to be -  
7 - and I have some experience in this regard. Under the  
8 Nixon Executive Order, there was an interagency  
9 classification review board to which one could take  
10 appeals. That then disappeared in the Carter Executive  
11 Order. And my recollection, in the Reagan one. I  
12 understand there is one in a sense of a different kind  
13 reinstated. And I distinctly recall, because I took a  
14 case to them and one over the National Security Agency,  
15 with the result that very large quantities of records  
16 which they had originally kept closed, were directed  
17 open by the board to the NSA.

18 My understanding is, and I obviously could be  
19 corrected, that there has been an intent, at least, to  
20 have some kind of an appeals procedure -- this is why  
21 I'm addressing your question -- in effect reinstated  
22 now. How far along it is in actually working, I don't  
23 know. But at least my understanding is that after this  
24 gap of a good many years between the Nixon order, then  
25 eliminated in the Carter and Reagan order -- I'm sorry.

1 I don't mean to offend anyone. I'm just trying to do  
2 some periodization here.

3 But that now, again, there is to be an  
4 appeals procedure and that therefore means, if I  
5 understood your concern, that it will be possible for  
6 individuals outside the government, as I was when I  
7 took this appeal in the past, outside the government,  
8 to have a body of records which the outsider can only  
9 describe very broadly -- by definition, you haven't  
10 seen them -- looked at and reviewed and a new set of  
11 decisions made.

12 Do I understand that correctly?

13 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes. That's part of it. The  
14 other part of it is if he doesn't know what he's  
15 appealing, he can't appeal. If he doesn't know what  
16 has been exempted. This is what you're saying.

17 MS. BRAGG: Well, he's got to identify the  
18 information that's of interest to him.

19 DR. GOLDBERG: But not the file series or the  
20 specific record.

21 MS. BRAGG: No. But then you would address  
22 that as it comes in and it would go through the normal  
23 process that we take.

24 MR. WEINBERG: But if I don't know how you're  
25 describing it, the person that reads my request --

1 MS. BRAGG: Tell us how you would describe  
2 it. Tell us the information that you want.

3 DR. GOLDBERG: No. We're not going to go  
4 into that. I'm sorry. That would take too much time.

5 MR. BROWN: I would be glad to stand here and  
6 answer questions but I think we probably have some  
7 common questions that maybe after the Air Force does  
8 there, --

9 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

10 MR. LEFFLER: I have one. Can I ask one  
11 question?

12 DR. GOLDBERG: Sure.

13 MR. LEFFLER: What advice would you like from  
14 the advisory committee?

15 MR. BROWN: Early on, a decision was made --  
16 I won't say early on. I think probably at the second  
17 meeting -- that you would like to see some pilot  
18 projects which would identify certain records of  
19 certain agencies for targeting because they represent,  
20 from your perspective, those records are of great  
21 interest to historians, to researchers and to the  
22 public.

23 And I think that's the role that you are in  
24 and that's what I would want to see. At one point  
25 there was some -- there was a request that we identify

1 what we thought was important and found that to be  
2 impossible to do because everybody's got a different  
3 opinion about what that would be.

4 So from the perspective of what this panel  
5 was established to do, it's to provide a focus on where  
6 you think we should be putting our efforts in these  
7 kinds of pilot projects, like -- okay, we would like to  
8 get records of the Office of Secretary of Defense  
9 because everything flows from there.

10 And on the other side of the coin is to tell  
11 me that I don't care what happened at the Bureau of  
12 Aeronautics in 1944.

13 MR. LEFFLER: So would you be willing to sort  
14 of share with us -- not today -- and say, well, you're  
15 doing this pilot project right now; right? You've  
16 engaged in this. Tell us what you're thinking for your  
17 next pilot project and tell us what the categories of  
18 records are that you're not doing and then ask us for  
19 our advice as to whether we think you're on to the  
20 right pilot projects.

21 MR. BROWN: I'll say again, as I previously  
22 did, I invite you, all of you and any of you, to come  
23 over to the Navy Yard to sit and talk with us for as  
24 long as you want and if you would like to sit at one of  
25 our periodic meetings of Navy security and records

1 managers where we are now discussing how we're going to  
2 approach this next, you're very welcome to do that.

3 DR. GOLDBERG: Will you be receptive to  
4 recommendations from this panel to undertake a specific  
5 pilot project relating to specific records?

6 MR. BROWN: You're certainly welcome to are  
7 view --

8 MR. LEFFLER: A suggestion. Let the Army do  
9 it. You have, as I understood what you said,  
10 identified X number of files that will be exempt;  
11 correct? You have already done that?

12 MR. BROWN: Yes.

13 MR. LEFFLER: When do you expect to get to  
14 review those files that have been exempted? Do you  
15 have a timetable for getting them? And does the  
16 timetable begin after the year 2000 and do you then  
17 have an enumerated timetable when you will get to each  
18 of those files?

19 MR. BROWN: No. No. And we have not -- I  
20 have not programmed that out.

21 MR. LEFFLER: But you will let -- all the  
22 exempt files -- just answer me yes or no because I just  
23 want to know. The exempt files, will you be evaluating  
24 any of the exempt files before the year 2000?

25 MR. BROWN: That will come as part of -- yes.



1 Because that is part of the process of reviewing the  
2 record groups and file series that we're going to be  
3 looking at. Those things will come up as a normal part  
4 of that review process, but not targeted, if I  
5 understand the focus of your question, that we'll take  
6 these and bracket them, set them aside and then go back  
7 to them.

8 DR. GOLDBERG: We are going to have to break  
9 for lunch soon, but before we do, Mike Kurtz of the  
10 National Archives has asked to say a few words about my  
11 remarks about the Archives and its accession  
12 capability.

13 MR. KURTZ: Thank you very much.

14 I just wanted to kind of bring everybody up  
15 to date in a situation Dr. Goldberg described about  
16 resources and so forth. It's certainly relevant. But  
17 since we have out new building and we're in the process  
18 of completing the last seven or eight months of the  
19 move, we have been able to accession a great deal of  
20 the backlogged material that sat at the Washington  
21 National Records Center for many years.

22 So, you know, in an orderly way we continue  
23 to accession records and I don't want there to be an  
24 impression that we have a great backlog and not able to  
25 manage that.

1           I would say this about accessioning. The  
2 Executive Order has a provision where it strongly  
3 recommends that agencies systematically review their  
4 records for declassification before transferring to the  
5 National Archives. And next week we're going to begin  
6 at the Archives developing guidance and a policy that  
7 will give life to that. And so we're going to be in a  
8 good bit of communication with the agencies so that we  
9 do not let a system develop where we just build up yet  
10 another huge backlog.

11           And so we're not going to quite operate the  
12 way we did before where we'll just take everything in  
13 and where it sits. They're either going to have to be  
14 systematically reviewed before we get them or there's  
15 going to have to be a date certain or event certain of  
16 which those records will be open. Because under the  
17 law, once these records are accessioned, they become  
18 they become the responsibility of the Archivist. And  
19 for continuation of restrictions on records that are  
20 more than 30 years old requires the active decision of  
21 the Archivist. And that's in the section of the law  
22 dealing with the Archivist, the authorities under  
23 accessioning and so forth.

24           So there's going to be a good bit of change  
25 in what we're doing when it comes to accessioning over

1 the next number of months, and so I'll be giving a talk  
2 at the INTEL conference. I'll be the keynote speaker.  
3 And there'll be an opportunity to say some more about  
4 that. But it's going to mean a change in our working  
5 relationship, I think, to achieve the goal of the  
6 spirit of the order that we don't after this initial  
7 period of time, build up yet another backlog.

8 DR. GOLDBERG: Overall, do have any estimate  
9 of how far along you are in accessioning in terms of a  
10 date? You say have most DoD records up to 1965 and  
11 '67?

12 MR. KURTZ: Well, we've actually accessioned  
13 a number of Vietnam -- all the Army Vietnam records,  
14 the Army Gulf War records. So there's a way in which  
15 we've taken records into the 1980's and '90.

16 DR. GOLDBERG: So it's not an even  
17 progression by service?

18 MR. KURTZ: No. No, it's not. It varies  
19 from service to service. Each one has a different  
20 records schedule and so forth. And I want to be clear  
21 about the accession in general.

22 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Can I just comment on  
23 that?

24 As part of the move, we've brought into the  
25 Archives everything that was scheduled for transfer

1 through 1995 with the exception of some Air Force  
2 records. So, we've caught up for everything that was  
3 scheduled to come into the Archives, except for those  
4 Air Force records that we ran out of time.

5 DR. CLARKE: What's the technical term  
6 "scheduled" mean? Does that mean were offered to you?

7 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: It means that an  
8 appraisal was done, the records were determined to be  
9 permanently valuable and a date was set for when they  
10 should be transferred to the National Archives.

11 MR. KURTZ: All agencies are supposed to  
12 schedule their records whether they're temporary or  
13 permanent for disposition. And so there are record  
14 schedules for all agencies and major components of  
15 agencies.

16 DR. GOLDBERG: All right. We've going to stop  
17 for lunch now.

18 MS. KLOSS: I'm sorry. I know you all are  
19 getting hungry and I'm sure the food is on the way, but  
20 we do have another commitment with our contingency from  
21 Air Force. So, two reasons to have Air Force before  
22 lunch. One, stimulating conversation during the lunch  
23 period; two, to allow them to make their afternoon  
24 commitments. And actually, a third reason. The food  
25 is not here.

1 DR. GOLDBERG: What is their afternoon  
2 commitment?

3 MS. KLOSS: Pardon?

4 DR. GOLDBERG: What is their afternoon  
5 commitment.

6 MR. WHITE: I'll tell you in my briefing.

7 MS. KLOSS: I'm sorry, sir.

8 DR. GOLDBERG: All right. If we're going to  
9 do that, we'll take a five minute break until then.

10 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

11 DR. GOLDBERG: I think you all have a notion  
12 now of where policy really comes from. It comes from  
13 security policy, not from the Stark office.

14 We'll now have the Air Force briefing. Mr.  
15 Gene White.

16 MR. WHITE: Thank you.

17 I have an announcement to make. As of  
18 yesterday, I can tell you that the Air Force has  
19 declassified all of its pre-1947 World War II records.

20 DR. GOLDBERG: Without exception?

21 MR. WHITE: Both of them.

22 (Laughter.)

23 If I do nothing else this morning -- and by  
24 the way, I assume I'll have a hard time keeping your  
25 attention because I see lunch has arrived. I'd like to

1 introduce our team and I'm going to underline the word  
2 team because the Air Force has tried to tackle this  
3 problem a little differently from our sister services.  
4 Maybe we're stretching the margins a little bit here,  
5 but it's a team effort. First and foremost, it's a team  
6 effort.

7           So let me just introduce very quickly Colonel  
8 Linda Smith who heads up our reserve declassification  
9 activity down at Maxwell. Next to her is Archie  
10 Lafonte of the historical research activity. Colonel  
11 Select, Mike Towns, who's going to head up our Gulf War  
12 records activity. The gentleman in front of me is  
13 Lieutenant Colonel Rick DeJesus, who's our  
14 representative on the Security Policy Board staff.  
15 Next to him is Mel Basey who works in classification-  
16 declassification policy.

17           This is the problem as we see it and this is  
18 the problem that we've all been discussing this  
19 morning. Conservative estimate from Steve Garfinkle is  
20 that there are approximately two billion 25-year old  
21 permanently valuable historical records within the  
22 government. And as you can see, the Navy estimate is  
23 500 million pages. The Army estimate -- you said in  
24 your briefing 270 million. Earlier, it was 300 million  
25 approximately. And our estimate is 176 million pages.

1 So that kind of puts the problem in perspective.

2 The Department of Defense has almost half of  
3 this material within the entire government. It's a  
4 daunting task.

5 We started early for several reasons. We had  
6 a vehicle in place for reviewing massive amounts of  
7 material and bulk declassifying information starting  
8 back in 1989 with the Southeast Asia records  
9 declassification effort and we have declassified tons  
10 of material during that effort.

11 What was the page count? Anybody remember  
12 what it was?

13 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Six million.

14 MR. WHITE: Six million pages just in that  
15 effort alone. So we had some history and we had a  
16 methodology established for getting teams activated.  
17 The one twist was we decided to get reservists together  
18 to form those teams because most of them had served in  
19 Southeast Asia and knew the terminology, could do the  
20 reviews, could index and triage and do some risk  
21 management in the process.

22 We also started earlier in changing Air Force  
23 policy and approach to classification and  
24 declassification so that we would be ready to go when  
25 the Executive Order became effective.

1           We have short policy directives in the Air  
2 Force which have broad general policy statements. We  
3 have one on information security and we've revised that  
4 to emphasize declassification as a key function of our  
5 area, of our field.

6           The meat of our procedures is in the Air  
7 Force instructions. We've got one that's ready to go to  
8 the printers or will soon be ready to go to the  
9 printers on information security, which implements the  
10 Executive Order and the OMB directive. And we're  
11 waiting for the DoD 5200.1R, which is going to have  
12 additional guidance. But in the meantime, we thought  
13 it was best to get the guidance out to the field and to  
14 get our commanders developing the process for reviewing  
15 material within their commands.

16           So when the Executive Order became effective  
17 in October, we were ready to go with a policy letter  
18 signed out by our administrative assistant, the  
19 Secretary of the Air Force, telling the CINCs, the  
20 commanders out there, to get started. And we included  
21 in that letter all of the guidance that had been  
22 published to date.

23           We were also to go on with the  
24 declassification plans. As a matter of fact, we  
25 submitted our declassification plan four days before



1 the deadline. We submitted ours on the 11th of  
2 October. I'm told that it's been approved, along with  
3 Navy's, but we're still waiting on the approval letter  
4 from ISIS. I think it probably will be very much like  
5 Navy's letter.

6 We also have a high level team consisting of  
7 all of the security functionals on the Air staff that  
8 meets weekly. If we have security issues across  
9 functional lines, we refer those issues to this team.  
10 It cuts a lot of red tape and the coordination is done  
11 fairly quickly. That's the Security Advisory Group.  
12 That's that second symbol under 85-35-401. So we were  
13 able to get that energized fairly quickly.

14 Early on we were looking at a number of  
15 things. We tasked our product centers and our commands  
16 that build systems and classify information to get on a  
17 two-year clock for revising all of their security  
18 classification guides and those security classification  
19 guides now contain detailed declassification guidance  
20 looking at the future.

21 Ultimately, the answer to the  
22 declassification issue that we're facing now is good  
23 classification for the future, so we need to pay  
24 attention to that. We have been trying to pay some  
25 attention to it, but not as much as we should. But

1 we're going to focus combined guidance, classification  
2 guides and declassification guides, in the same  
3 document.

4 As I'll mention later, we're going to try to  
5 get those on a database or a key word system in CD-ROM,  
6 so our classifiers can jump on the CD-ROM and key word  
7 search the issues that they're working and get an  
8 answer.

9 We're going to publish a handbook on  
10 classification and declassification and we're working  
11 on some self-paced, computer-based training modules so  
12 that folks out in the field where a lot of these  
13 records are, can sit down and work through the  
14 procedures and what's expected of them more critically.

15 Now, for our plan. I have to tell you that  
16 in a recent article of Steven Aftergood's publication,  
17 we were maligned a little bit because he missed our  
18 point. We said that the 176 million pages of material  
19 out there we 25 years old.

20 By the way, we got that estimate early on  
21 from our commands. We went to our commands. We asked  
22 them to do an estimate based on estimating guidance  
23 that was provide by the Information Security Oversight  
24 Office, and that's the figure that they all came back  
25 with. Not jut the repositories, not just the

1 libraries, but also the materials out there in the  
2 commands.

3           We said instead of trying to figure out what  
4 file series this information would fall within, we were  
5 going to say -- first of all, our interpretation of a  
6 Presidential exemption is a unique one-of-a-kind piece  
7 of specific information that nobody's seen before. In  
8 our view, if we find information that absolutely must  
9 be exempted, most of it, 99 percent of it will fall  
10 within the exemptions that have already been specified  
11 in the nine exemption categories of the Executive  
12 Order. The Secretary of the Air Force has the  
13 authority to approve and sign-off on those exemptions,  
14 if we find them. But we're going to identify those  
15 exemptions as we go.

16           We're opening up. We're not doing blanket  
17 exemptions. We're opening up all 176 million pages for  
18 review and we're going to try to look at all 176  
19 million pages with the idea of getting as much of it  
20 out as we can.

21           We're going to go after the most difficult  
22 material first. We're going to go after the high value  
23 stuff that's of interest to you folks, to historians,  
24 and the American people first, for two reasons. One is  
25 because we can show some progress if we do that, as you

1 were mentioning earlier. Secondly, it gives us time.

2           Now, for instance, if we find documents or  
3 pieces of information that have lots of equity,  
4 restricted data, for instance, human intelligence  
5 sources and method is another, we'll be able to refer  
6 those and get the answers back and we'll have the full  
7 four years. So we're going after the most difficult  
8 material first. And in fact, some of our early reviews  
9 under these guidelines were of top secret material in  
10 the large records repositories and we have declassified  
11 a big chunk of that. And I'll talk a little bit more  
12 about that later.

13           Our goal is 20 percent reviewed per year, not  
14 necessarily 15 percent declassified. We think we may  
15 reach a higher percentage per year once this process  
16 gets going full steam. And we're focusing, as someone  
17 mentioned earlier, on the training aspect because we  
18 opted to go with a decentralized approach and we opted  
19 to have a large team work this, consisting of reviewers  
20 at the command level, as well as centralized review  
21 efforts going on out of Maxwell and here in Washington.

22           So, training is key. We've got some training  
23 tools that are already available. We're developing  
24 other training tools. Most of these folks and at  
25 Maxwell are developing a wonderful tool book which has

1 a methodology. It has a triage approach to reviewing  
2 documents, large quantities of documents in  
3 categories -- and it's a tremendous tool that people  
4 can use and get familiar with fairly quickly and start  
5 reviewing documents.

6 Is that available? Do you know about that?

7 So it's available now.

8 Now, we also in our plan establish a method.  
9 We're requiring the subordinate commands, the major  
10 commands and their subordinate elements, along with the  
11 declassification centers, to report quarterly on their  
12 activities.

13 You have a copy of this chart in what's in  
14 front of you, but for those of you who don't, the  
15 yellow represents those documents that were reviewed  
16 and reported. The green column represents those that  
17 will probably be exempted. The red column represents  
18 those documents that we declassified. Just flat  
19 declassified. And you can see we're already up in the  
20 millions and we're only two-quarters into the effort.  
21 We're way up into the millions.

22 And considering the fact that it takes time  
23 and it takes a lot of communication and a lot of effort  
24 and coordination to get an organization like a major  
25 command underway and rolling on an effort like this,

1 this is pretty good. And we expect that once we get  
2 well underway, those figures are going to skyrocket.

3 I mentioned earlier, we're not asking for  
4 resources. One of the strengths of the Air Force  
5 program is that we have a network of security managers  
6 that go all the way to our small unit level. We have  
7 roughly 6,500 information security managers out there,  
8 most of whom are part-time, whose job it is to provide  
9 security support to local commands. That's a resource  
10 that's already there.

11 The policy decision that we made early on was  
12 that we were going to take some of the time, which  
13 also, of course, is a resource, that they are currently  
14 allocating to other security functions and we're going  
15 to re-prioritize that time to this effort. That,  
16 coupled with the efforts, the tremendous efforts of the  
17 classification review teams and the reservists that we  
18 were able to bring on specific problems has given us  
19 the mechanism for starting the effort.

20 Now, along with the metric that you saw on  
21 the level of activity, we're going to be looking at  
22 whether or not we reach plateaus and we're also going  
23 to be looking at issues that are surfaced by the  
24 commands and we're still waiting to see how much work  
25 we're going to get coming in the way of referrals from

1 other agencies and activities.

2 But this is our team. And as you can see,  
3 it's not just security guys. In fact, our  
4 administrative assistant by the way regrets he could be  
5 here. He wanted to be here, Mr. Bill Davidson. He's  
6 our honcho. He's providing Secretary of the Air Force  
7 level support to this entire effort.

8 I mentioned earlier the Security Advisory  
9 Group where we can quickly coordinate issues any time  
10 we have any problems that our customers may have coming  
11 into the Air Force and we can get those out there and  
12 get them working.

13 We rely heavily on Air staff for functional  
14 expertise, MAJCOM functional expertise, and the unit  
15 security managers to bring unit security expertise to  
16 get our subject matter reviews.

17 By the way, someone asked do you really have  
18 permanently valuable historical documents out there  
19 that are still within the units or have they all been  
20 accessioned to the Directors' Repositories or the  
21 Centers. Well, a good example is the B-52 operations.  
22 The defensive doctrine for B-52's is well over 30 years  
23 old. There's no question. And it's still  
24 operational. But I think it's an historically valuable  
25 document.

1           So we have lots of material that's out there  
2   in the units that's going to require review, and  
3   someone is going to be able to make the determination.

4           I mentioned we have a reserve classification  
5   team.

6           Now, we view you folks as second to the  
7   American people. You people are our customers, our  
8   main customers. That's why you have such a large  
9   contingent here from the Air Force and that's why we're  
10   listening very intently to your ideas and  
11   recommendations. We're taking notes and we're going to  
12   take them back with us. And we're not standing up here  
13   claiming to have all the answers.

14          The other thing -- and I'll wrap it up. The  
15   other thing that we've done is we've initiated a number  
16   of parallel actions. I mentioned earlier we're going  
17   to work the problem of better initial classification  
18   and better initial declassification decisions of  
19   information that's been classified. We're going to  
20   work that line. We're going to try and cross-index  
21   classification decisions so people faced with  
22   classifying a document can look on some sort of  
23   centralized database and determine whether or not like  
24   information has been classified and what decisions have  
25   already been made.



1           We'd like to get the Army and the Navy  
2 involved in this project as well, so that we can have  
3 some cross-referencing if we have it on a joint system.

4           We're working on a declassification database.

5           Now, what does IRIS stand for, Ms. Smith, the  
6 IRIS system? Are you all familiar with the IRIS?

7       Okay.

8           We're going to try to use the IRIS system to  
9 enter all of our declassification decisions. We've  
10 been working on it. Matter of fact, Ms. Smith just  
11 hosted a meeting down at Maxwell with a lot of people  
12 to work just that issue.

13           When we do that, hopefully we'll be able to  
14 eliminate a lot of duplication because right now one of  
15 the concerns is there's duplication between the  
16 commands and the repositories and the centers out  
17 there. I think whoever gets there first needs to be  
18 able to enter their action in this database so that the  
19 next person to come along looking at similar material  
20 can reference -- can go right to it and say, oh, this  
21 has been done. I don't have to do it. Either destroy  
22 it or send it back.

23           So that's an issue that we're working now.  
24 But we're trying to get as much of this automated as  
25 possible, not only for now, for the hearing now, but as

1 someone mentioned, for posterity.

2 Bulk declassification is something we've had  
3 some experience with and we will both declassifying  
4 material, which is another argument for going after the  
5 high risk stuff first because a little further down the  
6 road when we're in the moderate risk and the low risk  
7 areas, we'll be a little bit further along. We can  
8 make bulk declassification decisions, I think.

9 We're going to have a WEB site. That's  
10 pretty soon, am I correct? So that folks who don't  
11 have access to the IRIS system right now can jump on  
12 the WEB, can find out what's available in terms of  
13 training, can find out who to contact if they have a  
14 problem and those sort of things.

15 How far along are we on that?

16 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: We can let the  
17 committee know. We're looking to have the WEB site up  
18 and running by the end of June.

19 MR. WHITE: Okay. When we get that address,  
20 we'll get it to you so that you can put it on your  
21 bookmark and go to it and see what we're doing.

22 And finally, most importantly, someone  
23 mentioned earlier that none of this is any good if we  
24 don't have an active awareness and training campaign  
25 and if it's not focused on senior leadership as well as

1 the folks who are actually going to do the work.

2 I don't know if you've seen our video but we  
3 put together a quality video production, 17 minutes  
4 long. The bottom line is, "Get started. Do it." And  
5 it's kind of neat. If you haven't seen it, I think we  
6 can get that available to you, as well. It's sort of a  
7 60 Minute type thing. You know, problem introduced and  
8 then a solution. And then it runs pretty fast.

9 We're using that to kind of introduce senior  
10 management to what we're trying to do.

11 I'm getting reports in from some of our major  
12 commands now. They've got four star level interest in  
13 making sure that we do this. And we're also working on  
14 revising and modifying training the training. We've  
15 gotten as far as the classification authorities to get  
16 them to make smart declassification decisions, as well.

17 That's a very quick rundown of what usually  
18 is a 35 or 40 minute presentation. I'd like to finish  
19 the way I started. We're behind this effort because we  
20 think that it's positive. We think it's positive  
21 because if we can get rid of stuff, we can get stuff  
22 out to the public, we can tell our story, which is a  
23 good story, number one.

24 Number two, if we get rid of classified  
25 material that no longer requires protection, we can

1 reallocate the resources that we have left over to  
2 better protect the stuff that truly critical, truly  
3 sensitive.

4           We're going to screw up. We know there are  
5 going to be screw-ups. We know that information is  
6 going to be released that probably shouldn't be  
7 released. I sort of wanted to comment on your -- you  
8 know, hide an important weapon in the forest. Because  
9 there's the first rule of chaos theory that says that  
10 they will also go directly to the thing you're trying  
11 to hide.

12           (Laughter.)

13           So, that's my presentation. Can we answer  
14 any questions? I'm going to refer technical issues to  
15 our team.

16           By the way, the reason we have a commitment  
17 this afternoon is because these folks form a team, a  
18 cross-functional team. And we're looking at these  
19 issues. As a matter of fact, Mr. Sheldon Wilberg who  
20 usually attends those will be here with you folks. But  
21 we're working these issues real time now, so --

22           DR. GOLDBERG: Do they have to leave early?  
23 Is that what you're saying?

24           MR. WHITE: Yes.

25           DR. GOLDBERG: When?

1 MR. WHITE: When's your meeting scheduled?

2 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: 4:00.

3 DR. GOLDBERG: What? Catch a plane?

4 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: At 1:00.

5 MR. WHITE: I think Dr. Goldberg is  
6 suggesting, what could possibly be more important than  
7 this meeting right now.

8 (Laughter.)

9 GEN. ARMSTRONG: How are you handling the SAC  
10 and the NORAD records.

11 MR. WHITE: Joint staff. In other words, --

12 GEN. ARMSTRONG: Wait a minute. Air Force  
13 has executive agency for those two particular unified  
14 commands which means you have record responsibility.

15 MR. WHITE: And a lot of that's going to be  
16 referred. Referred and coordinated with the Joint  
17 Staff. Air Force is not going to act unilaterally on  
18 the SAC.

19 GEN. ARMSTRONG: Okay. So you're basically --  
20 have you started that process yet? Have you talked to  
21 anybody in the Joint Staff and told them you're going  
22 to do that?

23 MR. WHITE: Have we?

24 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: [Off mike.]

25 MR. WHITE: Don't think so.

1 GEN. ARMSTRONG: They have one declassifier.  
2 One.

3 MR. WHITE: Is that right?

4 GEN. ARMSTRONG: Yes. And, you know --

5 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Archie's got some  
6 comments on that.

7 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: We're working right  
8 now with the OASD, particularly on the SYOP question  
9 and we will be working -- we have started some  
10 coordination with JCS. The SAC histories and the NORAD  
11 histories fall into a common category of Air Force  
12 records that involve so many different parties.

13 NORAD involves Canada. It involves foreign  
14 countries. And all of these issues we are addressing  
15 either in terms of coordination or in terms of  
16 guidance. This type of process does not happen  
17 overnight, as all of you in the room are probably aware  
18 of.

19 But, yes, we're addressing it. As a matter  
20 of fact, as I speak the SAC histories from 1950 through  
21 1975 are currently being reviewed and all these issues  
22 are being addressed through both the Air Force and the  
23 OASD, which is also involved in the process.

24 GEN. ARMSTRONG: That's fine for the  
25 histories but what about the bulk of the SAC records,

1 which as I understand it, are held at Maxwell.

2 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Excuse me. We are  
3 talking about the records at Maxwell. The records at  
4 the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell  
5 consist primarily of SAC organizational and unit  
6 histories. There's a misunderstanding -- I've gotten a  
7 few FOIA's in that regard -- that we have this massive  
8 unprocessed SAC historical files down at Maxwell.

9 Basically, that, we don't have. We're  
10 talking about SAC histories, unit histories, numbered  
11 Air Force histories, squadron and wing histories  
12 primarily, some other type of historical documents,  
13 primarily.

14 GEN. ARMSTRONG: What about the rest of the  
15 SAC records?

16 MR. HEIMDAHL: Much of the oversight records  
17 are in the Records Center at St. Louis. I assume what  
18 we will do once we have the institutional record to  
19 look at the SAC histories, we can then apply that same  
20 thing to the SAC records.

21 MR. WHITE: Now, someone suggested earlier  
22 that we might want to look at a pilot program and that  
23 would be a tough one to bite off but you're probably  
24 right. You probably do need to get started. That  
25 might be a good candidate for a pilot program.

1           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: One thing, though,  
2 about a pilot program is that our pilot program was the  
3 whole Southeast Asia project, records from '61 to '75.  
4 And after a 3-1/2 year review of those records of Air  
5 Force information, we were able to declassify 98  
6 percent of it. The 2 percent was that kind of  
7 information that had to be referred to CIA or --

8           MR. WHITE: SAC is going to be a little more  
9 difficult, but it's a very good question. It's got  
10 everything from operational doctrine all the way to  
11 targeting. I don't know if the decision has been made  
12 on whether or not those targets, for instance, and the  
13 SYOP itself, which is read annually, whether that's of  
14 historical value or not because of the specious nature  
15 of the targeting information.

16           MR. LEFFLER: It's historically valuable.

17           (Laughter.)

18           DR. GOLDBERG: Let me ask a key question.  
19 Does the Air Force team expect to have lunch before  
20 going on to the next meeting?

21           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Well, yes, sir. We  
22 didn't order lunch but we could certainly walk around.

23           MR. WHITE: Would you like for us to continue  
24 after lunch?

25           DR. GOLDBERG: They have another meeting at



1 1:00, --

2 MR. WHITE: They might be able to slip it for  
3 a little while, if you'd like for us to be --

4 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Yes, sir. We can  
5 delay it.

6 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, no. But you haven't had  
7 lunch yet, if you'd like to have it.

8 Well, I think we can delay. This is a cold  
9 lunch, I take it, isn't it? I guess we can go on a  
10 little while.

11 MR. ULMAS: My name is Michael Ulmas, a  
12 civilian researcher. Air Force intelligence records  
13 have disappeared and a lot of records -- yes, they  
14 have. And a lot of records were transferred from Air  
15 Force intelligence to NSA. Would you be able to locate  
16 and reacquire the records transferred to NSA, the  
17 intelligence records from Vietnam era, I'm referring  
18 to.

19 MR. WHITE: How are we handling NSA?

20 Let me preface this. There's unique  
21 relationship there. If you're researching it, the Air  
22 Force is the only military department that issues NSA  
23 accounts, COMSEC accounts, for instance, and does the  
24 security type things for the NSA's national mission.  
25 Can't talk too much more about it right now, but there

1 is an issue there and I believe that the NSA will have  
2 the final say on what's going to happen to those  
3 records because everything the Air Force did was in  
4 support of that organization.

5 MR. ULMAS: Okay. And other air  
6 intelligence, such as, in particular, the 7607 cam  
7 televisions.

8 MR. WHITE: We're looking at those records.

9 MR. ULMAS: You are looking at them?

10 MR. WHITE: Yes.

11 MR. ULMAS: Okay.

12 MR. WHITE: And there's another privacy creed  
13 that we haven't talked about yet and we're working on a  
14 way to do it in an efficient manner, but once you've  
15 made a decision to declassify, that's half the thing.  
16 The other half is something you mentioned earlier. You  
17 need to show where those records are and how you can  
18 get access to them, and those can be released to the  
19 public, we need to start a mechanism for release to the  
20 public.

21 DR. GOLDBERG: Marc was next.

22 MR. TRACHTENBERG: I have to say I was real  
23 impressed with your presentation and especially your  
24 comment that you're not doing blanket exemptions.  
25 Because one of the things that disturbed some of us in

1 the Air Force plan that we were given, they were given  
2 blanket exemptions for entire records groups.

3 So I take it that what that was was just to  
4 kind of give yourself protection in terms of the  
5 Executive Order, but you're doing really the right  
6 thing because you're going through everything.

7 But the rest of the question I have is, if  
8 you're going to be going through everything anyway,  
9 what do you need from us in the way of input. It's not  
10 like we would say do this rather than do that.

11 MR. WHITE: We need you to help us prioritize  
12 that information that's already in the high risk areas.  
13 You need to tell us what's important to you so that we  
14 can go after that information first.

15 MR. LEFFLER: Well, have you begun to look at  
16 the records of the Secretary of the Air Force?

17 MR. WHITE: Have we?

18 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Yes, sir. The one  
19 thing that you did require from us in your -- one  
20 gentleman sent out the kind of serious work. We  
21 started with top secret and we have reviewed the top  
22 secret. There were a lot of secret files in there that  
23 we've not gotten to yet, but out of the list that you  
24 did give us, we have reviewed 50 percent of that and  
25 we're only into not even the first half of the year.

1           So I feel very confident. It confirmed for  
2 us that what we thought was valuable, you also had  
3 listed those as the same. So I felt like we had  
4 correlated that quite well, although we didn't plan it  
5 that way, but we were thankful that it did.

6           MR. TRACHTENBERG: Can I just follow-up with  
7 this? How can we help you prioritize? You are the  
8 professionals. You're the ones with the hands-on  
9 experience. You've seen all of that stuff. We're, you  
10 know, basically coming at this from the outside.

11           If you had specific questions having to do  
12 with specific problems that emerge in the course of  
13 your work that you think that our particular kind of  
14 expertise can bear on, --

15           MR. WHITE: We do. We do.

16           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Well, sir, I think of  
17 your interest. And I also think that you're the  
18 public. You have access, supporting the fact that we  
19 are trying to meet these requirements under the EO.  
20 Four years ago when I got into declassification, I  
21 didn't even think I knew how to spell the word. I had  
22 been in intelligence for years and never had anything  
23 on declassification, so it is a very young field. It's  
24 a very young discipline. But I think the public, the  
25 access you have for the public can help tell what we

1 are doing. I think that would be very helpful.

2 MR. WHITE: Right. You gentlemen, you  
3 channel work, you monitor work that's being done.  
4 Sheldon helps us tremendously in helping us sort the  
5 areas that we need to focus on, so there are ways. And  
6 we do consider you our primary customers.

7 DR. WAMPLER: The declassification database  
8 you talked about, which seems to be sort of a  
9 precedence database, so they can go out and see where a  
10 prior decision is made.

11 Is there room for that to evolve so that a  
12 decision taken in 1996 doesn't sort of establish the  
13 baseline for a decision taken in the year 1999?

14 MR. WHITE: Yes. And I'd like to refer to  
15 Mr. Garfinkle, who kind of snuck in and is seated in  
16 the back of the room here.

17 In fact, you have some efforts ongoing now to  
18 come up with a government wide declassification system,  
19 do you not, Steve?

20 MR. GARFINKLE: Well, that is one of the  
21 requirements of the order, that ultimately there be a  
22 government wide database.

23 I have to say that what it will ultimately  
24 look like is something we don't know now. We are  
25 looking at what various agencies are doing and I think

1 ultimately this database is not going to be totally  
2 centralized, but rather it's going to be a series of  
3 databases at the various agencies with a capability of  
4 communicating.

5 DR. WAMPLER: I don't know whether I made my  
6 question clear enough, but I got the sense this  
7 database was primarily initially for the use of your  
8 reviewers so they could get up to speed quickly on  
9 decisions that have been made and not have to reinvent  
10 the wheel on certain decisions.

11 MR. WHITE: It's both. For reviewers, yes,  
12 and the reviewers will use it. But ultimately the plan  
13 is for researchers to be able to access it and  
14 determine --

15 DR. WAMPLER: Yes. And my concern was that a  
16 decision that's made on the basis of sensitivities in  
17 one year doesn't establish a set decision down the  
18 road.

19 MR. WHITE: You're absolutely right. Yes.

20 DR. WAMPLER: So it can be.

21 MR. WHITE: And it needs to be a continuous  
22 effort. A comment was made earlier about revisiting  
23 information that's exempted. We're going to try to  
24 establish dates for ultimate declassification if we  
25 can. If we can't, we're going to go back. We need to

1 get past this initial five years first to make sure  
2 that we give everything a good look. And then the  
3 information that remains, the delta, we're going to  
4 take a look at again.

5 Plus, remember, there's an ongoing effort now  
6 that's going to be continuous with information that's  
7 becoming 25 years old.

8 DR. WAMPLER: Well, we're tackling the most  
9 difficult material first, but within that time frame,  
10 are you taking a strictly chronological approach? I  
11 mean, how are you breaking this down in terms of how  
12 you pull things over from the National Records Center  
13 somewhere else?

14 What's your process and what's your schedule?

15 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: We're doing a  
16 combination, actually. Pretty much going through in  
17 combination.

18 No, we have not done the review here at NARA.  
19 We have not started that. We've been working at  
20 Suitland and, of course, supporting, the Historical  
21 Research Agency review. But we are doing a combination  
22 of low risk review, medium risk and high risk.

23 There are certain series of boxes that we go  
24 into that are so low risk that we will not review them.  
25 Others, we will look at maybe a random sampling. So

1 you have a schematic from very high to very low,  
2 depending on your experience and depending upon the  
3 guides that you have. It could be one or a combination  
4 of those methods.

5 DR. WAMPLER: Is that schematic based on  
6 discrete retired records?

7 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: It's based on the  
8 record database that we have from NARA and also from  
9 Suitland, plus -- Archie can give you details about how  
10 their particular system, which is already inventoried  
11 document by document. One of the advantages of what  
12 we're doing is not just declassification but it's  
13 building that database, and that's critical because we  
14 don't have that database.

15 MR. WHITE: Yes. We don't have line items on  
16 documents. Some agencies do. Archie does. But he's  
17 the exception.

18 DR. WAMPLER: But you do have like 135's for  
19 different retired records and it makes more sense, it  
20 seems to me, just logistically in using your resources  
21 to bring a whole record accession over and go through  
22 it. And there will be a whole mix of high, low and  
23 medium category materials.

24 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: If I may make a  
25 comment about the prioritizing. At the Historical



1 Research Agency, we have item level description of our  
2 records, which are primarily organizational and unit  
3 histories. So we have an advantage over the National  
4 Archives, for example, where we don't deal with files  
5 series. We deal with individual documents.

6 And what we have done is we have let our  
7 customers, who are researchers that come to the agency  
8 who sent in a request for review or FOIAs tell us what  
9 record types and what organizations, what MAJCOMs or  
10 what have you are the most important based on the  
11 magnitude of the requests.

12 And we have already started that. We've been  
13 doing systematic review since October of last year.  
14 Actually, we've been doing a systematic review since  
15 the mid '70s, to be accurate, at the Historical  
16 Research Agency.

17 So we have reviewed a large volume of our old  
18 material already and what we're doing is, as we notice  
19 what types of requests are coming in and what do they  
20 primarily deal with, we target those MAJCOMs or those  
21 units.

22 For example, we are doing all of the Air  
23 Force operational wing histories because at our agency,  
24 those are the most popular single type history that we  
25 have. So we're starting with the first wing and we're

1 going all the way to the 90099th wing, if such a thing  
2 exists. And we're doing a systematic review of all of  
3 the histories and we're identifying all of the issues.  
4 And anything that we've reviewed, we will then put on  
5 our database.

6 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: One thing that Mr.  
7 White now has done in the Air Force, and I think the  
8 other services, too, is that this is as much an  
9 information management problem as it is a security  
10 problem. And we, this team that we're meeting with has  
11 the information management people there and we're  
12 trying to grapple with the problems of not having 135's  
13 in every box, how those are organized and so forth, to  
14 maybe -- and we have a full time SCM here, an  
15 information manager on board now working just  
16 declassification, and to hope to prevent some of the  
17 problems in the future.

18 DR. WAMPLER: But in terms of how you review  
19 it and whether it gets to the end user at some point,  
20 you'll have to be able to hand off retired accession to  
21 the Archives. So if you take a topical approach using  
22 your document item listing, there's a tradeoff there  
23 between going through the material in that manner and  
24 going through it in the manner in which you finally  
25 have a total accession that you've finished and you're

1 ready to hand off.

2 MR. WHITE: That's a good point. One of the  
3 things we're going to do in the future after we get  
4 through this frenetic level of activity that we're in  
5 right now, we're going to establish as a policy that we  
6 will not accession records to the National Archives  
7 until they've been declassified. So we're going to  
8 accession only declassified records to the National  
9 Archives.

10 That will make your life a lot easier.

11 DR. GOLDBERG: Let me make one observation  
12 before we stop for lunch. Many agencies and some of  
13 the services had some kind of declassification program  
14 underway before this Executive Order came into effect,  
15 which means that most of them had already reviewed and  
16 declassified a substantial body of document which  
17 presumably can count against their numbers for the  
18 first, second or third years, whatever. If one looks  
19 at it that way, it's possible that some of them have  
20 already done 15 or 30 percent or whatever, and that it  
21 would be possible to then undertake pilot projects  
22 looking at very high level materials.

23 We might want to discuss that later on. We  
24 won't do it now. It's something I do think has to be  
25 given some thought because it does pertain directly to

1 this matter of numbers and it seems to me they skew the  
2 whole process.

3 Let's stop now for lunch.

4 (Whereupon, the luncheon recess was taken at  
5 12:20 p.m.)

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## 1 AFTERNOON SESSION

2 [1:00 p.m.]

3 DR. GOLDBERG: We are going to have the last  
4 briefing of the day here, but I think not the least by  
5 any means. Colonel Dietrich is heading up a project  
6 which is very specific and limited in its scope. I  
7 think he has a great deal to offer us by way of  
8 information and insight into the problems of doing  
9 declassification.

10 Colonel Dietrich.

11 COL. DIETRICH: Thank you, sir.

12 I'm Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dietrich. I  
13 work at the U. S. Army Center of Military History and  
14 I'm the Director of the U.S. Army Gulf War  
15 Declassification Project. I tend to be outspoken, so  
16 I'd like to make it clear that the views I express  
17 today are my own and not to be construed as views of  
18 the U.S. Army, DoD or the government.

19 MS. KLOSS: We captured that on the record.  
20 Thank you.

21 COL. DIETRICH: On 22 March 1995, then Deputy  
22 Secretary of Defense Dr. John White signed a memorandum  
23 based on a meeting he had just come from with the  
24 President and that memorandum I consider to be the  
25 charter for the declassification of Gulf War records.

1 The primary focus in that declassification effort was  
2 to locate and declassify those records from the Gulf  
3 War which could help shed light on Persian Gulf War  
4 veterans' illnesses.

5 The memorandum created what I call a triad  
6 where the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency  
7 is responsible for the declassification of the  
8 intelligence records; the Assistant Secretary of  
9 Defense for Health Affairs is responsible for the  
10 declassification of medical records, as well as medical  
11 research and investigation.

12 Another mandate created a DoD Persian Gulf  
13 War Veterans' Illnesses Health Investigation Team,  
14 which I'll probably call the I-Team, and they received  
15 the declassified and classified records and used that  
16 in their investigation and analysis.

17 And then the third part of the triad is the  
18 Army was tasked with coordinative oversight for the  
19 declassification of operational records DoD wide. That  
20 responsibility passed to the Undersecretary of the  
21 Army, the Honorable Joe Reeder. And in May of last  
22 year, the Center of Military History, my boss,  
23 Brigadier General Mylecastle and I became responsible  
24 to Secretary Reeder for the day-to-day operations of  
25 the Army's mission.

1           Our mission is to coordinate the DoD wide  
2 operational records declassification effort and under  
3 our purview we have the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which  
4 has completed its mission. We have General  
5 Schwartzkoff's old headquarters at U.S. Central Command  
6 which is well underway down at Bill Air Force Base.

7           We have the U.S. Air Force, headed by Colonel  
8 Lynn Smith, who was here earlier and Lieutenant Colonel  
9 Mike Townes, who specifically heads the Gulf War  
10 portion of their declassification effort. And we have  
11 the sea services, which we are moving into, where my  
12 operation is located in Falls Church in Skyline Five so  
13 we can get some synergy with the Department of Navy and  
14 Marines there.

15           And we've been working very closely with  
16 Colonel Mike Monigan and Dr. Dudley in that effort and  
17 they have a team on site that meet.

18           Phase I of our operation is to declassify all  
19 those operational records which could help shed light  
20 on Persian Gulf War veterans' illnesses by December of  
21 1996, the end of this calendar year. Mr. Reeder has  
22 also tasked us to continue on beyond that to continue  
23 declassifying all the operational records from the Gulf  
24 War in what I call Phase II operations.

25           We also have to respond expeditiously to

1 requests from the DoD investigation team and all the  
2 documents that we have cleared for public release we  
3 post through the Defense Technical Information Center  
4 onto the Worldwide WEB on a page called GULFLINK.

5 Most of what I'm going to talk about today is  
6 exclusive to the Army's part of this mission, the  
7 Army's declassification effort. I'm prepared to  
8 address what the other services are doing and, of  
9 course, they have representatives here who can go into  
10 further detail, if necessary.

11 Under my control at Skyline Five I have 12  
12 military, 23 GS civilian employees, anywhere from 15 to  
13 35 full-time contractors, for a total of anywhere from  
14 50 to about 70 people working just on the Army's part  
15 of this mission. Out of that, I have 15 full-time  
16 classifiers.

17 We have decided that we would use an  
18 automated approach to our mission. And why automation?  
19 We have an estimated 10 million pages of Army documents  
20 from the Gulf War. You stack them up and they're twice  
21 as tall as the Sears Tower. I'll go into the 20 miles  
22 of records that was discussed earlier today.

23 Another reason for automation is the mission  
24 to put the information on the Worldwide WEB, which  
25 requires that the documents be digitized. And we also



1 thought that the only way we could get through all  
2 these documents and search them for the potential  
3 health related documents was to scan them and let the  
4 computer do an automated search for those health  
5 related documents so that we could meet our time line.

6 I'll walk you through this. It's not as  
7 painful as it may look.

8 This is our automated system. As far as I  
9 can tell, it's the only one of its kind in the world.  
10 It's the only system that we've found that is a fully  
11 integrated system. It can take a piece of paper, scan  
12 it, turn it into an image, take that image if it's  
13 machine generated and convert it into searchable text,  
14 put it into a digitized archive, search it and then  
15 send it through a workflow process to a  
16 declassification team that can then review and  
17 declassify that document on computer and then release  
18 that on the Worldwide WEB.

19 The only fully integrated system with all  
20 those capabilities that we've found. We've had visits  
21 from other government agencies to see our system and  
22 its capabilities, to see what they can learn from it  
23 and the applications for their own requirements for  
24 Executive Order 12958.

25 Part of our challenge was to locate and

1 gather the Army's records which are scattered to the  
2 four winds. I have an article in the current issue of  
3 Military Review that talks about historians in the  
4 information age. And in one of my footnotes, I made a  
5 comment that's along the lines of the feeling is  
6 widespread that the modern Army recordkeeping system is  
7 an abject failure. That was part of our challenge.  
8 Fine the records and get them to Skyline.

9           When records come in, we have a customized  
10 automated system where we immediately begin the  
11 digitization process. We log those records in, the  
12 boxes and the folders, into our computer system, and  
13 that begins the automated indexing of the documents.  
14 We use barcodes and handheld scanners.

15           Then they go on our shelves. And when we are  
16 ready later to put that box into the workflow, it then  
17 goes to one of our contract teams that does most of the  
18 work I'm going to describe now.

19           They take the box and they prepare it for  
20 scanning. And during the preparation phase they put a  
21 barcoded document separator in front of each folder so  
22 when we scan it, the computer knows where one folder  
23 begins and ends. And then they put another barcoded  
24 sheet like that in the front of each document so again  
25 the scanner knows where one document begins and ends.

1           They remove the staples, the paper clips.  
2   Some of the message sheets are this long. They have to  
3   cut that down to no longer than 11 inches so it will  
4   feed through the scanners. They have to be careful  
5   they cut it so they don't destroy any text in the  
6   process. The oversized documents, they take those and  
7   put them on a photocopier and try to reduce those to  
8   8-1/2 x 11 so that will feed through the photocopier.

9           So, that's the document prep process.

10          As stuff goes back into boxes -- and  
11   sometimes what's one box, because of all the work we  
12   have to do to prepare it, becomes a box and a half and  
13   two boxes. And that goes back on the shelf, prepared  
14   for scanning.

15          When we're ready, that box will then go to  
16   the scanners and they feed it through -- I have two  
17   Kodak scanners. Each one can scan up to 60 pages a  
18   minute. Our throughput goal is 20,000 pages per day  
19   through this system.

20          Now, somebody's calculating here. I'm not  
21   going to do all 10 million pages this year. I can  
22   address that later.

23          And I also have a customized application we  
24   use with the scanner to scan in some of the indexing  
25   information that we generated when the boxes came in.

1           Once it goes through the scanner, it goes  
2 through both the hardware and the software image  
3 enhancement feature, two image enhancement steps. And  
4 what that does is it takes this paper that we scan and  
5 takes the image from that paper and then it cleans it  
6 up and makes the best quality image technologically  
7 possible. And in most cases, that image in the  
8 computer is now of much better quality, much more  
9 readable than the original piece of paper that we  
10 scanned into the system.

11           And it goes to a visual quality check station  
12 where I again have contractors at computer terminals  
13 that look at every piece of paper, every image coming  
14 across the screen and make sure it's oriented properly.  
15 And they make a determination right there whether the  
16 document can be what we call OCR'd. That's where it's  
17 sent through a software program, optical character  
18 recognition or optical character reader. You can do  
19 that with only machine generated information.

20           If it's good enough quality machine generated  
21 copy, you can send it through the OCR engine and it  
22 will convert that image into a searchable text file.  
23 Some of our documents are printed in such poor quality,  
24 done on a dot matrix printer or maybe it came through a  
25 fax machine, maybe it's the 20th generation photocopy

1 of that faded information. optical character  
2 recognition program might not be able to decipher it.  
3 So that would not be OCR'd. If it's handwriting, it  
4 would not be OCR'd. That's a judgment call on the  
5 operator's part.

6 Now, some of those images, when the BQC  
7 operator looks at them, he may say, you know, this  
8 isn't a real good quality image here. I think we could  
9 maybe re-scan that and change some of the parameters on  
10 our program here to get a little bit better quality  
11 image. He'll flag those to go to a rework station.

12 If that batch is flagged to go to rework  
13 because of a few pages in there to be re-scanned, the  
14 rework operators, again contractors, will go to the  
15 box, will use our indexing information that's appended  
16 to that document, find the piece of paper on the box,  
17 put it on a flat bed scanner and will adjust the  
18 parameters on the image part of the system to get the  
19 best quality image possible for that piece of paper.

20 Once the rework is done, then it goes to our  
21 indexing workstations where again contractors sit  
22 there. And if the document has not been flagged to be  
23 OCR'd, they will then look at that non-OCRable document  
24 and they will skim the document, the image, picking out  
25 all the -- we've got about 300 health related key words

1 and we've got those in other applications in an index  
2 field in the computer. It's a pick list.

3           So they'll skim the document. If they see  
4 any of those key words in the document, they'll just go  
5 to the pick list and click on those words and those  
6 words automatically appear in the full text searchable  
7 index field with that document. So if it's got an OCR  
8 text, that's searchable. If it doesn't have an OCR  
9 text, we create a searchable text with this index field  
10 for those key health related terms.

11           If there's a unit mentioned in there in  
12 regards to health related information that doesn't  
13 appear in one of the other index field as an  
14 organization, a parent organization that this  
15 information came from, they'll put that unit ID in  
16 there also, again, from a pick list.

17           We get a standardized way to designate the  
18 units. The 24th Infantry Division Mechanized, there's  
19 probably 15 ways you could abbreviate that, but we use  
20 one standard way so we can search one standard way.

21           Once the indexing is completed, it then goes  
22 through a stage which I haven't implemented yet, but  
23 we're closed, called endorsement. In the endorsement  
24 stage, we shrink the image by about 3 percent and stamp  
25 a unique number on the bottom of each image so if we

1 ever get any Freedom of Information Act requests or the  
2 public sees one of these documents on the NET and they  
3 have any questions about it, all I need is that number  
4 and I can instantly find it in our digitized archives.

5 I can't wait to get that feature functional.

6 So this process here is where I want to get  
7 20,000 pages a day through my system. I'm going to  
8 have to go to a second shift with my contract firm,  
9 which will start on 1 June to meet that throughput.  
10 We're still in the ramp up phase right now.

11 There it goes through an optical character  
12 recognition process where all those documents flagged  
13 for OCR get OCR'd. Goes through a format bridge which  
14 does a little document -- a little information  
15 conversation to make that information from my front end  
16 processing system here then compatible with the --  
17 we're using a software program called EXCALIBER.  
18 EXCALIBER becomes my digitized storage and retrieval  
19 program and it also is our search program.

20 So those 20,000 pages per day, they go into  
21 the EXCALIBER system and every night when we go home or  
22 while the second shift is still there until 2:00 in the  
23 morning, EXCALIBER will take those 20,000 pages and  
24 will automatically search for those 300 key health  
25 related terms. When we come back to work the next

1 morning, all the documents that did not get a hit as  
2 being health related will have gone into a holding  
3 pattern inside the computer for Phase II.

4 All the documents that got a hit from that  
5 automated key word search we put out on a digital audio  
6 tape and we handcarry that over to the DoD  
7 investigation team for their research and analysis.  
8 And all those documents that got the automated key word  
9 hit also go into our workflow. We're using a WANG  
10 program for that.

11 Those are in our workflow to our  
12 declassification teams. When it gets to the  
13 declassification team, it gets a second screen this  
14 time by a human who reads through or skims through each  
15 of those pages that got a health related hit from the  
16 automated screening and they make a determination as to  
17 whether this document is really germane to the Persian  
18 Gulf War veterans' illnesses problem or not. So we get  
19 documents that get hits on key words that really aren't  
20 germane. For example, a nuclear or biological  
21 officer's award recommendation might get a hit. The  
22 public doesn't need to see that.

23 So they will then suspend all those documents  
24 that aren't germane. They go into the holding queue  
25 for Phase II. The rest of the documents that are



1 germane then go in continuing workflow and go to the  
2 declassifiers. And our goal is to declassify between  
3 1,000 to 1,500 pages a day between our 15  
4 declassifiers. And I'm finding that our folks are  
5 averaging over 100 pages a day with the on-screen  
6 classification.

7           We're using another WANG program. We're the  
8 first customer in the world to be using WANG's  
9 redaction program and we've been working in partnership  
10 with WANG and made a lot of enhancements in the  
11 redaction program on-screen. We put the exemption  
12 codes on there, all of the stuff that we've redacted or  
13 removed. That's all done in the computer on screen.

14           About up to 20 percent of our information is  
15 stuff that does not fall under our purview or for which  
16 we do not have the authority to make the  
17 declassification determination. For example, I have no  
18 authority to declassify intelligence information. So  
19 we're working in partnership with the DIA on referring  
20 our information to them if intelligence information  
21 appears in our files, for example.

22           All those documents that are cleared for  
23 public release then go back through the format bridge,  
24 back through the OCR engine so that we get -- and we're  
25 doing the declassification all on the image, so that

1 image then goes back through the OCR engine, gets re-  
2 OCR'd. So now we have an OCR version of the  
3 declassified image.

4 Those that are then cleared go out on a  
5 digital audio tape to the de-tech to go on the  
6 Worldwide WEB on GULFLINK.

7 Our customers, our number one customer of  
8 course, is DoD Health Investigation Team. They get  
9 everything that EXCALIBER says might be health related.  
10 Classified, unclassified. And then they get all our  
11 declassified information also, so that if they get a  
12 request from the public, they'll know whether we  
13 declassified it or not.

14 Of course, the general public is another top  
15 customer on GULFLINK. Another customer in here is the  
16 Army's Automated Historical Archives System which is a  
17 digitized archives out at Ft. Leavenworth at the Army's  
18 Combined Arms Center. They get everything that we  
19 produce, and that goes into that permanent digitized  
20 archives out there. I am not a permanent digitized  
21 archives holding facility. They handle that for us.  
22 They can reorganize my collection to their heart's  
23 content.

24 And our ultimate objective, and we've begun  
25 discussion with NARA on this. Our ultimate objective

1 is that NARA will accept our images, both classified  
2 and declassified, as new original records so that we  
3 can then access those into NARA. It is not in my  
4 mission. I have no resources and no requirement to go  
5 back and remark the paper copies to match the  
6 declassification that we've done on the screen.

7 GEN. ARMSTRONG: So basically, what you're  
8 saying is that if the public wants access to  
9 declassified stuff, they've got to go to NARA?

10 COL. DIETRICH: If it's not health related,  
11 they'll have to go to NARA or out to the Army's A House  
12 out at Leavenworth, sir.

13 MS. BRAGG: But what about what you're  
14 putting on the Worldwide WEB?

15 COL. DIETRICH: That's health related.  
16 That's accessible to the public.

17 I was assigned this project almost a year  
18 ago. In fact, it was a year ago today that I met with  
19 my boss to discuss what I'd be doing when I started  
20 work on 15 May 1995. We were under extreme pressure to  
21 meet our time lines and the pressure was coming as I  
22 followed the food chain from the President to the Dep.  
23 Sec. Def., to the Undersecretary of the Army, to  
24 General Mylecastle and myself. I'm very happy to get  
25 on with the mission, get it out there, get all the

1 services cranked up and have everybody making  
2 significant process ASAP.

3 Of course, at the same time, if you read the  
4 newspaper, every day there's something in the news  
5 about Person Gulf War veterans' illnesses. We're under  
6 incredible pressure form the public to provide them  
7 information to be used in helping get to the bottom of  
8 this issue.

9 And the I-Team has been pressuring us to  
10 provide information they can use for their research and  
11 analysis.

12 Something happened to me along the way. When  
13 I took the project, the automation idea was just  
14 kicking around in the back of our heads. There were  
15 some unrealistic time line projections briefed to the  
16 political appointees. I think they thought they'd be  
17 in full operations in May and then June and last  
18 Summer. You can't figure out your requirements and put  
19 a system together quite that quick. Then they thought  
20 it might be November of '95 and that didn't pan out and  
21 it slipped a little more.

22 So, my time available to do my work has  
23 closed in on us from one side because of the time it  
24 takes to get the automated system operational. And in  
25 August of last year, the Dep. Sec. Def., the new Dep.

1 Sec. Def., then Dr. White, told the American public  
2 that we would be done not in May of '97, our initial  
3 deadline, but that we'd be done in December of '96.  
4 The time line was closing in on us from both  
5 directions.

6 We had to go out and fight for resources.  
7 This is what we call an unfunded mandate. I was  
8 given -- I inherited a budget that was partial of my  
9 start-up cost. My marching orders were that I was not  
10 allowed to go out and buy myself a Cadillac for this  
11 automation system. I had to get something like a Jeep.  
12 So, we got a Jeep. It's durable and it's -- I think it  
13 will take us on the long haul.

14 Progress report. For the Army, we took 10  
15 million pages. We went and screened those pages and we  
16 determined out of that screening that we had 1.8  
17 million pages that are relevant and need to be scanned  
18 and searched this year. Those are primarily the  
19 records of those four major Army commands that deployed  
20 to the theater of operations. The types of records we  
21 screened and determined were not germane to this  
22 mission, for example, our Military Traffic Management  
23 Command shipping records is part of the several million  
24 pages that we're not going to do this year.

25 We estimate that we'll have about 200,000

1 pages in the Army, health related, to review for  
2 potential public release. About 360,000 pages DoD wide  
3 of operational information.

4 As of 10 May, today, the Army has either  
5 scanned or screened out of that 1.8 million pages about  
6 650,000 pages. We have sent 55,500 health related pages  
7 to the I-Team. DoD wide, we've sent just about 150,000  
8 pages to the I-Team. The Army has posted 2,071 pages  
9 on GULFLINK. DoD wide, we're at about 8,000 pages on  
10 GULFLINK. I've got in the Army probably 3,000-4,000  
11 more pages ready to go. Just need a final sanity check  
12 by my deputy and myself and we'll release those  
13 shortly.

14 I've got about another 10,000 pages that are  
15 being held up right now because they have information  
16 in them that I have to refer.

17 My issue slide. And I'm going to tie this to  
18 EO-12958. And as of today, I have absolutely no  
19 requirement to be involved with EO-12958 other than to  
20 apply it to what I'm doing. But as I look at what I'm  
21 doing and I see how it relates to EO-12958 and I wonder  
22 if maybe the Center of Military History might be  
23 ultimately tagged with the Executive Order  
24 implementation, some of these things come to my mind.

25 Who's in charge? We have stood up this DoD

1 operational records declassification project with  
2 little guidance from above as to what the standards are  
3 and what the procedures are. We basically had to  
4 create this as we go. It's been interesting.

5 My automation system had absolutely no  
6 guidance and no standards on anything to do with  
7 automation. We went out and did a market survey last  
8 Summer, three of us -- four of us, and spent two or  
9 three months surveying the market and determined our  
10 automated solution.

11 I started work on 15 May. I made the decision  
12 on my automated solution on 27 July. I needed extra  
13 money. Had a meeting on 28 July in the Pentagon. Got  
14 approval for my approach and approval for what I  
15 needed. And then I went on 31 July with a request for  
16 the additional funds. I didn't get those funds until  
17 September, days before the end of the fiscal year. We  
18 had just a few days, in some cases hours, to obligate  
19 that money before we lost it at the end of the fiscal  
20 year. So it was an interesting time.

21 Now, I'm creating a type of database. When  
22 you look at the Executive Order, like Mr. Garfinkle  
23 pointed out earlier, there is a requirement in the  
24 Executive Order for a government wide database of  
25 declassified information under the Executive Order.

1 We've been in business declassifying information for  
2 several months now creating a digitized database of  
3 that declassified information.

4 I have not seen any government wide standards  
5 for the declassified database under the new Executive  
6 Order and I hope that whatever those standards emerge  
7 to be they will be compatible with what the operational  
8 records community is doing. It would be a shame to the  
9 taxpayer if it's not compatible.

10 And also under the Executive Order there's a  
11 requirement for government wide automation standards.  
12 If you are going to be involved in an automated or  
13 digitized process, especially scanning, you've got to  
14 know the collection. Is it paper? It is microfilm?  
15 If I had microfilm, I would have bought a standard that  
16 does both paper and microfilm, but I'm not using  
17 microfilm.

18 What's the quality of the paper? How good is  
19 the quality if you're scanning paper? Is it one-sided  
20 or two-sided? A box holds so many sheets of paper.  
21 Well, what's a page? Is a page a sheet of paper with  
22 information on two sides or is it each side of print?  
23 And that makes a big difference in your resources as to  
24 how many people you need to do all the indexing, et  
25 cetera, or how much storage capacity you need in your



1 computer. You've got to know your collection pretty  
2 darn well in order to resource and plan to work with  
3 it.

4 I believe in something I learned a long time  
5 ago in the Army which we call the backward planning  
6 process. You look at what's your goal, what's your  
7 product, what's the end state. And then you back up  
8 from there and you say what's the process we're going  
9 to use to accomplish the mission. And then you say  
10 what are the resources we need to implement that  
11 process to accomplish the mission. Then you go after  
12 the resources. And by resources, I'm talking about  
13 money, people, furniture, space, transportation,  
14 communications, telephones. It's a monumental task to  
15 stand up a large team to implement something like this.

16 If you can, get yourselves one automation  
17 firm who is responsible for the overall integration of  
18 the mission. I've tried to do that. Under the time  
19 constraints and the resource constraints we were not  
20 able to pull it off, so my on loan warrant officer  
21 information management officer and myself became our  
22 own integrators and we have four automation firms that  
23 work under our direction. We are the ones that have to  
24 keep them functioning properly as a well oiled team.

25 I'll back up to here. Requirements analysis.

1 My on-loan automator, myself, a guy I got on loan from  
2 the Pentagon who's an automation specialist, automation  
3 procurement specialist, and my former deputy, a senior  
4 Army classifier, who passed away last August, Tom  
5 Johnson, the four of us went out in a market survey,  
6 did our own requirements analysis. And some people  
7 think you can sit down with a piece of paper at a table  
8 and knock one out. No, you can't. You should contract  
9 somebody to do your contracts analysis. We did that  
10 for the integration of the sea services into our own  
11 automation system and spent a considerable amount of  
12 money to do that.

13           And my guidance to that automation firm was I  
14 want you to come back and tell me what we need to  
15 integrate the sea services in our system down to the  
16 printer cable screws. So we knew exactly what  
17 contracts we had to put in place, what  
18 hardware/software we needed, what integration support  
19 services we needed. And based on their thorough  
20 requirements analysis, we were able to go out and start  
21 executing procurements for the sea services.

22           Clear specific deliverables on your  
23 contracts. Make sure that you've got a really savvy  
24 contract specialty on your team who makes very clear  
25 standards of work and gives you very clear and specific

1 deliverables with which you can hold the contractor's  
2 feet to the fire. There are a lot of shortcuts that  
3 can be taken in the procurement business that cause you  
4 pain down the road. Don't do it.

5 Another issue I have here is -- it came up  
6 earlier today. It's referrals. Information that we  
7 don't have the authority to declassify, and now what do  
8 you do. I've got health related information in my  
9 files. Some of its been written about in books,  
10 perfectly cleared. Yet when you talk to different  
11 governmental agencies -- oh, no, you can't talk about  
12 the shortage of this vaccine or why it's a shortage or  
13 you can't release information on the decision process  
14 on who it's given to and that type of thing.

15 So how do you deal with stuff like that?  
16 We're in the process of putting together a government  
17 wide what we'll call panel of experts. We'll call them  
18 together periodically to resolve specific issues like  
19 this one I'm just hinting at here. But the referral  
20 process can be an absolute show stopper.

21 When you look at the Executive Order  
22 implementation, the clock's ticking. The Army's got  
23 270 million pages, 2 billion government wide. It's a  
24 sobering challenge. The clock is ticking. Six months  
25 have already gone out of the five years we have to

1 execute it.

2 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: [Off mike.]

3 COL. DIETRICH: Well, no. We have 4-1/2  
4 years left.

5 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: The 18 April 2000,  
6 that's emblazoned in our minds.

7 COL. DIETRICH: Well, the five years started  
8 six months from the signing of the Executive Order. I  
9 still don't know who's in charge.

10 That concludes my briefing.

11 (Applause.)

12 MR. WEINBERG: Since both your digitized  
13 files and the original files are going to self-destruct  
14 over the coming years, has any thought been given to  
15 COM; that is, computer output microfilm, film as you go  
16 along, so that if anybody's interested in the Gulf War  
17 in 30 years they'll in fact be able to do work on it  
18 when both forms of record have physically evaporated?

19 COL. DIETRICH: I have not. I would hope  
20 that the Army's Automated Historical Archive System at  
21 Ft. Leavenworth would be thinking along those lines and  
22 I'm pretty certain that they are. That would be their  
23 requirement, in cooperation, I'd say, with NARA, to  
24 ensure that the collection is maintained for posterity.

25 DR. WAMPLER: What's the cost of this?

1 COL. DIETRICH: I've spent about -- I've  
2 spent \$2.3 million in FY 95. This is Army alone. I'm  
3 budgeted with about \$3.3 million this year. My  
4 automation system, a rough estimate on the cost of the  
5 hardware/software and integration is about \$2.5  
6 million.

7 DR. GOLDBERG: That's included with the  
8 numbers you already gave?

9 COL. DIETRICH: Yes, sir.

10 DR. GOLDBERG: What about the other services,  
11 the rest of DoD?

12 COL. DIETRICH: Mike, are you prepared to  
13 address that?

14 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I couldn't give you an  
15 accurate figure. I know our is a lot lower than that  
16 but I'm thinking we spent about \$700,000 on the  
17 automated. We've got smaller numbers to deal with,  
18 too. And part of yours is -- we're not using  
19 contractors. We're doing it all with the active duty  
20 in all the services. So, including designing the  
21 system and scanning.

22 COL. DIETRICH: My \$3.3 million for our plan,  
23 -- operating costs includes a civilian payroll, not  
24 military.

25 DR. GOLDBERG: Do you have an overall

1 estimate?

2 DR. DUDLEY: I should add that the Navy and  
3 Marine Corps together looks like \$2.8 million for this  
4 year and we expect less for next year since this is  
5 mostly stand up equipment purchase, requirements  
6 analysis. The personnel costs, of course, will  
7 continue, but that's the smaller. That's probably half  
8 of what we're spending.

9 COL. DIETRICH: That's for the sea services?

10 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

11 COL. DIETRICH: And SECCOM's cost was  
12 negligible. They already had an automation system in  
13 place. They'd already digitized their documents. So  
14 basically, what they do is they use EXCALIBER, search  
15 for health related documents, and then they farm those  
16 out to action officers on the staff who have the  
17 authority to review and declassify those documents.

18 DR. GOLDBERG: But overall, then, this  
19 program that covers perhaps 10 million pages or fewer,  
20 probably costs on the order of \$10 million alone  
21 overall?

22 COL. DIETRICH: At least. I'd say a \$1 to \$2  
23 a page, sir.

24 DR. GOLDBERG: So \$10 [million] to \$20  
25 million eventually would be the cost.

1 MS. BRAGG: Of only the Army information  
2 because the 10 million is just Army. The 10 million  
3 pages is Army.

4 COL. DIETRICH: The 10 million pages is only  
5 Army.

6 MS. BRAGG: Is Army. So if you're saying \$1  
7 to \$2 a page, that's at least \$10 [million] to \$20  
8 million for Army.

9 COL. DIETRICH: Right.

10 MS. BRAGG: Not counting the military  
11 personnel costs, which is a cost.

12 COL. DIETRICH: Let me back up. Let me break  
13 out the Army costs here.

14 We're funded for about five years. I don't  
15 know that it's going to take them five years to get all  
16 the documents done. I think we're going to be done  
17 soon. \$2.3 million, FY 95; \$3.3 million, FY 96; and  
18 about \$3 million thereafter until mission completion.

19 DR. GOLDBERG: That's \$10 million for the  
20 Army or \$9 million, approximately for the Army.

21 COL. DIETRICH: Right, sir.

22 DR. GOLDBERG: Plus the rest of DoD?

23 COL. DIETRICH: Right, sir.

24 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, that will be a  
25 considerable number of pages that you won't have to

1 cover when you get around to declassifying.

2 MS. BRAGG: No, no. We're not going to try  
3 to play any shell games in the Army. The Executive  
4 Order covers information that will be 25 years old by  
5 the year 2000.

6 DR. GOLDBERG: That's too recent for you.

7 MS. BRAGG: That's right. And that would be  
8 unfair to do that.

9 And another point that he made was that when  
10 we count pages, we are making the assumption that  
11 they're printed on one side. Every time we make a  
12 wrong assumption on that, we've doubled the count.

13 COL. DIETRICH: You can put 2,000 to 2,500  
14 sheets of paper in an archive box.

15 DR. WAMPLER: Do you have a sense that this  
16 automation is a cost saver?

17 COL. DIETRICH: Yes, sir.

18 DR. WAMPLER: Okay. But is it applicable for  
19 materials, given the poor quality of some of the papers  
20 and the text?

21 COL. DIETRICH: I think it may be applicable  
22 to part of the EO implementation but not part of the  
23 entire EO implementation.

24 GEN. ARMSTRONG: One point that Steve made.  
25 I would think that what the panel, particularly the



1 non-governmental members, ought to think about is this  
2 requirement for a government wide system so that you  
3 could figure out what's been declassified. There need  
4 to be some thing done about it. And to do something  
5 about it, you've got to have money.

6 Everything we talk about here is basically an  
7 issue of money, but that's something I would think  
8 would be very much in the academic community's  
9 interest, as well as in the interest of the U.S.  
10 Congress to get rolling on it. I don't think it was by  
11 any accident that he listed that first among the issues  
12 that have come up.

13 People I've talked to in the declassification  
14 business, the people who actually do the work, see that  
15 as the most important thing in the Executive Order and  
16 probably the most useful. But there's been almost no  
17 interest expressed here or no discussion of that  
18 particular provision. Which surprises me a little bit  
19 because I would think that that would be of real  
20 interest and use to historians.

21 COL. DIETRICH: What are the data elements or  
22 fields that you want on the database? Do you want the  
23 whole document or do you just want the title, the date  
24 and time group, do you want who it was addressed to and  
25 where the file came from? What's the information that

1 you want on the documents in the database? That's the  
2 first step.

3 And the next step is what are the automation  
4 standards for that automated database. It's a big  
5 task.

6 DR. GOLDBERG: The third step is to get all  
7 these different agencies and departments to pull  
8 together on this and provide the funds.

9 No. That's the first stage.

10 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Just a question.  
11 There are no electronic records pertinent to this  
12 project?

13 COL. DIETRICH: We have electronic records.  
14 The Department of Navy, for example, has the Chief of  
15 Naval Operations Message Traffic during the war. It  
16 was kept. And they have now taken that and made it  
17 available to the investigation team where they're doing  
18 a search for health related documents. And I've got  
19 some electronic records.

20 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: That's brings up the  
21 second question. How quickly can the investigation  
22 team review. There are only a limited number of them.  
23 And it seems to me if you did a review of what your  
24 flowchart says, that's the choke point.

25 COL. DIETRICH: Well, part of what they are

1 attempting to do is to use some really sophisticated  
2 automation technology, a lot of it developed by the  
3 government, to help them with their research, to go in  
4 and find relative connection to the information. You  
5 know, to find where there's clustering of information.

6           Maybe every time you have X happen, it's from  
7 this group of units, so then they can make some sort of  
8 correlation. So they're looking for automation to help  
9 them do that and that's one of the reasons that they  
10 want the information digitized.

11           DR. GOLDBERG: Would you say that yours is a  
12 five-year program?

13           COL. DIETRICH: Yes, sir. We're funded for  
14 five years.

15           DR. GOLDBERG: Funded for five years. So I  
16 take it, you expect to have to take that long in order  
17 to get through analyzing your documents?

18           COL. DIETRICH: I think we'll be done sooner.

19           MR. WEINBERG: I'd like to follow up on  
20 General Armstrong's question because I'm somewhat  
21 unclear as to what the purpose the database is supposed  
22 to serve and what information is supposed to be  
23 garnered.

24           DR. GOLDBERG: Basically, it will tell you  
25 what's been declassified. That's something that has to

1 be determined. That's what the data field is all  
2 about.

3 MR. WEINBERG: Is it supposed to be like a  
4 subset that's openly available of a classified database  
5 which would be shared amongst all the agencies?

6 DR. GOLDBERG: I don't know. The Executive  
7 Order, to my understanding, requires a government wide  
8 database which contains the relevant information on  
9 information that's been declassified. Is that right?

10 DR. WAMPLER: Are you going to establish the  
11 standards? Is that part of your function?

12 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: We have the  
13 responsibility of the oversight with regards to that.  
14 I hate to say that it is a subject we have not been  
15 able to address yet. We're in a situation in our  
16 office where -- quite honestly, the database has not  
17 been one of them yet, but I agree with you entirely  
18 that it is essential that it ultimately be dealt with.

19 DR. WAMPLER: Is it foreseen as something  
20 like an Internet where you'd have to have compatibility  
21 between the various database software that each agency  
22 develops to keep track of their own internal  
23 processing. When are you going to start addressing  
24 that compatibility problem?

25 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I'll be very honest

1 with you. It is a requirement in the Executive Order  
2 that is unfunded. We've received no -- the size of our  
3 staff has gone down. The responsibilities that we have  
4 under this new Executive Order have multiplied.

5 National Archives, which is responsible under  
6 the order primarily for the database, has received no  
7 funding for it and I'm not aware currently that funding  
8 is being sought.

9 So we're in between two competing situations  
10 here dealing with budget factors and program factors  
11 and I wish I could come up with an answer that would  
12 sound like I have an answer, but I don't.

13 MR. WEINBERG: Well, let me make a suggestion  
14 in a practical sense here on a very important issue  
15 that's been raised in different ways.

16 The notion of putting the documents or even  
17 descriptions of individuals documents on the WEB,  
18 Internet or whatnot, would be an enormous waste of  
19 money and time on everybody's part. The term database  
20 can be read in a number of ways, at least the way I  
21 read it in the Executive Order, and that is, that what  
22 is in fact needed, it seems to me, is group  
23 descriptions.

24 That is to say, not unlike what the National  
25 Archives does in the back of Prologue every issue. That

1 is to say, that the Bureau of Ships, 19XY, X hundred  
2 linear feet, have been processed or declassified. That  
3 the CNO records for this, that -- in other words, group  
4 descriptions which then make it possible for people to  
5 know, well, there is a group.

6 Now, if you want more details, you'd better  
7 get to Archives, too, or wherever and whatnot. If  
8 they've got inventories, you use them and so on.

9 The time and money that would be invested  
10 into anything more detailed is going to be time and  
11 money that won't go into declassification, which is  
12 vastly more important and vastly more urgent.

13 GEN. ARMSTRONG: I think you're making a  
14 mistake --

15 MR. WEINBERG: I'm sorry. I didn't hear what  
16 you said.

17 GEN. ARMSTRONG: I'm sorry. I think you're  
18 making -- my understanding of the idea is that we will  
19 identify documents that have been declassified so that  
20 other agencies know that and don't have to go through  
21 the declassification process again. From a  
22 declassifier's standpoint, that's what I understand  
23 they're looking for.

24 MR. WEINBERG: Well, if that's the case, it  
25 will take -- it will simply slow up rather than speed

1 up the process. It is cheaper and faster for three  
2 different declassifiers scanning through the whole U.S.  
3 government separately to declassify a particular  
4 document that happens to be in all three than for all  
5 government agencies to put down the hundreds of  
6 millions of declassification actions and feed them into  
7 a machine.

8 I agree that there's going to be some  
9 duplication here, and that's unfortunately unavoidable.  
10 There is another side to it which I shouldn't admit to  
11 this, but it's of course true. And anybody who works on  
12 the academic side knows this. And that is, that  
13 periodically, somebody finds a document which is closed  
14 in one archive but open in another. And the reality of  
15 life is that we're all going to have to live with this.  
16 That the government people are going to have to live  
17 with it unless they get unlimited funds, which they  
18 won't have. And the scholars will have to do the best  
19 they can under the circumstances.

20 The perfect is always the enemy of the good  
21 and practical.

22 MR. HEIMDAHL: Dr. Weinberg, if I might just  
23 interject, some of us are building the databases anyway  
24 as we do the declassification. Simply, for instance,  
25 in the Air Force, we declassify a document held by

1 the -- Command. That same document may be in the Air  
2 Mobility Command. Therefore, in order to provide  
3 uniformity of information throughout the Air Force, so  
4 that two separate people don't declassify the same  
5 document, we're putting it in a database so you can tap  
6 into that database, know what's been done and then two  
7 people won't be looking at the same thing and expending  
8 that much more time, energy and in essence, money also.

9 MR. WEINBERG: I don't disagree with you.  
10 Where and as it's practical and can be done, that's  
11 fine. But the notion that it can be done on a  
12 universal basis for individual documents across the  
13 government is simply going to slow the process rather  
14 than accelerate it. That's all I'm saying.

15 And of course, it particularly applies in  
16 distributions of things which run in whole series;  
17 standing orders which go out and so on and so forth and  
18 which only need to be declassified in one part of the  
19 hierarchy and the other parts can be notified.

20 I'm not disagreeing with you at all. You're  
21 absolutely correct. All I'm saying is the notion that  
22 you're going to put 500 million documents into some  
23 kind of a list, the inputting alone is going to cost  
24 more than declassifying the next 100 million.

25 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I think you may have



1 been talking about two separate things. You're talking  
2 about Air Force documents. I think you were talking  
3 about, let's say, a Navy file.

4 MR. WEINBERG: The point was raised about --

5 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: We have a CIA  
6 document, we have an Army document, we have an Air  
7 Force document, a JCS document. We are not going to  
8 review that document. We're going to tag it. If it's  
9 in the National Archives, if it's accessioned, then  
10 those agencies will come in and review that document  
11 which happens to be in our files. We may have equities  
12 in there. Depends on how much time we have. That's  
13 why I said earlier this is a very complicated business.  
14 I mean, there's no way to simplify it. I mean, smarter  
15 people than we have tried to find the solution and  
16 there just isn't any easy one.

17 DR. GOLDBERG: How are they going to find out  
18 whether it's been declassified?

19 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: It's up to the agency.

20 DR. GOLDBERG: This is has been the problem  
21 all through the years. That's why it's possible to  
22 find a document in one archive that's declassified and  
23 in three others, it's still classified.

24 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Nobody has corrected  
25 that.

1           GEN. ARMSTRONG: I don't entirely agree. It  
2 seems to me that the Air Force's approach, to the  
3 extent that an individual agency, such as the Army or  
4 the Navy, compiles a similar listing for their  
5 documents that are declassified, it would seem to me to  
6 be useful if all of those listings obeyed the same set  
7 of rules when they're developed. And that way, at least  
8 you could go with the same set of rules to each  
9 listing.

10           And if at some point in time those listings  
11 were linked together so that you didn't have a single  
12 database but you had multiple databases, all of which  
13 could be accessed through some common method, that  
14 would make sense. And I think that's what the  
15 declassifiers are interested in, isn't it?

16           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I think that's what  
17 the Government Information Locator Service feels it's  
18 supposed to do, although we haven't heard anything  
19 about that. I don't know if NARA is ready to talk  
20 about it or not. That's what I thought the purpose of  
21 GILS was going to be. To make available through the  
22 Internet a list and just the index of declassified  
23 documents.

24           MR. HEIMDAHL: I know the Air Force people  
25 are looking at it. I don't know what the status of

1 their effort to achieve conductivity will have --

2 GEN. ARMSTRONG: I don't think anybody's  
3 asking for a single list. I think the most anybody is  
4 asking for is if everybody uses the same rules to make  
5 their own list and make those lists accessible. That  
6 doesn't seem to me to be beyond -- it may be  
7 bureaucratically impossible given the status of the  
8 federal government. I don't know. But it seems on the  
9 face of it to be a reasonable thing to do.

10 COL. DIETRICH: But, for example, does this  
11 database only list the records groups or does it go  
12 down to the box level or the folder level or the  
13 document title? What are the elements of information  
14 that are supposed to be in this database? And if you're  
15 a researcher, do you want to have to figure out the  
16 Army standards when you go to the Army's database and  
17 then spend time trying to figure out what the Air Force  
18 was doing when they did theirs, and then try to figure  
19 out what CIA's standards were?

20 No. There should be one central government  
21 wide standard that we all adhere to. And the Air Force  
22 is well on the way on their project, and I'm sure  
23 they're already creating a database. Do they have to  
24 go back and start all over again if and when they  
25 receive these standards?

1 DR. GOLDBERG: Given the differences that  
2 exist already in the different systems of the services  
3 and the agencies, can you get a universal set of  
4 descriptors that will apply to all?

5 COL. DIETRICH: I think we could.

6 DR. GOLDBERG: You can?

7 GEN. ARMSTRONG: You could by fiat on the  
8 part of the Air Force.

9 MS. BRAGG: Well, by fiat and money. We've  
10 got enough by fiat that there's no check written to. I  
11 think really -- I agree. It took us until 2:00 and  
12 finally Dr. Weinberg and I agreed on something.

13 (Laughter.)

14 I wanted that to go on the record. But I  
15 think really we're talking about at least two databases  
16 here. There's one that I think Dr. Weinberg was  
17 talking about to let the public know what has been  
18 declassified. And then his terminology was group  
19 descriptions of what has been declassified. And that  
20 makes a lot of sense because if we have to get down to  
21 the nitty-gritty in every little document, it's going  
22 to bog us down and it's going to take away time from  
23 really reviewing the material and getting on with this.

24 DR. GOLDBERG: And when you say group, you  
25 don't mean record group. You mean some kind of group.

1           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: A file series  
2 approach.

3           MS. BRAGG: I don't know what we mean by  
4 group, but it's something other than an exact  
5 description of every little item of information in  
6 there and the title of every document.

7           There's another database that I think is very  
8 much needed and in our interagency discussions we have  
9 brought it up time and again, is when, for instance,  
10 you look through an Army file and we come up with a CIA  
11 document. We need some mechanism to let the CIA know  
12 that in box XYZ, file ABC, you need to come over and  
13 take a look because we've got some of your information.  
14 And that does make sense that we would have some sort  
15 of way that the CIA will know when they go to the  
16 Archives -- okay, in the Army records, I need to look  
17 at such-and-such. And the same for all other agencies.

18           Now, that's something that government  
19 agencies have to kind of do on their own. I'm not so  
20 sure that HRDAP is interested in it, but HRDAP might be  
21 interested in how it's identified to the public of what  
22 actually has been declassified.

23           DR. GOLDBERG: Then they'd have to come over  
24 and take a look because if you identify it for them,  
25 they probably couldn't find it in their own records.

1 MS. BRAGG: That's quite true.

2 COL. DIETRICH: That's a monumental challenge  
3 and that's the referral issue I had on my slide. It is  
4 a monumental challenge. And if you're CIA and you're  
5 up to your ears in CIA documents, how willing are you  
6 going to be to come running over to the Air Force or  
7 the Army or wherever to go review information in their  
8 files.

9 We've got Army intelligence records that are  
10 classified by multiple sources and it's not always  
11 clear to us who those sources are; CIA, NSA and so on.

12 DR. WAMPLER: But does such a database, if  
13 you have it, be on a classified basis? Say you pull up  
14 something that has another agency equity. You're Army.  
15 You get something from the CIA. If you could somehow  
16 plug in a descriptor of that into a CIA database and  
17 see whether they've already located it and made a  
18 decision on it, you've already done the referral  
19 process, a great deal of it.

20 They found it. You've identified an exact  
21 copy of something they've already looked at and you've  
22 taken care of it.

23 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: But CIA, I don't think  
24 would permit that.

25 DR. WAMPLER: Well, okay. But what about

1 other agencies? What about Army-Navy, Army-Air Force.  
2 You know, those sorts of equities within the Pentagon  
3 even.

4 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: We have to be very  
5 careful about the CIA inputs. I mean, even the job of  
6 the signer of a document at the time they sign it can  
7 make a difference in whether the document is  
8 classified.

9 DR. WAMPLER: What I'm saying is if the CIA  
10 has already looked at that document and made their own  
11 decision and then sometime subsequently you find a copy  
12 of that document in another agency and you can go to  
13 their database and see they've made a decision. You  
14 just follow their decision.

15 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Is it an exact copy?  
16 Does it have other graphic notes on it?

17 DR. WAMPLER: That depends on what sort of  
18 database each agency wants to set up for their own  
19 internal cross-references for precedent.

20 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: We have been told  
21 don't take any chances.

22 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes?

23 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: We did a -- along  
24 those lines, a test once at the National Archives. We  
25 took three random days out of our database that we'd

1    thrown items and checked all of the citations that  
2    looked like they might be the same document. We had at  
3    least several instances with the exact same citation of  
4    the document which turned out to be totally different  
5    documents and at least one instance of two citations  
6    that looked like they'd be different documents but  
7    turned out to be the same document.

8                    So you can't go just from the bibliographic  
9    citation and assume that you have the same document as  
10   the one you're holding in your hand. You're not really  
11   going to eliminate that many referrals that way.

12                   It seems to me, and I know this is not a  
13   popular opinion among many agencies, is that what would  
14   be more useful would be a database that takes all of  
15   the agency's declassification guidance, makes it  
16   available on line for anyone to use, so that you don't  
17   have to do all of this interagency referral except for  
18   things at the most sensitive level.

19                   GEN. ARMSTRONG: That means giving you  
20   declassification authority to see all the documents.

21                   AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I may not get  
22   declassification authority over CIA documents but I  
23   already have declassification authority for State  
24   Department, Navy, Army, Air Force, almost everybody but  
25   the intelligence agencies. And if the Archives can do



1 it, why can't the Navy do it and the State Department  
2 do it? They have generally more senior people doing  
3 this kind of work than anybody.

4 COL. DIETRICH: Why should the Navy do it?  
5 Why doesn't the government do it? Why should the  
6 lowest organization have to be proactive and go ask  
7 them for it. Why don't it come down from on high?

8 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: You mean the money and  
9 the resources?

10 COL. DIETRICH: The money and the resources,  
11 the policy, the guidance, the standards. And if you  
12 want the Army to have declassification authority for  
13 Navy documents and Department of State documents, give  
14 it to them. Don't make them come ask for it.

15 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: But you can't do that,  
16 Steve. You know you can't do that.

17 COL. DIETRICH: That's right.

18 MS. KLOSS: I think we're starting to talk  
19 about interagency issues and I was wondering if we  
20 could rein it back into a DoD outlook for the final few  
21 comments. We're getting to about a half hour from  
22 close time and there are interagency forums to tackle  
23 some of the issues such as automation. And under Steve  
24 Garfinkle's cognizance, I'm sure he you will take some  
25 of these sentiments back with him. But DoD needs from

1 the historians, let's get back to that.

2 DR. GOLDBERG: All right. I think we've  
3 reached the point where we ought to consider what we  
4 would like to report as the essence of this meeting;  
5 what kind of recommendations we would like to make with  
6 reference to it. I intend to make a report once again  
7 to the Secretary of Defense. It will go to the  
8 Assistant Secretary for C-3I and from him, probably to  
9 the Deputy Secretary again.

10 However, we can get attention at the level of  
11 the Assistant Secretary for C-3I and reaction because  
12 that is the office which has overall responsibility for  
13 DoD declassification. And I think we can address  
14 whatever we have to say primarily to that office with  
15 the hope of getting some kind of reaction from them.

16 Therefore, I would like to ask you to give me  
17 your thoughts on the kind of thing we ought to be  
18 thinking about and asking about.

19 One thing I might bring to your attention  
20 initially is that the directive which will provide the  
21 overall prescription for the operation of the program  
22 within DoD is still in the making. It's nearing  
23 completion. It may be too far along for us to really  
24 affect it. I'm not sure.

25 However, I see no reason why we shouldn't

1 make some recommendations about what might be included  
2 in that directive which would further the legitimate  
3 interests of this panel.

4 MR. BROWN: Can you identify that directive  
5 you're talking about?

6 DR. GOLDBERG: It's the DoD directive on  
7 declassification. It's the basic directive.

8 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Do I take it that we're  
9 wrapping up with our discussing the fundamental issues  
10 that were raised in the exchange of classified --

11 DR. GOLDBERG: And what terminology was that?

12 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Can we talk about it at  
13 some length? Because it's going to --

14 DR. GOLDBERG: I don't know about the length,  
15 but go ahead.

16 MR. TRACHTENBERG: All right. I don't know  
17 other people feel but I'm just speaking as a  
18 professional historian, I don't know if I share the  
19 view of the other civilian historians or academic  
20 historians, but to me there's something quite  
21 unsatisfactory about the course that these discussions  
22 have taken.

23 Not that there've been problems with these  
24 briefings, which the last one was very interesting,  
25 really. It's fascinating to hear you're doing this

1 stuff. But is this what we're supposed to be about as  
2 a committee? I mean, you're not asking us for  
3 historical advice. You're telling us what you're  
4 doing, which it's interesting.

5           Is the function of this committee as far as  
6 the historians are concerned to give the academic  
7 historians an education in the declassification as a  
8 bureaucratic process and all the problems that are  
9 faced by people doing the declassification? If so, to  
10 what? What's the point of that? Are you interested in  
11 getting our input into how to better manage the system?

12           I'm not an expert in archives management or  
13 in database management or records management or  
14 anything like that. That's not my area of expertise.  
15 This is the sort of issue where as far as I'm concerned  
16 you're the professionals. This is where you're the  
17 ones who have the hands-on experience. This is where  
18 your judgment should be decisive; right? And yet it  
19 seems that practically all of the discussion today has  
20 been on declassification as a bureaucratic process and  
21 how it could be better done.

22           The issue keeps arising in my mind what do  
23 they want from us? What do you want from us?

24           My assumption was originally that you wanted  
25 input from us of a professional nature in our capacity

1 as professional historians rather than as people who  
2 have something to say about records management. Is  
3 that happening? I don't see it.

4 Let me finish because then everybody can have  
5 a chance to react because I thought this out and it's -  
6 - to my mind, this is the central issue. Not how we  
7 should go about organizing the computer system or  
8 anything like that, and I think we should talk about  
9 it.

10 In the letter from Rene Davis-Harding, which  
11 has a certain official weight given her official  
12 position, she doesn't like the idea of people coming  
13 with lists of files and lists of documents. That's not  
14 what we're supposed to do. Okay. Well, what does she  
15 want from us? How are we supposed to proceed?

16 She says in the bottom of the first page of  
17 the letter that -- and this is true that at the last  
18 meeting an invitation was extended from the Navy staff  
19 to visit the Navy Yard and talk because that is the  
20 preferred way to provide assistance to the services.  
21 Do it informally, she's saying.

22 So what are we supposed to do as a committee?  
23 Rather than trying to force the panel's view on an  
24 already overburdened security staff, it's supposed to  
25 be done in formally.

1           What I had hoped for was that these  
2 presentations would provide the framework for an  
3 exchange of views, a kind of dialogue between the  
4 people doing declassification and the professional  
5 historians about problems that develop, how the balance  
6 should be struck between the legitimate security  
7 interests of the government agencies and the public  
8 interest in getting information out. I don't see that  
9 happening. And I don't see that we're really moving in  
10 the direction where our input as historians counts for  
11 something.

12           So, just to conclude, it's very nice to get  
13 this education. It's very expensive to the American  
14 taxpayer. It's not just the cost of bringing us in but  
15 the cost to the taxpayers of everybody's time in this  
16 room, and to what end, to what end? So if we're really  
17 not being asked for any serious input about what  
18 matters in terms of its historical importance, what is  
19 the point of the committee -- of this panel.

20           Unless that question is answered, you know,  
21 you really have to wonder about what is going to  
22 happen.

23           DR. DUDLEY: Okay. Now, I disagree that  
24 nothing's been happening here and you're one of the  
25 precipitants of this and you were from the early time

1 on, as well as the other members of this panels.

2 I do think you've had a dialogue. You've  
3 been bringing up issues. You're asking for advice;  
4 right? That's the wrong way. You're supposed to be  
5 giving advice. We are supposed to be giving advice.  
6 That's, I think, what should be happening now. That  
7 is, the members of this group, supported by other  
8 people, should formulate advice and not be asking the  
9 members of this audience to give you advice.

10 MR. TRACHTENBERG: We can't give advice in a  
11 vacuum. We've given our very general advice. But for  
12 advice to have any value, it has to be in response to  
13 specific questions that are put. There has to be a  
14 dialogue. It can't just be dished out by us. And she  
15 made it quite clear that she does not want us to take  
16 the initiative.

17 DR. DUDLEY: Well, you can turn that around.  
18 I've been involved in advisory committees myself from  
19 my department. So has Dr. Goldberg. Others have, as  
20 well. You're an advisory committee. Then you  
21 deliberate and give advice. You don't have to ask for  
22 guidance. You don't have to take guidance. You can  
23 give advice.

24 DR. GOLDBERG: That is correct.  
25 Incidentally, Ms. Davis-Harding is gone. She will not

1 be involved in this any further. I was not in  
2 agreement with what she wrote there.

3 With reference to giving advice, this is one  
4 of the reasons I proposed and am pushing the idea of  
5 pilot projects. And it's my intention that these pilot  
6 projects, that is, the actual contents of these pilot  
7 projects be drawn from the lists which have been  
8 submitted to this committee; one by a member of the  
9 panel and one by somebody else, David's list and the  
10 Wampler list.

11 I think this will mean that this committee  
12 has given advice if you are in agreement with this  
13 approach, that this represent a form of priority for  
14 the services and the other agencies involved. We will  
15 recommend that these be given priority as they report  
16 back to us, then engage in a dialogue with us on what  
17 they have accomplished, what they think can be  
18 accomplished, and what is our reaction to what they've  
19 done.

20 Does that answer you in any way?

21 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Well, let's hear what Bob  
22 has to say.

23 DR. GOLDBERG: It's what?

24 MR. TRACHTENBERG: It's good. It's the right  
25 direction.



1 DR. WAMPLER: As part of the follow on  
2 dialogue, do you envisage us also having a discussion  
3 with them about, gee, why did you not release that? I  
4 mean, that article we saw, this was at some point  
5 getting to a dialogue over weighing the risk against  
6 the need for public understanding.

7 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, this is the nub of what  
8 a lot of you people have in mind.

9 DR. WAMPLER: Yes.

10 DR. GOLDBERG: Your concern with having as  
11 much released as possible and you want to know why  
12 things aren't being released; what is the  
13 justification. And you're asking for a fuller  
14 justification, for exemptions. Is that not correct?

15 Well, in some instances, you're getting it.  
16 Some of these lists do have very full justifications  
17 for not releasing.

18 DR. WAMPLER: Do you have -- how would you  
19 proceed going through the lists? How should we come to  
20 a decision as to which items on the list we want to put  
21 forward as a pilot program?

22 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, I was thinking of doing  
23 it myself as a representative of the panel selecting  
24 very high quality projects, very high quality offices.  
25 The office of Secretary of Defense, to begin with. The

1 office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of  
2 Staff of the Air Force and so on. Selecting those high  
3 level records and a certain amount of them, something  
4 that's doable within the next three months so they can  
5 come back and report to us.

6 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Well, I would propose that  
7 the two of you get together and draft something and  
8 send it around to the entire panel.

9 DR. GOLDBERG: We've already done it, in  
10 effect.

11 MR. WEINBERG: It does seem to me that there  
12 are a couple of broad areas. I mean, in one respect I  
13 agree with what Dr. Trachtenberg said. That is to say,  
14 it's not our posture to tell them which computer  
15 program to us. But I do think that there are some  
16 broad issues on which at least I sense there is some  
17 agreement among members of the panel, including  
18 Professor Leffler, who had to leave, which go at the  
19 broader issue of direct declassification.

20 It seems to me, for example -- I'll just give  
21 two. One of them is I think there is general agreement  
22 that we would urge the agencies to do their  
23 declassification in what I would call broadly phased  
24 chronological sequence. To start with the immediate  
25 post-World War II period and move in whatever stages

1 the records lend themselves to towards the present  
2 rather than the other way around. Nobody has to agree  
3 with me, but that's a broad timely recommendation which  
4 one can discuss and agree to or not agree to.

5 A second area on which it seems to me at  
6 least there is some agreement in the panel is that we  
7 should urge that included in these guidelines coming  
8 from the DoD is a sense that those categories which are  
9 to be listed under the various exemption categories  
10 should include brief, one or two line descriptions that  
11 can be made public, which refer to nature, dates,  
12 involvement. That is to say chemical warfare, 1945 to  
13 '55, 100,000 pages. That doesn't reveal any great  
14 secrets to anybody, but it gives a sense of what's  
15 involved.

16 And that rather than simply referring to  
17 segments of the Executive Order under which it's done,  
18 some such very broad categorization be included and  
19 that can be made public and be included in the  
20 description. Subject matter, dates, approximate size.  
21 Again, --

22 DR. GOLDBERG: That has been done to some  
23 extent.

24 MR. WEINBERG: I'm sorry?

25 DR. GOLDBERG: That has been done by some.

1           MR. WEINBERG: Yes. It has by done by some,  
2 not by others. Again, we don't, it seems to me, want  
3 to get into the precise details of how the agencies do  
4 it. What we're trying to do it give advice for a  
5 framework.

6           DR. GOLDBERG: And that's why I brought up  
7 the matter of the DoD directive --

8           MR. WEINBERG: Exactly.

9           DR. GOLDBERG: -- and the possibility of  
10 having broad prescriptions in there which can be  
11 applied by the agency.

12          MR. WEINBERG: That's exactly the two that  
13 I'm suggesting.

14          DR. DUDLEY: I agree, Professor, with what  
15 you've said. And I was wondering if, in addition, Dr.  
16 Goldberg, whether pilot programs, for example,  
17 specifically focusing in on what Professor Weinberg  
18 said, a pilot program at one of the agencies focusing  
19 in on the 1945 to 1960 period, for example, to see what  
20 kind of obstacles arise; to see what percentage of  
21 exemptions must occur. Seems to me that could be done.  
22 That could be advice. I mean, you're asking for  
23 advice. This is advice.

24          DR. WAMPLER: I don't know where this fits in  
25 and it takes some background.

1           I followed up on the invitation and had a  
2 talk with people at the Joint Staff last week to find  
3 out about their program and they seemed to be following  
4 the same approach that Professor Weinberg was talking  
5 about in terms of chronological. And they're very far  
6 along.

7           What I was told by the end of this year,  
8 early next year, they will have completed their review  
9 of all the category three materials, which is the  
10 lowest level, least difficult. Then they will move to  
11 category two, chronologically, starting with '64,  
12 coming up through '75, looking into every single file  
13 series. And then they will move into category three,  
14 perhaps, by the end of the period.

15           What I was told was there might be some way  
16 for them to get additional resources through the use of  
17 reservists to accelerate the review of category two,  
18 which does have historically important material in it  
19 dealing with various Cold War crises, conventional,  
20 chemical, biological, arms control, Middle East wars.

21           There's material in there that historians  
22 would like to see and there's a way which could be  
23 worked out perhaps to get reservists on board to help  
24 out with category two. And I would defer to General  
25 Armstrong as to how we would frame and word that, but

1 still, the impression I was given is that a  
2 recommendation to that end could be useful to them in  
3 trying to arrange for the use of these reservists by  
4 their declassification program to accelerate that.

5 It would get historical material out sooner  
6 and get them to the category one material sooner.

7 DR. GOLDBERG: We've already recommended more  
8 resources.

9 DR. WAMPLER: Well, this is very specific and  
10 doable.

11 DR. GOLDBERG: Just for the Joint Chiefs?  
12 This is only Joint Chiefs of Staff you're talking  
13 about.

14 DR. WAMPLER: Well, reservists may not be  
15 used for --

16 DR. GOLDBERG: That's a very unique  
17 organization in this respect.

18 DR. WAMPLER: But do all our recommendations  
19 have to be geared towards the overall problem? If we  
20 see a target of opportunity where we can get something  
21 done, shouldn't we try to say we should move on this?

22 DR. GOLDBERG: All right. We can do that.  
23 We can do it for all of them. We can recommend this as  
24 a possibility.

25 GEN. ARMSTRONG: Well, there's a little bit

1 of different in each of the services' own reservists.  
2 The JCS doesn't have reservists. We have to go to the  
3 services and get them. And so, they could use some  
4 help, I think. And for that special reason.

5 We did I don't know how many hours.

6 DR. WAMPLER: A couple of hours,  
7 approximately.

8 GEN. ARMSTRONG: As you say, that's a unique  
9 and rather small collection and so forth and so on and  
10 they've gotten started.

11 But to get back to this point of the  
12 chronological -- broad chronological approach, it may  
13 be too broad, which is why I suggest these pilot  
14 projects and I suggest priorities within that broad  
15 general approach, which would focus on the high level  
16 policy materials, which is what you're most interested  
17 in and perhaps the public is most interested in also,  
18 to the extent that it's really interested.

19 So I think the pilot projects can give us  
20 some indication of how it will work and how far we can  
21 go in recommending priorities for that sort of thing  
22 within the broader chronological category.

23 COL. MONIGAN: I want to address Professor  
24 Trachtenberg's concerns just a bit because I think it's  
25 important for us to have an understanding.

1           I saw the agenda as you did on the read ahead  
2 package and welcomed the opportunity for the individual  
3 services to come in here and brief the panel of  
4 historians, in anticipation of advice to be  
5 forthcoming. That's what they're looking for. These  
6 are good people trying to get the job done with the  
7 resources that they have available. It's not a  
8 bureaucratic problem. These are some smart people  
9 trying to attack a problem as best as they can and  
10 getting on with it.

11           Perhaps it would be more satisfactory for the  
12 civilian historians, Dr. Goldberg, if they would  
13 participate in the formulation of the agenda for our  
14 next meeting. And it sounds to me as if it was  
15 solicitation to have more of a panel type of  
16 discussion, open, roundtable discussion, rather than  
17 formal presentation. And I would like you to take that  
18 into consideration.

19           DR. GOLDBERG: Yes. Well, we have had some  
20 communications in the past and we have fashioned the  
21 agenda to permit taking care of the requests for  
22 inclusion of issues on the agenda.

23           Am I correct in understanding that?

24           MS. KLOSS: Well, we are providing you the  
25 speakers because you asked for it, actually.



1           I could be wrong but what we are trying to do  
2 is take your recommendations after the meetings and try  
3 to act on them. Now, Professor Trachtenberg's comments  
4 I think go to the heart of the issue: what's the role  
5 of HRDAP; are we getting anywhere; is the charter a  
6 valid charter; i.e., looking at topical areas for  
7 recommendations.

8           I would suggest to you the value of having  
9 the three briefings today from the military services  
10 and certain Colonel Dietrich's was to give to you an  
11 appreciation of parameters. If you come back with  
12 recommendations that are undoable because of resources,  
13 because of configurations of your request, because of  
14 the mechanisms for retrieving the information, it will  
15 be hard for us to weigh those recommendations as  
16 appropriately as we should.

17           MR. TRACHTENBERG: Let me just respond.

18           I'm leery about the idea of us as a panel  
19 coming in and making recommendations in a vacuum. What  
20 I had hoped for was a dialogue, a give-and-take  
21 dialogue with people doing the actual work coming in  
22 and saying, gee, these are the things that we're not  
23 quite sure of. We know we have to strike a certain  
24 balance. We're not quite sure of what's important in  
25 terms of the interests of the entire society in

1 understanding these issues. Let's talk about this and  
2 then have a dialogue take place.

3           Instead of a dialogue, we've basically had  
4 presentations. This is what we're doing; so-and-so  
5 many cubic feet of documents per year. Those are not  
6 substantive historical questions which can draw on our  
7 judgment; right?

8           I don't think it's impossible to say that  
9 from now on instead of, quote, briefings, what we'd  
10 like to have are presentations which raise issues that  
11 crop up at the working level in which professional  
12 judgment of historians can have a certain bearing.  
13 That's all.

14           MS. KLOSS: So much more the value for a  
15 pilot program because that way you all have a common  
16 objective.

17           MR. TRACHTENBERG: Yes.,

18           DR. GOLDBERG: Can you'd tell us some of  
19 these issues?

20           MR. TRACHTENBERG: Well, of course. For  
21 example, we had the Air Force presentation and he had  
22 these nice bar charts and how many feet of documents  
23 get declassified and how many remain exempt.  
24 Presumably it's a judgment call whether something  
25 should go into one category or into another.

1           People could be up front about their  
2   uncertainties in deciding what should go where. And as  
3   I say, they could say, well, for example, this is a  
4   typical problem that developed and we'd like to get  
5   some sort of sense for why historians think it's so  
6   important that we get this stuff released.

7           So you could have a little bit of a  
8   discussion on that, where I would feel like my skill  
9   and background as a historian was being drawn on and  
10   was having some impact on the day-to-day work of these  
11   people.

12           Now, your idea of pilot projects, that's  
13   fine. But that's just kind of an isolated thing in  
14   this huge ocean. And my understanding was that we were  
15   supposed to have some impact on what was going on with  
16   these matters.

17           DR. GOLDBERG: You don't expect to comprehend  
18   the whole ocean in the beginning, do you?

19           MR. TRACHTENBERG: No. But I would like to  
20   get a dialogue going and I don't think we've had what I  
21   would call a dialogue.

22           DR. GOLDBERG: Well, you certainly heard a  
23   lot of reaction from members of the panel as well as --

24           MR. TRACHTENBERG: We've had reaction. Of  
25   course. I have a lot of things to say about the whole

1 process of declassification as a problem of  
2 organization, but that's not the core of what we're  
3 about. As I say, I am not an expert in records  
4 management and yet a lot of the discussion was a  
5 discussion that should have taken place among people  
6 who are experts in records management and not  
7 historians.

8 DR. GOLDBERG: There's nothing to stop you  
9 from initiating a dialogue.

10 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Again, this is the sort of  
11 thing where we are an advisory committee. We don't  
12 give advice in a vacuum. People have to come to you  
13 with specific problems.

14 MS. KLOSS: Professor Trachtenberg, I think  
15 one of the main issues that would face that type of a  
16 dialogue in this forum is that we are in an open forum  
17 and the dialogue should be on areas that have yet to be  
18 resolved if they were of continued classification or  
19 declassification. Thus, you have eliminated the  
20 potential for that dialogue to be held at this forum.

21 Now, again, each of the components has  
22 offered numerous times to include you in their  
23 infrastructure and they do that sincerely -- as I look  
24 for nodding heads.

25 (Laughter.)

1           For us to take advantage of your expertise,  
2 we think that we have to do it twofold. We have to do  
3 it as a collective where you look at broad areas. Some  
4 of your comments today; specifically, do you go through  
5 the oldest documents, most recent, and so forth. But  
6 also specifically to work with the agencies, with the  
7 components, on an individual basis. That's where the  
8 need is.

9           MS. BRAGG: Can I offer an observation?

10          DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

11          MS. BRAGG: And I'd like to do so while Steve  
12 Garfinkle is in the room.

13           Steve, you weren't here earlier when we, I  
14 thought, did have a dialogue. And the concerns that I  
15 conveyed to the panel was that the Army felt that there  
16 was a clock ticking and the clock was dated 17 April  
17 2000. And that what our charter was under the terms of  
18 the Executive Order is anything that we had not  
19 reviewed and determined to be legally exemptible under  
20 one or more of the nine categories.

21           On 17 April 2000, whether or not that  
22 information had been reviewed it would be automatically  
23 declassified.

24           Now, some of the members of the panel  
25 questioned that and more so, I think, during the breaks

1 when they came up to me and said, oh, no, that's not  
2 really what the order says. You're over-interpreting  
3 it. It won't actually be declassified if you haven't  
4 reviewed it.

5 So I was wondering if you could comment on  
6 that because -- and then after you do, I'd like to then  
7 give a reason why I'm asking for that.

8 MR. GARFINKLE: Well, the very easy answer to  
9 your specific question is yes. That is exactly what  
10 the order says and that is exactly what was intended  
11 for it to say.

12 And you didn't ask me this, but I would,  
13 since I have the floor, -- when we drafted the order  
14 and a number of political and other factors drifted in  
15 in the final months of the order, when the decision was  
16 made to go to a 25 year rule, I think we failed to  
17 comprehend the records management consequences of that  
18 decision and the weakness that was inherent within  
19 agencies in knowing what was encompassed by this order.

20 And I think a lot of the problem that  
21 Professor Trachtenberg is expressing and relating it to  
22 hearing so much about records management is the very  
23 thing that has caught us or that we were not eager  
24 about, and that is that this initial period, this first  
25 year of this Executive Order has been less a period of

1 substantive declassification and knowing specific  
2 subject areas than it has been getting a grip within  
3 the agencies on what the product is, what the problem  
4 is.

5           And I think a lot of what you're hearing in  
6 the records management area is the reflection of a  
7 catch-up that's had to be conducted this past year.  
8 And I think as we get along farther in the process,  
9 you'll get a lot closer to the very substantive issues  
10 regarding subject matter that you're more interested  
11 in.

12           DR. GOLDBERG: Steve, may I ask you a  
13 question that just occurred to me? Would you like to  
14 have the Historical Records Advisory Panel?

15           MR. GARFINKLE: Well, the Executive Order  
16 calls for the creation -- one of the things that  
17 fascinates me the most about sitting in here is that  
18 there's a requirement in the Executive Order to  
19 establish just such a panel.

20           DR. GOLDBERG: I was talking about your  
21 office.

22           MR. GARFINKLE: For our office? No, I don't  
23 think specifically for our office. I think it's  
24 important that we move ahead with the establishment of  
25 the panel as its anticipated for the authority overall.

1 But I guess I'm taken by the fact that were we to  
2 establish that panel today, we might confront these  
3 very same questions about what its purpose was that  
4 this panel is confronting because, for sure, the DoD  
5 panel is talking about 80 percent of the product that  
6 we're talking about government wide.

7 So it's not going to differ significantly.

8 MS. BRAGG: So the reason -- thank you,  
9 Steve. The reason that I asked for that clarification,  
10 getting back to -- I think you made some very good  
11 points, Dr. Trachtenberg, is what do you want from the  
12 panel and what kind of advice do you want.

13 If we didn't have the clock ticking, then the  
14 Army would like to see, okay, what does the historical  
15 community think we should go after first. Instead of  
16 digging out some old files that the public has no  
17 interest in, what does the public have interest in;  
18 what does the historical community have interest in.

19 But because the clock is ticking, we've got  
20 to go through this massive effort to try to protect the  
21 critical items that we think are out there that are  
22 legally exemptible under the terms of the Executive  
23 Order and we've got less than four years now to do it.  
24 And so that's -- that really complicates, I think, the  
25 mission of the panel, knowing that.



1           MR. TRACHTENBERG: Can we just nail down this  
2 whole issue of the clock ticking, because it seems to  
3 lay behind a lot of the concerns that you have -- of  
4 the government people.

5           Suppose we hit midnight and suppose because  
6 of the limited funding that's been made available the  
7 people doing the declassification haven't been able to  
8 get through all of the potentially sensitive materials.  
9 Is there anything in the Executive Order that would  
10 keep them at that time from invoking paragraph B of  
11 Section 3.4 and exempting those materials? And not to  
12 mention the fact that wouldn't you agree also that in  
13 political terms there is no way in which there is going  
14 to be a security catastrophe occurring as a result of  
15 the clock ticking away and getting the data?

16          MR. GARFINKLE: I agree with our second  
17 comment. I think as a political issue the possibility  
18 always looms of action being taken to prevent a, quote,  
19 disaster, if that were perceived to be the case. But  
20 as far as the specific language of the Executive Order  
21 is concerned, I don't agree with you. I don't believe  
22 the agencies could at midnight come in and presume to  
23 exempt material that had already passed this five years  
24 -- five-year period.

25          What that would require would be a rewriting of

1 the Executive Order, quite frankly, or the legislation  
2 that would be contrary to the --

3 MR. TRACHTENBERG: That's material that had  
4 already been exempted but they haven't gotten around to  
5 it because of limited funding.

6 MR. GARFINKLE: Well, if what you're saying  
7 is they have applied a blanket exemption that covers  
8 everything? Is that what you're referring to?

9 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Well, whatever they've  
10 exempted and there are exemption plans that have been  
11 approved and they haven't been able to get around to it  
12 because they haven't been given the resources. That's  
13 the issue.

14 MS. KLOSS: No. It's the opposite. It's not  
15 exempt.

16 MR. TRACHTENBERG: The claim is that the  
17 stuff that's been exempted automatically becomes  
18 declassified.

19 MS. BRAGG: No, no. It's exempted from  
20 automatic declassification.

21 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: There's a  
22 misperception. Section 3.4 talks about identifying the  
23 records that are exempted. Those are to be reviewed  
24 under Section 3.5 starting on the 18th of April 2000.

25 MR. TRACHTENBERG: I see what you're saying.

1           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Theoretically, if we  
2    had the resources, we should be reviewing the non-  
3    exempted list of files, going on for the next four  
4    years.

5           DR. GOLDBERG: Now you know what it's like to  
6    go up against the bureaucracy.

7           MR. BROWN: Although I do like your  
8    suggestion because if we could get that interpretation,  
9    I don't have do anything.

10           (Laughter.)

11           DR. GOLDBERG: Well, that suggestion has been  
12   made before. Let it all go. Don't bother with any of  
13   it. Wait until 2000 and it will all be declassified.

14           Jim David?

15           MR. DAVID: Yes. There's a gentleman from  
16   the Department of Navy and I talked about this before  
17   lunch and perhaps this is a clarification. As I read  
18   the Executive Order, exempt files and collections are  
19   still subject to systematic review for April 2000 and  
20   as I see it, there's no reason why they shouldn't be  
21   included in various systematic review plans of the  
22   agencies.

23           And the gentleman from the Department of Navy  
24   takes the position that they're immune, essentially,  
25   from systematic review and --

1 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: No, no. Automatic  
2 review. From automatic review.

3 MS. BRAGG: Not systematic.

4 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Systematic review  
5 kicks in on the 18th of April 2000, under Section 3.5.

6 MR. DAVID: But there's no reason why exempt  
7 files and collections can't be systematically reviewed  
8 before then.

9 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: If you had resources,  
10 you could do them today.

11 MS. BRAGG: There's millions of reasons and  
12 every one is a dollar.

13 MR. DAVID: But as I suggested earlier,  
14 there's no reason why very credible claims for  
15 exemption of large numbers of the 270 million Army  
16 pages, for example, can't be made and focus systematic  
17 review be done on collections of various interest.  
18 Once again, starting from the Secretary of the Army,  
19 Chief of Staff of the Army, and working on down.

20 DR. GOLDBERG: There's no money for that, I  
21 think.

22 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Like I say, the  
23 problem is the 15 percent and the 100 percent in the  
24 next four years. That's the problem.

25 DR. GOLDBERG: And 15 percent is the non-

1 exempt records?

2 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: That's right.

3 MS. BRAGG: That's the ballpark.

4 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: If you don't have the  
5 resources, you can't even count on being able to review  
6 the non-exempt records in the next 3 years, 11 months  
7 and one week.

8 MR. TRACHTENBERG: Well, I think we've gotten  
9 the impression that the bulk of the records are the  
10 exempt records. Maybe that's where we're having our  
11 problem.

12 MS. BRAGG: Who's giving this impression.

13 MR. TRACHTENBERG: You told us there are only  
14 54 files out of 6,000. That cannot be the bulk of her  
15 files. They're all part of her files that are going to  
16 be exempt that will wait until after this five year  
17 panic is over and then they will do it, that stuff, as  
18 they can realistically. That applies to all the  
19 services.

20 DR. WAMPLER: I have to go back into the  
21 original plans that include percentages which were  
22 pretty high for what they estimated the exempt material  
23 was going to be. If not for Army, then for the OSD or  
24 SAC or other people like that. They're the ones who  
25 were saying, okay, the bulk of our material is exempt.

1           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Okay. Let's talk  
2 about SAC. The SAC histories, most of them are  
3 restricted data. They're going to be reviewed. Some  
4 of them, as Archie said, they're being reviewed now.  
5 But there's a lot of RD that they can't touch. That  
6 will have to be done in negotiations with DOE probably  
7 after the five years.

8           Thirty to forty percent of the stuff down at  
9 Maxwell is RD. It will be done after the rest of the  
10 stuff.

11          GEN. ARMSTRONG: When you talk about  
12 histories, you're really talking about a special  
13 category. I have some familiarity with trying to get  
14 histories declassified -- just trying to get my own  
15 history declassified. And because there are multi-  
16 agency documents or the documentation is multi-agency,  
17 it takes on the average -- the latest one I got  
18 declassified took two years. The Vietnam series took  
19 about six years, 4-1/2 years spent at CIA.

20          So declassification of these histories is a  
21 different thing from document declassification because  
22 inevitably it involves referrals, which means it goes  
23 first to the Joint Staff, then it goes to OSD, then it  
24 goes to State, then it goes to CIA and then NSC,  
25 sequentially. Not at the same time, but sequentially.

1           So histories are a different thing. And I  
2   remember Dr. Leffler, the last time, said I'd like to  
3   get the histories first. Speaking as a guy who wants  
4   to publish things eventually, I'd like to, too. But as  
5   a practical matter, those are the hardest things to  
6   declassify because of their sourcing and because the  
7   way the U.S. government handles them bureaucratically.  
8   It handles them sequentially --

9           DR. GOLDBERG: They don't have to go  
10 sequentially.

11          GEN. ARMSTRONG: Well, that's the way OSD has  
12 said.

13          DR. GOLDBERG: The only people who insist on  
14 it are the NSC people. They insist that everybody  
15 looks at it before they do.

16          You're right about the time. One of the  
17 reasons is that they all have lists.

18          GEN. ARMSTRONG: Queues.

19          DR. GOLDBERG: They have queues. It doesn't  
20 matter who you are. You go to the end of the queue  
21 when you come in.

22          GEN. ARMSTRONG: Yes. You go to the bottom of  
23 the FOIA people.

24          DR. GOLDBERG: That's why it can take years  
25 to get a history declassified. And both Dave Armstrong

1 here and I speak from the heart from painful  
2 experience.

3 We have had histories delayed two to three  
4 years before we finally got them declassified. And the  
5 reason was simply often a bureaucratic one. They  
6 didn't get around to it and they weren't going to give  
7 us preference. They were to give their own work  
8 preference.

9 MR. HEIMDAHL: The histories that Goldberg is  
10 talking about, they were much more narrow yearly  
11 command histories, not the kind of comprehensive agency  
12 --

13 DR. GOLDBERG: I understand that.

14 GEN. ARMSTRONG: But even those, they say  
15 they're going to have to come up to the Joint Staff and  
16 be fiddled with.

17 DR. GOLDBERG: All right. Then maybe it was  
18 a slip of the tongue to say histories. Let's say the  
19 SAC files out at St. Louis. I'm sure the same  
20 percentage of that stuff is going to be RD as what's in  
21 the histories.

22 DR. GOLDBERG: All right. This is an insider  
23 comment.

24 GEN. ARMSTRONG: I do have one thing that I  
25 want to -- I recognize it's my hobbyhorse and it's a



1 managerial issue, but I also recognize you work for  
2 Emmet Page, who's the big guru of C-4I, and if we can't  
3 get government wide standards for data that we put in  
4 our own individual agency listings of what we've  
5 declassified, why can't we get DoD ones? That's Emmet  
6 Page's job.

7           And I would personally recommend that that go  
8 in Al's report. Now, that also covers 80 percent of  
9 the documents, according to some people. That is  
10 something I think is doable. And I think it would be -  
11 - it's probably less useful to the historical community  
12 frankly than it is to the declassifiers. But any  
13 amount of their assets we can timely save means more  
14 work done, I would guess.

15           DR. GOLDBERG: Let me take a few minutes to  
16 run over the list of items that we ought perhaps  
17 include in the report that we make.

18           First of all, with reference to the DoD  
19 directive which is close to completion, it would be  
20 difficult to include most of the specifics that we have  
21 mentioned here in that kind of a directive. It's an  
22 overall thing. We can make a recommendation that it be  
23 flexible, that it give the individual services and  
24 agencies a considerable amount of leeway in doing what  
25 they are doing and as much assistance as possible from

1 the OSD level.

2 With reference to the overall standards, I  
3 think we can definitely recommend that and ask that  
4 they be applied to as many different aspects of  
5 declassification as possible and spell out some of  
6 them, some of the specifics. We don't know all of them  
7 yet at this point.

8 I think we ought to talk specifically about  
9 the pilot programs and recommend that the services and  
10 some of the agencies carry out these pilot programs and  
11 state that we will, through C-3I, recommend specifics  
12 for these pilot programs to the services. And these  
13 specifics will be addressed to the highest level policy  
14 offices in all of those organizations.

15 We can make a specific recommendation for  
16 reserve officers for the JCS.

17 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I appreciate that.

18 DR. GOLDBERG: Because that is a special  
19 category.

20 What else would we like to have included here  
21 in our report?

22 DR. WAMPLER: Can I ask a point of  
23 clarification on the pilot program?

24 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

25 DR. WAMPLER: That request will be for, as

1 you say, a specified record accession?

2 DR. GOLDBERG: We can specify. We can say  
3 that we would like to specify the specific records, the  
4 offices and the periods.

5 DR. WAMPLER: And this would be for any  
6 exempt, as well as non-exempt file series that occur  
7 within that record?

8 DR. GOLDBERG: Not paying attention to  
9 whether it's exempt or non-exempt.

10 DR. WAMPLER: Yes. Well, I mean it's  
11 everything that's in there.

12 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, we'll make it without  
13 knowledge really of whether it's exempt or not exempt.

14 DR. WAMPLER: But they won't have the power  
15 to say we won't look at the exempt material? We want  
16 them to review everything that's in that group whether  
17 it's within a requested exempt file or not.

18 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, they can review it and  
19 come back and tell us it's none of our business.  
20 That's a possibility.

21 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Can there be an  
22 instrument or a group for review of the exempt  
23 material?

24 DR. GOLDBERG: An instrument?

25 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Or a way or a process

1 instead of having an open-ended computer system signal  
2 that it's up for review 15 years from now if it's been  
3 exempted, that it be subjected to review if we don't  
4 know what it is because it isn't listed or identified.

5 DR. GOLDBERG: No. We are going to identify  
6 what we want them to look at. And if it's exempted, we  
7 still would want them to look at it.

8 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I understand that.  
9 But you may have access to the list but other  
10 historians --

11 DR. GOLDBERG: No, no. I'm taking it from  
12 lists which have been submitted by two people here.

13 DR. WAMPLER: If they go for record review 30  
14 list, there is a detailed --

15 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Particularly if you  
16 pick a top secret. There's going to be a very detailed  
17 listing of the documents that are in that record group.

18 DR. GOLDBERG: In the main, these will be top  
19 secret files. Yes. They're the kinds of things you've  
20 been talking about here for two meetings.

21 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: So that would also  
22 include what Army said about their essential files here  
23 this morning?

24 DR. GOLDBERG: No.

25 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: That's what i'm

1 talking about.

2 DR. GOLDBERG: No. As a matter of fact, we  
3 would have to get listings. We do have some listings  
4 of the Army.

5 MS. BRAGG: Well, from what I hear, you're  
6 proposing that you would select a topic or topics --

7 DR. GOLDBERG: No.

8 MS. BRAGG: -- to look at as a pilot program.

9 DR. GOLDBERG: Not topic or topics. Actual  
10 records.

11 MS. BRAGG: Okay. All right. Excuse me. I  
12 used the wrong term. You would have some sort of list  
13 of records.

14 DR. GOLDBERG: We would come to you and say  
15 we want you to examine the top secret records of the  
16 Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff for the  
17 period 1945 to 1955 or something like that or as much  
18 of it as you can do in a three-month period.

19 MS. BRAGG: Then my impression would be that  
20 the Army response, and of course, I don't -- this has  
21 not been proposed to the Army so I can't say  
22 definitely. But my impression would be and what I will  
23 recommend is that whatever was on the listing there for  
24 the Army, that the Army would review that material.

25 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

1 MS. BRAGG: Whether it happens to fall in one  
2 of our exemption categories or not. So be it. I mean,  
3 we would review the materials.

4 DR. GOLDBERG: It's not likely to fall under  
5 an exemption category. It might include some exempted  
6 material and probably a good deal of exempted material.  
7 But not your series, the 54 series that you're talking  
8 about probably.

9 DR. WAMPLER: There's one here on the list  
10 that David put in. It's the top secret Secretary of  
11 the Army files, 1963 to 1964, three feet. That seems a  
12 pretty good little chunk that you could go through and  
13 see what happens.

14 DR. GOLDBERG: That's the sort of thing I  
15 have in mind. The question I might put to those of you  
16 who are still here representing the services, how much  
17 would be a reasonable amount in terms of footage to ask  
18 of you?

19 MS. BRAGG: Well, speaking from the Army  
20 perspective, as you've seen, and I don't come to you  
21 with any degree of happiness or pride to report this,  
22 but I'm looking you in the eye and giving you an honest  
23 estimation.

24 Right now, if you gave us a list, it would be  
25 very difficult because we're still in our starting

1 phases, as you well know. We still have not designated  
2 the program manager.

3 What I would request is that presumably this  
4 group will be meeting for some period of time. I don't  
5 think it's a group that's going to go away in the next  
6 three months.

7 DR. GOLDBERG: Some of the people may go  
8 away, but --

9 MS. BRAGG: If you could grant us some  
10 consideration that on your initial list you don't  
11 include Army information. We're not trying to -- well,  
12 I don't know who I would give it to.

13 (Laughter.)

14 Well, you heard the Air Force say. "Here's my  
15 team. Stand up." Here's my team. Okay? I mean, if  
16 you want me to review the Secretary of the Army files  
17 in addition to everything else I do, please, I'm trying  
18 to tell you honestly that the resources right now --  
19 the Navy has 75 people. You've heard the Air Force.  
20 They have a number of people working on this. The Army  
21 does not have anyone.

22 GEN. ARMSTRONG: You know, that's something  
23 that ought to be in your thing. If you've got a -- if  
24 this panel has a concern, it ought to be concerned  
25 about the fact that the bulk of the records in DoD are

1 in a single agency purview. Right now, there is no  
2 funding or no staff person responsible for the review  
3 program.

4 You know, I'd put that right at the top.

5 DR. GOLDBERG: Actually, you could use our  
6 request, perhaps, as some leverage within the Army.

7 GEN. ARMSTRONG: You need to understand the  
8 Army right now, as you all know, in connection with  
9 CMA, so the Army right now is looking for a billion  
10 dollars in program cuts and they -- I know the guy  
11 who's going it, the four star, quite well. And I doubt  
12 very seriously he is extraordinarily receptive to her  
13 request for people and money.

14 He's going to say how many brigades does that  
15 put in Kuwait tomorrow, and she's going to look at him  
16 and say none. So, I'm serious. If you want to say  
17 something, then say damn it, the single biggest body of  
18 record right now has no institutional effort to comply  
19 with the Executive Order.

20 DR. GOLDBERG: The Navy has the biggest  
21 single body right now.

22 GEN. ARMSTRONG: Okay. Second biggest.

23 DR. GOLDBERG: It has more than the other two  
24 put together. I've wondered about that, by the way.  
25 Why does the Navy have more than the Army and the Air



1 Force?

2 AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Let me say something  
3 for the Army. The main declassifier in the Army  
4 History Office, as Colonel Dietrich alluded to, passed  
5 away suddenly last year. He was my counterpart and the  
6 counterpart of Ellen Argel in Naval history. And that  
7 put a big setback to the Army plans in the EO  
8 procedure. This is one of the unexpecteds that can  
9 happen to any procedure.

10 GEN. ARMSTRONG: Yes. But it's been a year  
11 and they need to get on with it. I was in the Army for  
12 30 years. I'm sympathetic to their problems. I know  
13 some of them, like Ron Griffiths. But, you know --

14 DR. GOLDBERG: All right. I have no problem  
15 with including that in a report to the Assistant  
16 Secretary.

17 MR. WEINBERG: Especially if the Army is the  
18 one that is most concerned about the cutoff date in the  
19 year 2000. There is an inner contradiction between on  
20 the one hand this, shall we say, devout belief that  
21 everything will be opened in the year 2000 and on the  
22 other hand -- and all of the security risks that that  
23 entails, and on the other hand, the most cavalier  
24 attitude to maybe doing a weeny bit something to  
25 alleviate these security risks.

1           GEN. ARMSTRONG: I don't think it's cavalier  
2 but I wouldn't -- I don't think that's a fair comment  
3 to make. It's a real problem.

4           MR. WEINBERG: I didn't dispute that,  
5 certainly. I was merely suggesting that there is a  
6 kind of inner contradiction between the concern on the  
7 one hand that the clock is ticking and the disregard of  
8 the clock at the same time.

9           DR. GOLDBERG: The question is for whom does  
10 the clock tick.

11           (Laughter.)

12           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I don't think it was  
13 particularly planning on any enforcement of the  
14 Executive Order. If we're required to declassify so  
15 many percentage a year and it's not being done and it's  
16 an Executive Order issued by his office, there must be  
17 some enforcement or is there any enforcement or doesn't  
18 it matter.

19           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Of course, it matters.  
20 The reason -- if you're addressing why was this 15  
21 percent placed in the Executive Order and is there  
22 going to be some kind of rigid review to see have you  
23 met exactly your 15 percent, the reason that a  
24 percentage was listed in the first place was not  
25 because we felt that there had to be 15 or 16 or 20 or

1 10 but rather that we were creating an Executive Order  
2 that had a five-year window and that if we created an  
3 Executive Order with a five-year window without any  
4 intermediate requirements, what would inevitably happen  
5 is that the agencies would wait 4-1/2 years and say,  
6 oh, my god, I've got six months and then the shoe is  
7 going to drop.

8           The purpose of the 15 percent rule was to, in  
9 effect, get the procedure going from day one. Whether  
10 agency A has 15 percent and agency B has 20 percent and  
11 agency C only has 5 percent is the farthest concern to  
12 us than is the fact that both -- that A, B and C are  
13 making progress from day one toward the ultimate goal.

14           What concerns us greatly is the unevenness  
15 that we observe in this room and that we observe  
16 elsewhere in the government in terms of compliance.  
17 We're less concerned to get somebody because they only  
18 made 12 percent rather than 15 percent than we are  
19 concerned to let the Secretary of the Army know that  
20 the clock is ticking and nothing has been done with  
21 respect to Army records. That is where our greater  
22 concern is.

23           DR. GOLDBERG: Just a moment, please. The  
24 clock is ticking for this meeting also.

25           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: That's why I thought

1 it was as good idea to have input. You asked for  
2 input.

3 DR. GOLDBERG: Yes. I'm sorry. But our  
4 Reporter is going to be leaving shortly. We are going  
5 to have to terminate this meeting in just a few  
6 minutes. So I have asked for suggestions for use in  
7 this report. I have a considerable list here. I will  
8 include them in the report. And members of the panel  
9 will receive a draft of the report. You will be asked  
10 to make any changes, suggestions or initiatives in the  
11 same report. I hope I'll be able to cover what we have  
12 done here.

13 Yes. Jim David?

14 MR. DAVID: One quick general recommendation  
15 that I would suggest is that agencies, as soon as  
16 practicable after review of records and record centers  
17 that the agencies themselves transfer them to the  
18 National Archives.

19 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, we are being told that  
20 that is happening. That the Archives was up to date in  
21 accessioning or scheduling. If you expect them to  
22 transfer the most immediate records, it's not practical  
23 and won't happen.

24 MR. DAVID: Well, as soon as practical after  
25 review.

1           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: But, sir, that needs  
2 to be -- I believe needs to be added to that in  
3 consonance with our own retirement schedule of records.

4           AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Yes. The Department of  
5 Navy has a practice of a 15-year retention period. We  
6 just now retired our World War II records. Unless  
7 there's some interest. And these records are available  
8 to the public at our Historical Center. That's not a  
9 problem. You have access to these records now.

10          COL. MONIGAN: The reason I bring it up is  
11 that I want to put in an additional time line on people  
12 who are already spread thin in support of making the  
13 requirement. That's another added requirement that the  
14 advisory panel certainly does not have to lay upon the  
15 individual services, so I do not specifically dissent  
16 against including that in our recommendations.

17          DR. GOLDBERG: All right.

18                If there are no further remarks to be made,  
19 the meeting is closed.

20                Thank you.

21                (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)

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
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1  
2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

3 This is to certify that the attached  
4 proceedings before: U.S. DOD  
5

6  
7 In the Matter of: HISTORICAL RECORDS MEETING 5-10-96  
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11  
12 were held as herein appears and that this is the  
13 original transcript thereof for the file of the  
14 Department, Commission, Administrative Law Judge  
15 or the Agency.  
16

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